nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒07‒05
five papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Do Patent Citations Predict Market Value? The Case of Agricultural Biotechnology Patents By Naseem, Anwar; Singla, Rohit
  2. Global dynamic timelines for IPRS harmonization against software piracy By Antonio R. Andrés; Simplice A. Asongu
  3. Patents as Signals for Startup Financing By Annamaria Conti; Jerry Thursby; Marie C. Thursby
  4. Are All Technological Improvements Beneficial? Absolutely Not By Yochanan Shachmurove; Uriel Spiegel
  5. Competition between Private Label and National Brand for Health-differentiated Food Product: A Canadian Retailing Case By Ying, Xiongwei; Anders, Sven M.

  1. By: Naseem, Anwar; Singla, Rohit
    Keywords: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:150958&r=ipr
  2. By: Antonio R. Andrés (Al Akhawayn University, School of Business Administration); Simplice A. Asongu (African Governance and Development Institute)
    Abstract: This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against business software piracy. The findings on 99 countries are premised on 15 fundamental characteristics of software piracy based on income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and, regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). The results broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years.
    Keywords: Software piracy, Intellectual property rights, Panel data, Convergence
    JEL: F42 K42 O34 O38 O57
    Date: 2013–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adv:wpaper:201301&r=ipr
  3. By: Annamaria Conti; Jerry Thursby; Marie C. Thursby
    Abstract: We examine the role of patents as signals used to reduce information asymmetries in entrepreneurial finance. A theoretical model gives conditions for a unique separating equilibrium in which startup founders file for patents to signal invention quality to investors, as well as appropriating value. The theory allows for heterogeneous investors and examine the optimal match of different types of startups, as defined by the quality of their technology, to investors who differ in the amount of non financial capital they provide. The empirical analysis is consistent with the model's predictions using a novel dataset of Israeli startups that received external funding during the period 1994-2011.
    JEL: G14 O16 O3 O34
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19191&r=ipr
  4. By: Yochanan Shachmurove (Department of Economicss and Business, The City College and Graduate Center of the City University of New York); Uriel Spiegel (Department of Management, Bar Ilan University and Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: This paper shows, using a simple model, that wasteful innovations may result in a loss-loss situation where no country experiences an increase in welfare. If some countries introduce innovations that result in harmful effects on other countries, it may cause the adversely affected countries to retaliate by imposing impediments to international trade. In a globalized and integrated World economy, such policies can only harm the countries involved. Thus, it is in both countries' best interest to encourage sustainable coordination between policies in order to better their own citizens, as well as the World's aggregate welfare.
    Keywords: International Trade; Samuelson; Gainers and Losers from Trade; Technological Improvements; Concealed Technological Improvements; Pareto Improvements in Production and Consumption; Nash Bargaining Process; Sleeping Patents; Rest of the World; Terms of Trade; Distributive Justice; China; United States.
    JEL: F0 F1 O O1 O3 D51
    Date: 2013–06–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:13-027&r=ipr
  5. By: Ying, Xiongwei; Anders, Sven M.
    Abstract: Retailers in Canada are beginning to introduce private labels to gain vertical bargaining power over manufacturers and horizontal differentiation among retailers. Product differentiation in health and wellness is an emerging trend for both private labels and national brands. This study applies a model derived from a random utility nested logit model to estimate the extent to which consumer choice of health-related food attributes has affected retailer pricing and brand-level competition, using the Distance-Matrix (DM) approach to identify the location of both private label and national brands of canned soup market in their attribute space. It suggests that private label does not have a positive effect on retailers’ demand.
    Keywords: private label, national brand, health differentiation, distance matrix, nested logit, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Production Economics,
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea13:151280&r=ipr

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