nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2015‒11‒15
five papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”
  1. Modeling Software Piracy Protection: Monopoly versus Duopoly By Kresimir Zigic; Jiri Strelicky; Michael Kunin
  2. CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON THE PRELIMINARY EFFECTS OF PATENT BOX REGIMES ON PATENT ACTIVITY AND OWNERSHIP By Bradley, Sebastien; Dauchy, Estelle; Robinson, Leslie
  3. On the price elasticity of demand for trademarks By Gaétan de Rassenfosse
  4. Intellectual Property Protection and the Industrial Composition of Multinational Activity By Olena Ivus; Walter Park; Kamal Saggi
  5. Portfolio Spillovers in Venture Capital: Evidence from Patent Litigation By Filippo Mezzanotti
  1. By: Kresimir Zigic; Jiri Strelicky; Michael Kunin
    Abstract: The economic analyses of software piracy typically rely on the simplifying assumption that the product is o¤ered by a single producer. We argue that a realistic description of the software market and associated economic aspects of software piracy might be also captured by studying competition between software developers. Using an illegal version of software violates intellectual property rights (IPR) and, due to public protection (such as copyrights), is punishable when discovered. If a developer nonetheless considers the level of piracy to be high, he may introduce his own private protection. The focus of our analysis is on the interaction between public and private IPR protection in the two market structures under considerations. We show that, unlike in cases of monopolies, there is no conflict of interest between the regulator and producers in duopoly setup. Moreover, unlike in a monopoly, the optimal public IPR protection in duopoly does not affect the developers' choice of software quality.
    Keywords: software piracy; private and public IPR protection; quality and competition effects; vertically differentiated duopoly;
    JEL: D43 L11 L21 O25 O34
    Date: 2015–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp551&r=ipr
  2. By: Bradley, Sebastien (School of Economics); Dauchy, Estelle (New Economic School); Robinson, Leslie (Tuck School of Business)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the initial impacts of patent box regimes in light of their primary stated objectives: stimulating domestic innovation and retaining mobile patent income to limit base erosion. Despite their lack of nexus requirements, we find that patent box regimes yield a 3 percent increase in new patent applications for every percentage point reduction in the tax rate on patent income. We find no significant impact of these regimes on deterring outward cross-border attribution of patent ownership, or on attracting ownership of foreign inventions. Increased patenting activity hence appears focused on inventions involving co-located (domestic) patent owners and inventors.
    Keywords: patent box; tax policy; innovation; base erosion
    JEL: H25 H32 K34
    Date: 2015–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:drxlwp:2015_001&r=ipr
  3. By: Gaétan de Rassenfosse (Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne)
    Abstract: This paper provides econometric estimates of the fee elasticity of demand for international trademarks. The analysis focuses on monthly trademark applications submitted to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The elasticity ranges from -0.31 to -0.42, which is in a similar range to the fee elasticity of demand for patents.
    Keywords: Fee, Price Elasticity, Trademark
    JEL: O34 O38 O50 M38
    Date: 2015–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iip:wpaper:1&r=ipr
  4. By: Olena Ivus (Queen's University); Walter Park (American University); Kamal Saggi (Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: In a North-South model with endogenous FDI, we examine the impact of Southern IPR protection on the mode and industrial composition of international technology transfer. A novel feature of the model is that, due to technological reasons, industries differ with respect to their susceptibility to imitation. In equilibrium, licensing occurs in industries where the risk of imitation is low and FDI where it is of intermediate magnitude. Stronger IPRs in the South (i) alter the industrial composition of multinational activity towards licensing at the expense of FDI; (ii) reduce local imitation; and (iii) increase licensing and, to a lesser extent, FDI.
    Keywords: trade, intellectual property rights, licensing, FDI, technology transfer
    JEL: F1 O3
    Date: 2015–11–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-15-00014&r=ipr
  5. By: Filippo Mezzanotti
    Date: 2015–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qsh:wpaper:349621&r=ipr
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