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on Intellectual Property Rights |
|
Issue of 2014‒03‒22
four papers chosen by Giovanni Ramello Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
| By: | Ming Liu (Deptartment of Finance, Nankai University); Sumner La Croix (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: | We use dynamic panel data regressions to investigate whether the strength of a country’s patent protection for pharmaceuticals is associated with more pharmaceutical patenting by its residents and corporations in the United States. Using the Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Protection (PIPP) Index to measure patent strength, we run dynamic probit and Poisson regressions on panels from 25 developing and 41 developed countries over the 1970-2004 period. Results vary, depending on whether we examine partial effects at the mean or average partial effects for the PIPP Index. APEs for the PIPP Index are positive but statistically insignificant in both developed and developing country samples. |
| Keywords: | Patent; pharmaceutical; innovation; TRIPS; intellectual property |
| JEL: | O1 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201407&r=ipr |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi; Julia Spies; Farid Toubal |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) regime in destination countries influences the way multinationals structure the international organization of their production. In particular, we explore how multinationals divide tasks of different complexities across countries with different levels of IPR protection. The analysis studies the decision of firms between procurement from related parties and from independents suppliers at the product level. It also breaks down outsourcing into two types by distinguishing whether or not they involve technology sharing between the two parties. We combine data from a French firm-level survey on the mode choice for each transaction with a newly developed complexity measure at the product level. Our results confirm that firms are generally reluctant to source highly complex goods from outside firm boundaries. By studying the interaction between product complexity and the IPR protection, we obtain that (i) for technology-sharing-outsourcing IPRs promote outsourcing of more complex goods to a destination country by guaranteeing the protection of their technology, (ii) for non-technology-related-outsourcing IPRs attract the outsourcing of less complex products that are more prone to reverse engineering and simpler to decodify and imitate. |
| Keywords: | Outsourcing;Product complexity;Intellectual Property Rights;Technology Sharing |
| JEL: | F12 F23 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2014-07&r=ipr |
| By: | Basir, Nada (Schulich School of Business, York University.); Beyhaghi, Mehdi (College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio); Mohammadi, Ali (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Drawing on the reputation literature and signaling theory, this article builds on work that looks at patents as reputation signals. We build a multi-industry database of patents that expire due to lack of maintenance fee payments and test for a relationship between these patents and the firm’s IPO date. We find a significant and positive relationship between the likelihood of patents expiring due to lack of maintenance fee payments and the time to IPO. We also find that patents associated with firms which are not venture capital backed, are more likely to expire. Our findings suggest that patents that are used for signaling intentions are more likely to be underutilized. Implications for research and policy are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Patents; reputation signal; innovation; IPO; intellectual property |
| JEL: | O30 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–03–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0348&r=ipr |
| By: | Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hall, Bronwyn H.; Hottenrott, Hanna |
| Abstract: | Information about the success of a new technology is usually held asymmetrically between the research and development (R&D)-performing firm and potential lenders and investors. This raises the cost of capital for financing R&D externally, resulting in financing constraints on R&D especially for firms with limited internal resources. Previous literature provided evidence for start-up firms on the role of patents as signals to investors, in particular to Venture Capitalists. This study adds to previous insights by studying the effects of firms' patenting activity on the degree of financing constraints on R&D for a panel of established firms. The results show that patents do indeed attenuate financing constraints for small firms where information asymmetries may be particularly high and collateral value is low. Larger firms are not only less subject to financing constraints, but also do not seem to benefit from a patent quality signal. -- |
| Keywords: | Patents,Quality Signal,Research and Development,Financial Constraints,Innovation Policy |
| JEL: | O31 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:133&r=ipr |