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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Anja Schoen; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe; Joachim Henkel |
| Abstract: | Despite the growing interest in university-to-industry technology transfer, there are very few studies on the governance of universities’ technology transfer offices (TTOs). The few existing ones tend to focus on U.S. universities and generally tackle one dimension of the governance. The present paper aims at contributing to this literature in two ways. First, it takes into account the diversity of organizational models with a theoretical perspective: the paper presents a discussion on which combinations of four structural dimensions should yield viable configurations. Four main types of TTOs are identified: (1) classical TTO; (2) autonomous TTO; (3) discipline-integrated Technology Transfer Alliance; and (4) discipline-specialized Technology Transfer Alliance. Second, the paper relies on 16 case studies of universities located in six European countries in order to address the pros and cons of the four types of TTOs. The results provide both a conceptual understanding and an empirical overview of how universities organize their technology transfer and intellectual property management. |
| Keywords: | Technology transfer offices; organizational structure; governance; academic patents |
| JEL: | L30 O31 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/134246&r=ipr |
| By: | Francis Bidault (ESMT European School of Management and Technology) |
| Abstract: | Co-development alliances are formed to create new capabilities (technologies, products, services, processes, etc.) that partner organizations need in order to reach their goals. They involve the combination of competencies, and other intangible assets. These alliances typically face a high level of risks in terms of undesired leakages of confidential knowledge or failure to achieve the expected development. Relational quality, an important consideration in all alliances, is particularly key. Without it, partners might not be open enough to combine their knowledge effectively with the partners’. This article proposes a framework for defining, assessing, and monitoring relational quality in co-development alliances. |
| Keywords: | alliances, creative collaboration, innovation management, technology management, new product management, co-development, joint innovation |
| Date: | 2012–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-12-07&r=ipr |
| By: | Jacobo Campo Robledo |
| Abstract: | En este artículo se presenta un modelo empírico de datos panel no estacionario y cointegrado para explicar el impacto que tiene la propiedad industrial, medida como Patentes, sobre el PIB de 10 países de América Latina en el periodo 1990 - 2010. Se aplican pruebas de raíces unitarias tradicionales y una prueba de raíz unitaria de última generación, la cual incorpora un quiebre estructural y la dependencia entre las observaciones cross-section, propuesta por Hadri y Rao (2008). A través del test de cointegración de Pedroni (1999, 2000, 2004) se prueba la existencia de una relación de largo plazo entre las variables y se estiman las elasticidades de largo plazo. Los resultados muestran la existencia de una relación positiva entre el nivel de innovación y el PIB. |
| Date: | 2012–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000458:010091&r=ipr |
| By: | Pfeifer, Christian (Leuphana University Lueneburg and IZA); Wagner, Joachim (Leuphana University Lueneburg, CESIS) |
| Abstract: | This empirical research note documents the relationship between composition of a firm's workforce (with a special focus on age and gender) and its performance with respect to innovative activities (outlays and employment in research and development (R&D)) for a large representative sample of enterprises from manufacturing industries in Germany using unique newly available data. We find that firms with a higher share of older workers have significantly lower proportions of R&D outlays in total revenues and of R&D employment in total employment, whereas firms with a higher share of female employment seem to be more active in R&D. |
| Keywords: | Ageing; firm performance; gender; Germany; innovation; R&D |
| JEL: | D22 D24 J21 J24 L25 |
| Date: | 2012–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0291&r=ipr |
| By: | Jean-Pascal Bénassy; Elise S. Brézis (Bar-Ilan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper links the two fields of “development traps” and “brain drain”. We construct a model which integrates endogenous international migration into a simple growth model. As a result the dynamics of the economy can feature some underdevelopment traps: an economy starting with a low level of human capital can be caught in a vicious circle where low level of human capital leads to low wages, and low wages leads to emigration of valuable human capital. We also show that our model displays a rich array of different dynamic regimes, including the above traps, but other regimes as well, and we link explicitly the nature of the regimes to technology and policy parameters. |
| Keywords: | brain drain; development traps; human capital; migration. |
| JEL: | F22 J61 O11 O15 |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2012-03&r=ipr |
| By: | Bryan Engelhardt (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross); Justin Svec (Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross) |
| Abstract: | We propose a mechanism that eliminates the incentive for risk-averse agents to influence government policy via political contributions. The mechanism requires the government to create a political insurance exchange where agents can insure against the outcome of a government decision and firms selling insurance announce and commit to a price of insurance and their political contributions. If the exchange contains actuarially fair priced insurance, then the agent fully insures and neither the firm nor agent lobbies the government. The exchange is better than contribution limits because it is welfare-enhancing, more fair, and does not restrict speech. |
| Keywords: | Campaign finance, complete markets, insurance, lobbying, political contributions |
| JEL: | D72 G22 M37 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1204&r=ipr |