nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2014‒12‒19
six papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  2. Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs By Iain M. Cockburn; Jean O. Lanjouw; Mark Schankerman
  4. Demographic and Economic Factors Affecting Demand for Brand-Level Milk in Texas By Bingham, David; Dharmasena, Senarath; Capps, Oral; Salin, Victoria
  5. Managing Portfolio of Licenses By Nicola Dimitri
  6. Collaborating With People Like Me: Ethnic Co-authorship within the US By Freeman, Richard B.; Huang, Wei

  1. By: David Encaoua (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Thierry Madies (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, Université de Fribourg - University of Fribourg)
    Abstract: The contemporary tensions between patents and competition no longer reside in the traditional trade-off between the exclusionary right given to an inventor to encourage innovation, and the welfare loss induced by the market power associated to this right. They rather result from three important distortions of the patent system that create conflicts between patents and competition on the product market, the technology market, and the innovation market. The first distortion is related to the existence of dubious or weak patents: too many patents are granted to applications of bad quality according to the patentability criteria. This increases the uncertainty attached to patents, reduces the credibility of the system and calls into question the justification of the patent as a protective mechanism. Second, the configuration of a patent, originally designed in the context of an isolated innovation, is not quite adapted to the context of sequential innovations. While sequential patents requires fine limitations between successive generations of innovations, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, including the extension of the patentable subject matters, opened the door to opportunistic behavior and adversely affected the technological exchanges. Third, the emergence of complex technologies, in which the use of a large number of fragmented patents is necessary to produce a new product, implies the necessity to coordinate the behavior of numerous patent holders. Some entrants in these complex technologies are struck by the imperfect coordinated behavior of these patent holders as illustrated in different settings such as the pooling of complementary patents and the licensing of essential patents by the Standard Setting Organisation members. Very often, patents serve to create ambushes or to capture unjustified rents through excessive license fees, which in turn create barriers to entry for new competitors in the innovation market. Two important consequences of these distortions are derived. First, the resolution of the conflicts cannot rely exclusively on the application of the antitrust law. Second, the distortions lead to a very expensive judicial implementation of the patent system.
    Keywords: uncertain patents, product market, technology market, innovation market, litigation, licensing cost,fragmentation, patent pools, competition policy
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Iain M. Cockburn; Jean O. Lanjouw; Mark Schankerman
    Abstract: This paper studies how patent rights and price regulation affect how fast new drugs are launched in different countries, using newly constructed data on launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries for the period 1983-2002, and information on the duration and content of patent and price control regimes. Price regulation strongly delays launch, while longer and more extensive patent protection accelerates it. Health policy institutions, and economic and demographic factors that make markets more profitable, also speed up diffusion. The effects are robust to using instruments to control for endogeneity of policy regimes. The results point to an important role for patents and other policy choices in driving the diffusion of new innovations.
    JEL: I15 I18 K19 L65 O31 O33 O34 O38
    Date: 2014–09
  3. By: Juana Sanchez
    Abstract: This paper uses new business micro data from the Business Research and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) for the years 2008-2011 to relate the discrete innovation choices made by U.S. companies to features of the company that have long been considered to be important correlates of innovation. We use multinomial logit to model those choices. Bloch and Lopez-Bassols (2009) used the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) to classify companies according dual, technological or output-based innovation constructs. We found that for each of those constructs of innovation combinations considered, manufacturing and engaging in intellectual property transfer increase the odds of choosing innovation strategies that involve more than one type of categories (for example, both goods and services, or both tech and non-tech) and radical innovations, controlling form size, productivity, time and type of R&D. Company size and company productivity as well as time do not lean the choices in any particular direction. These associations are robust across the three multinomial choice models that we have considered. In contrast with other studies, we have been able to use companies that do and companies that do not innovate, and this has allowed to rule out to some extent selectivity bias.
    Keywords: Innovation, R&D, productivity, intellectual property, generalized logistic regression, choice models
    Date: 2014–10
  4. By: Bingham, David; Dharmasena, Senarath; Capps, Oral; Salin, Victoria
    Keywords: Brand-level milk, Tobit model, Nielsen data, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, D11, D12,
    Date: 2014–05
  5. By: Nicola Dimitri (Professor of Political Economy, Department of Political Economy and Statistics, University of Sienna, and Honorary Professor at Maastricht School of Management)
    Abstract: Patenting is a most common strategies to protect and commercially exploit innovations. Patented inventions could be licensed on the market, and its use allowed to interested parties at a price. Therefore, many organizations have to form desirable combinations of licenses, to perform efficiently important operations for their functioning. In the paper we discuss a methodology on how to value and rank single licenses. as well as set of licenses.
    Date: 2014–11
  6. By: Freeman, Richard B. (Harvard University); Huang, Wei (Harvard University)
    Abstract: This study examines the ethnic identity of authors in over 2.5 million scientific papers written by US-based authors from 1985 to 2008, a period in which the frequency of English and European names among authors fell relative to the frequency of names from China and other developing countries. We find that persons of similar ethnicity co-author together more frequently than predicted by their proportion among authors. Using a measure of homophily for individual papers, we find that greater homophily is associated with publication in lower impact journals and with fewer citations, even holding fixed the authors' previous publishing performance. By contrast, papers with authors in more locations and with longer reference lists get published in higher impact journals and receive more citations than others. These findings suggest that diversity in inputs by author ethnicity, location, and references leads to greater contributions to science as measured by impact factors and citations.
    Keywords: homophily, impact factor, citations
    JEL: D8 F22 J24
    Date: 2014–08

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