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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2015‒06‒20
seven papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Hyojeong Lim (Korea Institute of Intellectual Property) |
| Abstract: | Based on the assumption that intellectual property rights are a driver of economic development, this paper aims to estimate the production elasticity of intellectual property stocks in Korea. The unbalanced panel data during 2005-2012 is constructed with 29 manufacturing and service industries and applied to a Cobb-Douglas production function. Empirical results confirm that the stock of patents, the stock of trademarks, and the stock of design rights significantly contribute to Korean economic growth in the 2000s, respectively. Whereas the production elasticity of intellectual property stocks differs in the characteristics of patents, trademarks and design rights, the results show that increases in trademark stocks are the most influential factor in economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Production Elasticity, Intellectual Property Stock, Cobb-Douglas Production Function, Panel Data |
| JEL: | O00 O30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:2503617&r=ipr |
| By: | Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine |
| Abstract: | We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N (> 2) competing firms. We find that the fully cooperative royalty, i.e., the one that allows them to achieve the monopoly profit, can be sustained as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements, regardless of whether the agreements are public or private and whether firms compete in quantities or prices. We extend this monopolization result to a general class of two-stage games in which firms bilaterally agree in the first stage to make each other payments that depend on their second-stage non-cooperative actions. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived. |
| Keywords: | Cross-Licensing, Royalties, Collusion, Antitrust and Intellectual Property. |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L24 L41 O34 |
| Date: | 2015–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:29318&r=ipr |
| By: | NAGAOKA Sadao; NISHIMURA Yoichiro |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the determinants of the use of grace periods, as well as their effects on knowledge flow, in order to assess the economic effects based on a large scale panel data of the use of grace periods in Japan. For this purpose we discriminate which of the three views ("acceleration of disclosure," "deferral of domestic patent filing," and "promotion of domestic patenting") best explains the use of grace periods. The major findings are the following. Grace periods are used more for inventions with strong science linkages and in high technology sectors, but for those with a smaller number of claims. Science linkages matter more than the number of claims for academic inventors compared to corporate inventors in using grace periods. Their use has significantly declined in those technology areas with high level of international applications, following the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Reform in January 2004, allowing, in particular, automatic designation of all PCT contracting states. Critically, the use of grace periods significantly increased the knowledge diffusion to third parties as measured by non-self forward citations, relative to self-citations. Such effect is stronger than that of ex-post academic disclosure, following the patent application or its publication. These results show that the main motivation of the use of grace periods is the acceleration of disclosure, and that they enhance knowledge diffusion and are likely to enhance social welfare. |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:15072&r=ipr |
| By: | ONISHI Koichiro; OWAN Hideo; NAGAOKA Sadao |
| Abstract: | Using novel panel data on Japanese inventors, we investigate how monetary incentives affect corporate inventors' behavior and performance, as well as how they interact with the strength of intrinsic motivation. In order to identify the effects, we exploit inventors' responses to a policy change in Japan in the early 2000s that forced firms to strengthen monetary incentives for inventors. Our major findings are as follows: (1) while introducing or increasing revenue-based payments is associated with a small improvement in patent quality, such schemes significantly decrease the use of science in research and development (R&D) projects; (2) the above positive effect of revenue-based payment on patent quality is smaller and the negative effect on scientific intensity is greater in research areas where risk heterogeneity among potential projects is greater; (3) the strength of intrinsic motivation is significantly associated with the inventor's patent productivity; and (4) strong intrinsic motivation weakens the marginal effect of monetary incentive on inventive productivity, and reinforces the negative effect of monetary incentive on scientific intensity in research areas where risk heterogeneity among potential projects is sufficiently large. The results are consistent with our model predictions and imply that strengthening monetary incentives changes project selection toward less risky and less exploratory ones. |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:15071&r=ipr |
| By: | P. Aghion; U. Akcigit; A. Bergeaud; R. Blundell; D. Hémous |
| Abstract: | In this paper we use cross-state panel data to show a positive and significant correlation between various measures of innovativeness and top income inequality in the United States over the past decades. Two distinct instrumentation strategies suggest that this correlation (partly) reflects a causality from innovativeness to top income inequality, and the effect is significant: for example, when measured by the number of patent per capita, innovativeness accounts on average across US states for around 17% of the total increase in the top 1% income share between 1975 and 2010. Yet, innovation does not appear to increase other measures of inequality which do not focus on top incomes. Next, we show that the positive effects of innovation on the top 1% income share are dampened in states with higher lobbying intensity. Finally, from cross-section regressions performed at the commuting zone (CZ) level, we find that: (i) innovativeness is positively correlated with upward social mobility; (ii) the positive correlation between innovativeness and social mobility, is driven mainly by entrant innovators and less so by incumbent innovators, and it is dampened in states with higher lobbying intensity. Overall, our findings vindicate the Schumpeterian view whereby the rise in top income shares is partly related to innovation-led growth, where innovation itself fosters social mobility at the top through creative destruction. |
| Keywords: | Itop income, inequality, innovation, patenting, citations, social mobility, incumbents, entrant |
| JEL: | O30 O31 O33 O34 O40 O43 O47 D63 J14 J15 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:557&r=ipr |
| By: | Aghion, Philippe; Akcigit, Ufuk; Bergeaud, Antonin; Blundell, Richard William; Hemous, David |
| Abstract: | In this paper we use cross-state panel data to show a positive and significant correlation between various measures of innovativeness and top income inequality in the United States over the past decades. Two distinct instrumentation strategies suggest that this correlation (partly) reflects a causality from innovativeness to top income inequality, and the effect is significant: for example, when measured by the number of patent per capita, innovativeness accounts on average across US states for around 17% of the total increase in the top 1% income share between 1975 and 2010. Yet, innovation does not appear to increase other measures of inequality which do not focus on top incomes. Next, we show that the positive effects of innovation on the top 1% income share are dampened in states with higher lobbying intensity. Finally, from cross-section regressions performed at the commuting zone (CZ) level, we find that: (i) innovativeness is positively correlated with upward social mobility; (ii) the positive correlation between innovativeness and social mobility, is driven mainly by entrant innovators and less so by incumbent innovators, and it is dampened in states with higher lobbying intensity. Overall, our findings vindicate the Schumpeterian view whereby the rise in top income shares is partly related to innovation-led growth, where innovation itself fosters social mobility at the top through creative destruction. |
| Keywords: | citations; entrant; incumbents; inequality; innovation; patenting; social mobility; top income |
| JEL: | D63 J14 J15 O30 O31 O33 O34 O40 O43 O47 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10659&r=ipr |
| By: | Alam Kazmi, Syed Hasnain |
| Abstract: | Brand pricing decision models and established theories in the marketing and econometrics focus typically on assuming the symmetric competing businesses. The empirical generalities are key for strategic marketplace planning. The significance of pricing to customer store and brand choices are always regarded as a widely known truth among marketing scholars and explains consumer’s role responding to their psychological representations of price rather than price itself. Scholars have highlighted simple but earlier unrecognized marketing practices that managers can employ to cultivate the positioning of their prices. Many theoretical researches in promotions have focused its aspects on developing powerful pricing strategies and its impact on consumer decisions, which is might because much of the literature has focused on building and evaluating price promotion strategies. This review experiential will enlighten us on advancements that will also lead us for optimistic cross-brand category level, cross-cultural level and cross-national level influences in pricing strategies. |
| Keywords: | psychological, promotion, theory, consumer, brand, sales promotion |
| JEL: | M1 M3 M31 |
| Date: | 2015–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:64984&r=ipr |