nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒03‒16
eight papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Do Patents Shield Disclosure or Assure Exclusivity When Transacting Technology? By Gaétan de Rassenfosse; Alfons Palangkaraya; Elizabeth Webster
  2. Theory and Empirics of Stage-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights By Chu, Angus C.; Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
  3. Patent Rights, Product Market Reforms, and Innovation By Philippe Aghion; Peter Howitt; Susanne Prantl
  4. Sequential R&D and Blocking Patents in the Dynamics of Growth By Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
  5. Entrepreneurial Commercialization Choices and the Interaction between IPR and Competition Policy By Gans , Joshua; Persson, Lars
  6. Privatization of Knowledge: Did the U.S. Get It Right? By Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
  7. What Limits Indirect Appropriability? By Waldman, Michael
  8. Innovation and Inclusive Development: A Discussion of the Main Policy Issues By Caroline Paunov

  1. By: Gaétan de Rassenfosse (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Alfons Palangkaraya (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Elizabeth Webster (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne; Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne)
    Abstract: Patents may assist trade in technology either by protecting buyers against the expropriation of the idea by third parties (the appropriation effect) or by enabling sellers to more frankly disclose the idea during the negotiation phase (the disclosure effect). We test for the presence of both these effects using quasi-experimental matching analysis on a novel dataset of 860 technology transaction negotiations. We identify the appropriation effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a granted patent with those involving a pending patent. Similarly, we identify the disclosure effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a pending patent with those involving no patent. We find evidence for the appropriation but not the disclosure effect: technology transaction negotiations involving a granted patent instead of a pending patent are 10 per cent more likely to be successfully completed (compared with an average completion rate of approximately 80 per cent).
    Keywords: Markets for technology, R&D, invention, patent, intellectual property, appropriability
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2013–02
  2. By: Chu, Angus C.; Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
    Abstract: Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is stagedependent. At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Therefore, the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of patent strength increase as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of patent strength in China. Furthermore, we use a dynamic panel regression model to provide empirical evidence that supports the key implication of our theoretical model.
    Keywords: Economic growth, stage-dependent intellectual property rights
    JEL: O31 O34 O40
    Date: 2013–03
  3. By: Philippe Aghion; Peter Howitt; Susanne Prantl
    Abstract: Can patent protection and product market competition complement each other in enhancing incentives to innovate? In this paper, we address this question by investigating how innovation responses to a substantial policy initiative increasing product market competition interact with the strength of patent rights. We provide empirical evidence of innovation responding positively to the product market reform in industries of countries where patent rights are strong, not where these are weak. The positive response to the reform is more pronounced in industries in which innovators rely more on patenting than in other industries, and in which the scope for deterring entry through patenting is not too large. Our empirical findings are in line with step-by-step innovation models predicting that product market competition enhances innovation and, more importantly, that patent protection can complement competition in inducing innovation.
    JEL: L1 L5 O3 O4
    Date: 2013–02
  4. By: Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
    Abstract: The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, innovation and growth? In a common law system an explicitly dynamic macroeconomic analysis is appropriate. This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a twostage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We focus on two issues: (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights in basic research; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators. We show that the dynamic general equilibrium interactions may seriously mislead the empirical assessment of the growth effects of IPR policy: stronger protection of upstream innovation always looks bad in the short- and possibly medium-run. We also provide a simple "rule of thumb" indicator of the basic researcher bargaining power.
    Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Basic and Applied Research, Endogenous Technological Change, Common Law.
    JEL: O31 O33 O34
    Date: 2013–03
  5. By: Gans , Joshua (Rotman School of Management); Persson, Lars (Institutet för näringslivsforskning)
    Abstract: This paper examines the interaction between intellectual property protection and competition policy on the choice of entrepreneurs with respect to commercialization as well as the rate of innovation. We find that stronger intellectual property protection makes it more likely that entrepreneurs will commercialize by cooperating with incumbents rather than competing with them. Consequently, we demonstrate that competition policy has a clearer role in promoting a higher rate of innovation in that event. Hence, we identify one reason why the strength of the two policies may be complements from the perspective of increasing the rate of entrepreneurial innovation.
    Keywords: Entrepreneurs; innovation; commercialization; intellectual property law; competition law
    JEL: O31
    Date: 2013–08–09
  6. By: Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
    Abstract: To foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This paper studies the impact of the gradual shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R&D undertaken by universities. We see this movement as making universities becoming responsive to "market" forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research using an exogenous stock of researchers motivated by "curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on innovation and welfare. We build a Schumpeterian model and match it to the data to assess this important turning point.
    Keywords: R&D and Growth, Sequential Innovation, Basic Research, Patent Laws
    JEL: O31 O34 O41
    Date: 2013–03
  7. By: Waldman, Michael
    Abstract: One argument concerning copyright protection is that the returns to copyright protection are limited because of indirect appropriability, where indirect appropriability is the idea that original producers receive returns from copying because the buyers of original units are willing to pay more when they can sell copies. This paper argues that indirect appropriability is limited in most real world markets and explores in a series of theoretical models why this is the case.
    Keywords: copyright, indirect appropriability
    JEL: D40 K0
    Date: 2013–02–20
  8. By: Caroline Paunov
    Abstract: Inclusive development is a key policy priority since growth processes have not always helped lowerincome groups. Innovation is a major driver of growth and its relationship with inequalities in income and opportunities raises some important policy questions: Do innovation and the resulting technological change necessarily lead to increased inequalities? Do policies aimed at supporting innovation foster inequalities? To what extent can innovation be mobilised to improve the life conditions of the lower income groups? These questions are the basis of this report, which, prepared for the OECD-DST Conference on Innovation for Inclusive Development, reviews the existing evidence in response.<P>L'innovation et le développement inclusif : une discussion des principales questions politiques<BR>Le développement inclusif est une priorité politique importante car la croissance économique ne bénéficie pas toujours aux groupes à faible revenu. L'innovation est un moteur de la croissance, et sa relation avec les inégalités de revenus et d'opportunités soulève des questions majeures : l'innovation et le changement technologique qui en résulte conduisent-ils nécessairement à l'accroissement des inégalités ? Les politiques visant à soutenir l'innovation conduisent-elles à une augmentation des inégalités ? Dans quelle mesure l'innovation peut-elle être mobilisée pour améliorer les conditions de vie des groupes à faible revenu ? Ces questions sont au départ du présent rapport, préparé pour la Conférence de l'OCDE et du DST sur l'innovation et le développement inclusif, qui passe en revue les informations et connaissances existantes sur le sujet.
    Keywords: inclusive, frugal and grassroots innovations, inequalities in income and opportunities, within-country innovation and productivity dispersion, ICTs for inclusive development, developing and emerging economies, innovation, inclusives, frugales et « grassroots », inégalités de revenus et d’opportunités, dispersions d’innovation et de productivité à l’intérieur des pays, TICs pour le développement inclusif, les économies en développement et émergentes
    JEL: D20 I30 L30 O10 O30
    Date: 2013–01–29

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