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on Intellectual Property Rights |
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Issue of 2014‒05‒09
three papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
| By: | Raffaello Bronzini (Bank of Italy); Paolo Piselli (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the impact of an R&D subsidy program implemented in a region of northern Italy on innovation by beneficiary firms. In order to verify whether the subsidies enabled firms to increase patenting activity, we exploit the mechanism used to allot the funds. Since only projects that scored above a certain threshold received the subsidy, we use a sharp regression discontinuity design to compare the number of patent applications, and the probability of submitting one, of subsidized firms with those of unsubsidized firms close to the cut-off. We find that the program had a significant impact on the number of patents, more markedly in the case of smaller firms. Our results show that the program was also successful in increasing the probability of applying for a patent, but only in the case of smaller firms. |
| Keywords: | research and development, investment incentives, regression discontinuity design, patents |
| JEL: | R0 H2 L10 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_960_14&r=ipr |
| By: | Suzuki, Keishun |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of seizing illegal imitations within developing countries on imitation, innovation, and economic growth. The model shows four main results. First, a higher seizure rate does not always decrease imitative activity in the South because it may encourage the infringer to commit repeated offenses. Second, the model shows a U-shaped relationship between innovation and the strengthening seizure rate. Third, numerical analysis indicates that a sufficiently high seizure rate that is larger than a critical value is required to enhance economic growth. Finally, unlike seizure, the extended model shows that a prohibition on importing Southern illegal imitations in the North necessarily lowers imitative activities. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, North-South, Seizing Illegal Imitation, Import Prohibition |
| JEL: | F13 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–04–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:55535&r=ipr |
| By: | Sylvain Dejean (LR-MOS, University of La Rochelle, France); Raphaël Suire (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France) |
| Abstract: | Illegal digital file consumption is widely believed to influence sales of cultural goods. Online piracy is now regulated and prohibited in some countries, especially in France, where HADOPI is a legal authority in charge of Peer-‐to-‐Peer (P2P) protocol monitoring. We claim that prohibitions on digital markets share some characteristics of other criminal activities such as those of the drug market. Prohibition of a good or service can lead to the emergence of a black market embedded in a social network. Based on an original and representative 2012 French survey, we show that such a social and offline organisation is observed. Indeed, offline swapping is now the largest way to exchange digital files. We show that offline swapping is embedded in a hierarchical social network where different behaviours are observed. On one hand, there are wholesalers of digital files who provide more than they receive from this offline network and maintain online downloading activity through P2P technology. On the other hand, there are also the “simple” consumers who consume only from offline swapping and never provide files to others. They never use monitored P2P technology because HADOPI acts as a deterrent. Our econometric analysis suggest that this “fear” of HADOPI plays a significant role in structuring this offline swapping network, as the position in the swapping network is driven by the feeling of being threatened by HADOPI. |
| Keywords: | HADOPI, social network, piracy, prohibition, offline swapping |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201406&r=ipr |