nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒11‒16
five papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? By David S. Abrams; Ufuk Akcigit; Jillian Popadak
  2. Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition By Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean
  3. Do Regional Trade Agreements Enhance International Technology Spillovers? By Naoto Jinji; Xingyuan Zhang; Shoji Haruna
  4. Technology Platforms in Europe: an empirical investigation By Lisa De Propris; Carlo Corradini
  5. In search of consensus: The role of accounting in the definition and reproduction of dominant interests By Farjaudon, Anne-Laure; Morales, Jérémy

  1. By: David S. Abrams (Penn Law School & Wharton Business Economics & Public Policy Department, University of Pennsylvania,); Ufuk Akcigit (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania & NBER); Jillian Popadak (Wharton Business Economics & Public Policy Department, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more and this view has become standard in the empirical innovation literature. Using an NPE-derived dataset with patent-specific revenues we find that the relationship of citations to value in fact forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. Since the value of patents is concentrated in those at the high end, this is a challenge to both the empirical literature and the intuition behind it. We attempt to explain this relationship with a simple model of innovation, allowing for both productive and strategic patents. We find evidence of greater use of strategic patents where it would be most expected: among corporations, in fields of rapid development, in more recent patents and where divisional and continuation applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our basic understanding of growth, innovation, and intellectual property policy.
    Keywords: productive innovation, defensive innovation, patents, creative destruction, citations, patent value, competition, intellectual property, entrepreneurship, strategic patenting, defensive patenting, patent thickets, fencing patents.
    JEL: O3 L2 K1
    Date: 2013–11–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:13-065&r=ipr
  2. By: Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean
    Abstract: The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements. Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination is feasible or not.
    Keywords: tacit collusion, cooperation, substitutes and complements, essentiality, joint marketing agreements, patent pools, independent licensing, unbundling, co-opetition.
    JEL: D43 L24 L41 O34
    Date: 2013–10–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:27696&r=ipr
  3. By: Naoto Jinji; Xingyuan Zhang; Shoji Haruna
    Abstract: We examine whether regional trade agreements (RTAs) enhance international technology spillovers by using a panel of patent application and citation data for 142 countries/regions during 1990–2006 at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. We use patent citation data as a proxy for technology spillovers. A gravity-like model is estimated by the negative binomial model and the fixed effects negative binomial (FXNB) model. We find that technology spillovers between two countries/regions measured by patent citations are greater if they are signatories to the same RTA. This finding is quite robust for different estimation techniques. The estimated results from the FXNB model suggest that there is no significant difference in the effects of free trade agreements and customs unions on technology spillovers. We also find that General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and participation in the Information Technology Agreement of WTO facilitate technology spillovers across signatories.
    Keywords: regional trade agreement, technology spillovers, patent citations, economic distance, gravity model
    JEL: F15 O33
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-12-010&r=ipr
  4. By: Lisa De Propris; Carlo Corradini
    Abstract: In the last decades, innovation activity has been defined by an increasing complexity and a faster pace of the underlying technological change. Accordingly, several studies have shown that competitive systems of innovation benefit from being able to build upon a wide but integrated spectrum of technological capabilities characterised by a sustained dynamism in the level of inter-sectoral technology flows. In this context, technological platforms – defined as knowledge and scientific launching pads that spin out of key enabling technologies - may create the opportunity for technological externalities to take place across a set of related sectors through a swarm of increasingly applied and incremental innovations. In this report, we look at the presence and determinants of these technological platforms across EU Countries and explore the mechanisms through which these influence inter sectoral technology spillovers, thus fostering technological shifts and technological synthesis within the broader economy. Using data on patents and patent citations obtained from the PATSTAT-CRIOS database, covering all patent applications made to the European Patent Office (EPO), we try to model the systemic nature of technology platforms. In particular, our aim is to provide empirical evidence that the presence of key enabling technologies at the base of the platform may lead to a more sustained interaction across second tier innovations characterised by a “distant” knowledge base. Then, we endeavour to investigate the relationship that may take place between this process and the role played by the national dimension.
    Keywords: Clusters, ecological innovation, industrial innovation, innovation, innovation policy, new technologies, patents, socio-ecological transition, sustainable growth
    JEL: O3 O31 O32 O33 O38
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feu:wfewop:y:2013:m:11:d:0:i:34&r=ipr
  5. By: Farjaudon, Anne-Laure; Morales, Jérémy
    Abstract: This article examines the role of accounting in the manufacture of consensus. Consensus building is often considered a central value for rational decision-making and management. However, more than a democratic confrontation of vantage points, the quest for consensus is a way to discourage conflict and resistance. Our main argument is that accounting and consensus play central roles in processes of definition and the social reproduction of dominant interests. Accounting acts to promote some stakes and strategies (and silence others), as if they were collective and disinterested, which makes them more powerful in debates that deny struggles and asymmetries in positions of power, as well as increases legitimacy by creating an illusion of participation. We illustrate these processes through a case study in which we document the intersection between two fields of knowledge, marketing and accounting, that compete for a monopoly on the definition of value and the ability to speak for the organisation. This analysis draws on Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic domination to highlight how powerful actors secure influence while avoiding contestation. Accounting produces symbolic violence that consolidates asymmetries in positions of power by shaping what is consensual and what is not so that dominant interests are reproduced with the consent of those who have most to lose in the process.
    Keywords: Consensus; Symbolic domination; Brand valuation; Intellectual capital; Management control;
    JEL: M31 M41
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dau:papers:123456789/10730&r=ipr

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