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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2014‒09‒29
three papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” |
| By: | Reinan Ribeiro; David Turchick |
| Abstract: | Patenting and licensing are introduced into the lab-equipment horizontal innovation model of endogenous growth. Patent length is not deterministic, in that patent holders' market power will collapse if and only if their patented goods get successfully imitated. The model is solved in an exact fashion. Consideration of static and dynamic inefficiencies shows that optimal intellectual property rights protection entails maximal patent length, but nonmaximal patent breadth. By fixing a lower patent breadth level, government is able to trade off a modest negative long-term effect on growth for a substantial positive short-term effect on consumption. A third potential source of inefficiency, reputational, is also considered. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property rights; horizontal innovation; lab-equipment model; growth; patent length; patent breadth. |
| JEL: | L13 O31 O34 O41 |
| Date: | 2014–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2014wpecon15&r=ipr |
| By: | Adrien Hervouet (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - Université de Nantes : EA4272); Marc Baudry (EconomiX - CNRS : UMR7166 - Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) |
| Abstract: | This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety creation. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders' Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration or minimum standards as commercialisation rules. The main result is that the combination of minimum standards and PBRs (patents) provides higher incentives for sequential and initial innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator when sunk investment costs are low (high) and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high (low). |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights; Plant Breeders' Rights; Catalogue; Product differentiation; Seed market; Biodiversity |
| Date: | 2014–09–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01060565&r=ipr |
| By: | Castellari, Elena; Moro, Daniele Daniele; Platoni, Silvia; Sckokai, Paolo |
| Abstract: | Using a panel data set on the yogurt market for four hundred points of sale in Italy, we investigate, at the segment level, the interactions between private label (PL) market shares and national brand (NB) leader’s prices. We estimate a reduced form model which controls for the heterogeneity of point of sales and time using a two way fixed effect (FE) error components model (ECM). Consistently with several theoretical findings available in the literature, we expect retailers to use PL to discriminate prices among different groups of consumers. The analysis, however, shows not all segments of the market are influenced by PL shares. Specifically, for the most dynamic segments (functional and yogurt with snack), Pl shares are on average smaller and NB leader’s prices are not affected by their presence. Differently, in the most traditional segments (whole and skimmed yogurt), where PL exhibits on average a sizable presence, the analysis shows a positive effect between PL shares and NB prices. Results suggest leader’s product innovation and product introduction dynamics might play a role on retailer’s power to influence NB leader’s prices, retaining PL development. |
| Keywords: | Private Label, Dairy market, Price Competition, Agribusiness, Marketing, Q13 D40 L11, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aiea14:173020&r=ipr |