nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2016‒01‒03
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Departure and Promotion of U.S. Patent Examiners: Do Patent Characteristics Matter? By Corinne Langinier; Stephanie Lluis
  2. Coordination of Inventions and Innovations through patent markets with prices By Ullberg, Eskil
  3. Trade in Ideas: Performance and Behavioural Properties of Markets in Patents with Two-part Tariff By Ullberg, Eskil
  4. Changing Traditional Mechanisms of Russian Law: Protection of Means of Individualization on the Internet By Tatiana A. Brazhnik

  1. By: Corinne Langinier (Department of Economics, University of Alberta); Stephanie Lluis (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo)
    Abstract: Using data from patent examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, we ask whether, and if so how, examiners’ career outcomes relate to aspects of the patent review process. Exploiting longitudinal information about all the patents granted by a group of examiners between 1976 and 2006 and their yearly mobility outcomes (departure and promotion) between 1992 and 2006, we find consistent evidence from static, dynamic and duration models of the importance of patent characteristics, granting experience in specific technological fields, repeated interactions with the same inventor and self-citations in predicting an examiner’s departure or promotion.
    JEL: J60 O34
    Date: 2015–12
  2. By: Ullberg, Eskil (The Ratio Institute and george Mason University)
    Abstract: This article examines coordination between inventors and innovators through prices in a market for contracts on patented technology, in a controlled laboratory experiment. Typically, a hierarchical approach is used to analyze such coordination, new technology being exogenous, and risk managed in separate markets. Price signals and search patterns are compared for three institutional mechanisms and two levels of patent validity in a 3 x 2 experimental design. “Willingness to search” in a technology map of 9 “technology areas”, each with private and uncertain values for agents, are used to characterize and differentiate institutional behavior with respect to investment decisions in new technology. The results indicate that coordination and that the willingness to search out the most valuable technology differs sharply between the mechanisms; low patent validity also results in poor coordination. Policy implications suggest facilitating a market in tradable contracts on patents is needed. This may entail lowering risk in using patent “assets” (access to quality patents and enforcements for SMEs) and new forms of legal associations for IP intensive firms.
    Keywords: patent markets; coordination; invention; innovation; patent licensing; experimental economics; intellectual property rights assets
    JEL: B00 C92 D83 O00 O30
    Date: 2015–11–27
  3. By: Ullberg, Eskil (The Ratio Institute and George Mason University)
    Abstract: Performance and behavioural properties of markets in patents are studied using a contract with a two-part tariff (fixed fee and royalty) on patented technology with limited validity and random values, in an economic experiment. Performance doubles when demand side bidding is introduced for both tariffs, resulting in gains from trade, compared with supply side take-it-or-leave-it offers. This departs from the hierarchical view of (Arrow, 1962), where the invention and innovation takes place in the same firm, eliminating any gains from trade in the analysis. An informal theory is proposed, based on insurance of market access, and tested. The sustained prices support the hypothesis that fixed fee = blocking value, thus supports rational expectations according to Muth under conditions of demand-side bidding in both tariffs. Understanding nature then drives demand for science (North, 1981). What made productivity grow in Europe may therefore have been the patent system by increasing growth in economically useful technology through a producer market.
    Keywords: patent markets; two-part tariff contract; patent licensing; insurance; experimental economics; intellectual property rights assets
    JEL: B00 C92 L10 O00 O30
    Date: 2015–12–23
  4. By: Tatiana A. Brazhnik (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This article is motivated by the growing interest in the problem of Internet trademark usage and the comparatively low interest in the non-Internet equivalent. . Despite the fact that differences in the regulation of on-line and off-line trademark utilization have been recognized over a long period of time, there is still no harmonization among the numerous Russian laws in the field of ‘other means of individualization’. . Although recent research studies have been numerous, lawmakers still haven’t decided on how the Internet has influenced the exclusive rights granted within Chapter 76 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. The issue at hand is affected by the significant growth of the Internet and electronic commerce. Moreover, the problem discussed in this paper arises from the fundamental question of limits on the exercise of subjective civil rights. The aim of this paper is to analyze different means of individualization under Russian legislation; to show key aspects of usage and protection of the means of individualization on-line; to reveal the doctrinal theories stipulating the emergence of new distinctive objects; to describe the current and potential pitfalls of the legislative framework; and to demonstrate modern legal trends in this field. In addition, this paper suggests different steps for and models of further regulatory development
    Keywords: means of individualization, trademark, trade name, brand, company name, geographical indicators, appellation of origin of goods, commercial name, domain name
    JEL: O34
    Date: 2015

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