nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒12‒29
nine papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Buy, Keep or Sell: Economic Growth and the Market for Ideas By Ufuk Akcigit; Murat Alp Celik; Jeremy Greenwood
  2. The Technological Specialization of Countries: An Analysis of Patent Data By Lucio, Picci; Luca, Savorelli
  3. Appropriability and Complementarities in a Fragile Patent System: Evidence from Brazilian Manufacturing By Barros, Henrique M.
  4. The Role of Knowledge Variety and Intensity for Regional Innovative Capability By Tavassoli, Sam; Carbonara , Nunzia
  5. Shared Rights and Technological Progress By Yuzhe Zhang; Matthew Mitchell
  6. Management of Intellectual Property in Brazilian Universities: a Multiple Case Study By Pojo, Sabrina Da Rosa; Vidal, Valéria Schneider; Zen, Aurora Carneiro; Barros, Henrique M.
  7. Strategic Decision-Making in Hollywood Release Gaps By Dalton, John; Leung, Tin Cheuk
  8. The Nature and Incidence of Software Piracy: Evidence from Windows By Susan Athey; Scott Stern
  9. Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions By Arvate, Paulo; Barbosa, Klenio de Souza; Gambardella, Dante

  1. By: Ufuk Akcigit (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Murat Alp Celik (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Jeremy Greenwood (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in researching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm's productivity. By how much depends on how central the idea is to a firm's activity. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the U.S. The analysis attempts to gauge how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.
    Keywords: Growth, Ideas, Innovation, Misallocation, Patents, Patent Agents, Research and Development, Search frictions
    JEL: O31 O41
    Date: 2013–12–12
  2. By: Lucio, Picci; Luca, Savorelli
    Abstract: New methods of analysis of patent statistics allow assessing country profiles of technological specialization for the period 1990-2006. We witness a modest decrease in levels of specialization, which we show to be negatively influenced by country size and degree of internationalization of inventive activities.
    Keywords: Patents, Internationalization, Specialization, Technological Sectors,
    Date: 2013
  3. By: Barros, Henrique M.
    Date: 2013–10
  4. By: Tavassoli, Sam (Industrial Economics, Blekinge Institute of Technology, Karlskrona, Sweden and CIRCLE, Lund University, Sweden); Carbonara , Nunzia (Dept of Mechanical and Management Engineering, Politecnico di Bari, Italy)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of variety and intensity of knowledge on the innovative capability of regions. Employing data for Swedish functional regions, the paper tests the role of the variety (related and unrelated) and intensity of (i) internal knowledge generated within the region and also (ii) external knowledge networks flowing into the region in explaining regional innovative capability, as measured by patent applications. The empirical analysis provides robust evidence that both the variety and intensity of internal and external knowledge matter for regions’ innovative capability. When it comes to variety, related knowledge variety plays a superior role
    Keywords: Knowledge intensity; Knowledge variety; Related variety; Unrelated variety; Internal knowledge; External knowledge; Patent applications; Functional regions
    JEL: F14 O32 R12
    Date: 2013–12–18
  5. By: Yuzhe Zhang (Texas A&M University); Matthew Mitchell (University of Toronto)
    Abstract: We study how best to reward innovators whose work builds on earlier innovations. Incentives to innovate are obtained by offering innovators the opportunity to profit from their innovations. Since innovations compete, awarding rights to one innovator reduces the value of the rights to prior innovators. We show that the optimal allocation involves shared rights, where more than one innovator is promised a share of profits from a given innovation. We interpret such allocations in three ways: as patents that infringe on prior art, as licensing through an optimally designed ever-growing patent pool, and as randomization through litigation. We contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is prohibitively costly, and therefore must be avoided. Avoiding sharing initially slows progress, and leads to a more variable rate of technological progress.
    Date: 2013
  6. By: Pojo, Sabrina Da Rosa; Vidal, Valéria Schneider; Zen, Aurora Carneiro; Barros, Henrique M.
    Date: 2013–10
  7. By: Dalton, John; Leung, Tin Cheuk
    Abstract: Hollywood blockbusters are usually released in the U.S. before other foreign markets. The release gaps have declined significantly over time and varied greatly across countries. While movie piracy has been suggested as an important determinant for the release gap decision of distributors, theory and evidence suggest there are other important determinants. In this paper, we use a discrete choice release gap decision game model to disentangle the impacts of the i) release gap effect, which includes factors that provide incentives for a distributor to shorten the release gap; ii) word-of-mouth effect, which provides incentives for a distributor to lengthen the release gap; and iii) strategic effect, which accounts for the incentives blockbusters have to avoid each other. We obtain box office and release gap data from the private industry source Our results suggest all three factors have an economically significant impact on distributors' release gap decision.
    Keywords: Hollywood, movie exports, release gap, intellectual property rights
    JEL: F14 L82 O34
    Date: 2013–12
  8. By: Susan Athey; Scott Stern
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the nature, relative incidence and drivers of software piracy. In contrast to prior studies, we analyze data that allows us to measure piracy for a specific product – Windows 7 – which was associated with a significant level of private sector investment. Using anonymized telemetry data, we are able to characterize the ways in which piracy occurs, the relative incidence of piracy across different economic and institutional environments, and the impact of enforcement efforts on choices to install pirated versus paid software. We find that: (a) the vast majority of “retail piracy” can be attributed to a small number of widely distributed “hacks” that are available through the Internet, (b) the incidence of piracy varies significantly with the microeconomic and institutional environment, and (c) software piracy primarily focuses on the most “advanced” version of Windows (Windows Ultimate). After controlling for a small number of measures of institutional quality and broadband infrastructure, one important candidate driver of piracy – GDP per capita – has no significant impact on the observed piracy rate, while the innovation orientation of an economy is associated with a lower rate of piracy. Finally, we are able to evaluate how piracy changes in response to country-specific anti-piracy enforcement efforts against specific peer-to-peer websites; overall, we find no systematic evidence that such enforcement efforts have had an impact on the incidence of software piracy.
    JEL: L86 O34
    Date: 2013–12
  9. By: Arvate, Paulo; Barbosa, Klenio de Souza; Gambardella, Dante
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicatesthat generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.
    Date: 2013–12–05

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