nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒12‒06
seven papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. External capital access and new product launch in start-up firms with uncertain intellectual property rights By Heger, Diana; Hussinger, Katrin
  2. Measuring, Explaining and Addressing Patent Quality Issues in China By Prud'homme, Dan
  3. Does fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership stifle investments in innovation? By Schwiebacher, Franz
  4. Standard-Essential Patents By Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
  5. Deals Not Done: Sources of Failure in the Market for Ideas By Ajay Agrawal; Iain Cockburn; Laurina Zhang
  6. Do inventors talk to strangers? On proximity and collaborative knowledge creation By Riccardo Crescenzi; Max Nathan; Andrés Rodríguez-Pose
  7. My Urban Idol 2050 – The City of Gothenburg By Karlsson, Charlie

  1. By: Heger, Diana; Hussinger, Katrin
    Abstract: Classical patent literature assumes that patents grant well-defined legal rights to exclude others from practicing an invention. In this scenario, start-up companies benefit from the exclusive right to commercialize patent-protected inventions and the certification effect of patents which signals the ventures' 'quality' to investors. If the decision about patent applications is pending at the patent office patent rights become probabilistic and both effects may not realize. We show that start-up companies are reluctant to launch new products if patents are pending. Further, pending patents attract risk-seeking investors (venture capitalists), while more cautious investors (banks) do not react on pending patents. --
    Keywords: start-ups,patents,probabilistic patents,pending patents,access to finance,new product launch
    JEL: L26 O31 O34
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Prud'homme, Dan
    Abstract: Although China became the world's leading patent filer in 2011, patent quality is still a serious issue in the country. This article first provides a statistical snapshot of this situation and then discusses how China's network of patent-related policies and practices in certain cases actually contributes to this problem and hampers innovation. The article also looks at the negative consequences of poor patent quality, paying special attention to the impacts on foreign companies in China.
    Keywords: patent quality; patent quality metrics; China's patent policy; China's innovation policy; indigenous intellectual property rights
    JEL: K11 O25 O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2013–03–01
  3. By: Schwiebacher, Franz
    Abstract: Thickets of partially overlapping patent rights raise costs to secure IPR for innovation. Fragmented IP ownership raises coordination costs to resolve mutual blockades. Inadvertent patent infringement poses the risk of fruits from investments to be exploited. A gap in economic commitment levels may be exploited if capital-intensive innovators have more invested application-specifically than inadvertently infringed IPR owners. I study whether fragmentation or heterogeneous capital-intensities among owners of overlapping patents affect propensities to invest in innovation. I find that firms with small patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if IPR is fragmented. Firms with large patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if cited patent owners have smaller stocks of fixed capital. This suggests that effects of patent thickets on innovation are not evenly spread among innovating firms. --
    Keywords: Investment in innovation,Complementary assets,IP hazards
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
    Abstract: A major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex-ante not that important may, by being included into the standard, become standard-essential patents (SEPs). In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most standard-setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms. Such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to intense litigation activity. This paper builds a framework for the analysis of SEPs, identifies several types of inefficiencies attached to the lack of price commitment, shows how structured price commitments restore competition, and analyzes whether price commitments are likely to emerge in the marketplace.
    Keywords: Standards, licensing commitments, standard-essential patents, royalty stacking, FRAND, hold ups and reverse hold ups.
    JEL: D43 L24 L41 O34
    Date: 2013–11–05
  5. By: Ajay Agrawal; Iain Cockburn; Laurina Zhang
    Abstract: Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, congestion, lack of market safety) to deal outcomes. We disaggregate the licensing process into three stages and find that although lack of market thickness and deal failure are correlated in the first stage, they are not in the latter stages, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which negotiations over intellectual property often occur. In contrast, market safety is only salient in the final stage. Several commonly referenced bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, particularly in the second stage. Also, universities and firms differ in the stage during which they are most likely to experience deal failure.
    JEL: L24 O32 O34
    Date: 2013–11
  6. By: Riccardo Crescenzi; Max Nathan; Andrés Rodríguez-Pose
    Abstract: This paper investigates how physical, organisational, institutional, cognitive, social, and ethnic proximities between inventors shape their collaboration decisions. Using a new panel of UK inventors and a novel identification strategy, this paper systematically explores the net effects of all these ‘proximities’ on co-patenting. The regression analysis allows us to identify the full effects of each proximity, both on choice of collaborator and on the underlying decision to collaborate. The results show that physical proximity is an important influence on collaboration, but is mediated by organisational and ethnic factors. Over time, physical proximity increases in salience. For multiple inventors, geographic proximity is, however, much less important than organisational, social, and ethnic links. For inventors as a whole, proximities are fundamentally complementary, while for multiple inventors they are substitutes.
    Keywords: innovation, patents, proximities, regions, knowledge spillovers, collaboration, ethnicity,
    JEL: O31 O33 R11 R23
    Date: 2013–12
  7. By: Karlsson, Charlie (Jönköping International Business School, Blekinge Institute of Technology & CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies)
    Abstract: I have been asked to write a paper over “my urban idol 2050” to be the foundation for a presentation at a session at the ERSA congress in Bratislava in August 2012. No special instructions were given, so I have chosen to write a kind of scenario for the possible future development in the region where I live – the Gothenburg region. I have not used a traditional scenario technique with several different scenarios. Instead I present one scenario, which I have developed based upon some of the information I have about the region, ideas found in the literature in the field and ideas developed by the SWECO team during the RiverCity workshop in June 2011. Certainly none of us know what the future will bring but I hope that at least my attempt will stimulate some thinking and some discussions about urban development both in general and in Gothenburg.
    Keywords: Urban development; scenario; urban region; urban planning; new tradeable sectors; key occupations; investments; built environment; city branding; climate change; creativity
    JEL: H40 H70 I30 J20 O18 R11 R58
    Date: 2013–11–28

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