By: |
Yuanzhu Lu (China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, China);
Sougata Poddar (Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Law, Auckland University of Technology) |
Abstract: |
We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the
insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation
or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple
justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing contracts in
industries. |
Keywords: |
Salop Model, Hotelling Model, Costs, Innovation,PAtent Licensing |
JEL: |
D43 D45 L13 |
Date: |
2013–07 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aut:wpaper:201308&r=ipr |