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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Francesco LISSONI (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113); Michele PEZZONI (KITeS, University of Bocconi); Bianca POTI (CERIS-CNR); Sandra ROMAGNOSI (Parco Scientifico Università \"Tor Vergata\") |
| Abstract: | Using data on patent applications at European Patent Office, we search for trends in academic patenting in Italy, 1996-2007. During this time, Italian university underwent a radical reform process, which granted them autonomy, and were confronted with a change in IP legislation, which introduced the professor privilege. We find that, although the absolute number of academic patents has increased, (i) their weight on total patenting by domestic inventors has not, while (ii) the share of academic patents owned by universities has increased. By means of a set of probit regressions, we show that the probability to observe an academic patent depends largely on the technology considered and characteristics of the local innovation system. After controlling for these determinants, the conditional probability to observe an academic patent has indeed declined over time. Also by means of probit regressions, we find that the rise of university ownership is explained, significantly albeit not exclusively, by the increasing share of public vs. private R&D and by the increased autonomy of Italian universities, which has allowed them to introduce explicit IP regulations concerning their staff\'s inventions. The introduction of the professor privilege has had no impact at all. |
| Keywords: | academic patenting, university autonomy, professor privilege |
| JEL: | I23 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2012-26&r=ipr |
| By: | Bas Straathof; Sander van Veldhuizen |
| Abstract: | Despite the centrality of incentives for innovation in models of economic growth, there is little systematic evidence that the value of technologies varies with market size and institutional arrangements. This paper presents micro-evidence indicating the value of patent rights for a given technology show substantial variation across countries. Read also the <a href="http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/the-value-of-a-well-designed-eu-patent">CPB Policy Brief 2012/05 'The value of a well-designed EU Patent'</a>. A large part of this variation can be attributed to market size and institutional arrangements. We estimate the value of patent rights by exploiting the validation behavior of holders of European Patents granted in 2004. We control for unobserved patent and country characteristics. The mean value of patent rights across countries ranges from 17 thousand euro in Germany to 400 euro in Ireland. The mean value over 16 countries is 9 thousand euro per country. Protection of intellectual property rights and market size seem to explain most of the German advantage. The estimated total value of granted European Patents is 2.6 billion euro in 2004, of which a third are German patent rights. |
| JEL: | O34 O38 K1 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:discus:226&r=ipr |
| By: | Giacomo Ponzetto |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective of their dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firm organization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment: how much cost-minimizing effort to exert, and whether to direct it towards partnership or defection. In equilibrium, the first best can be attained if and only if property rights are as strong for intangible as for tangible assets. When IP rights are weaker, the structure of the firm is distorted and efficiency declines. An entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which induces a fall in their investment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. My model predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration in response to weaker IP rights. It also predicts a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empirical predictions are consistent with evidence on the organization of multinational companies. As a normative implication, I …find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect one business opportunity without holding up its potential spin-offs. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property, organization, hold-up problem, property rights, vertical integration, outsourcing, product cycle, spin-off, licensing |
| JEL: | D23 D86 K11 L22 L24 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:668&r=ipr |
| By: | Gutierrez, Juan Julio; Correa, Paulo |
| Abstract: | This paper explores fundamental issues affecting technology commercialization of publicly funded research and development (R&D) in the Russian Federation. Despite substantial R&D investments, Russia has experienced a decline in scientific output and employment. Nevertheless, the innovation system remains strong in several technological fields. This paper develops an analytical framework to discuss conditions for technology commercialization, which hinge on the innovation system research base, governance of research institutions, alignment between specialization and sector prioritization, availability and performance of scientists and engineers, intellectual property (IP) regime for publicly funded discoveries, and early stage finance. The paper identifies areas for policy and regulatory improvement to incentivize research institutes and scientists to undertake research with market potential. These include: stronger results-based management that rewards commercialization efforts and focuses not only on high-technology sectors, but also on sectors where Russia has technological comparative advantages. In addition, researchers'career development could consider performance metrics that include entrepreneurial achievements, as well as support for young scientists and for international collaboration. Moreover, the IP regime for federally funded R&D may consider transferring full ownership of research discoveries to research organizations. Finally, to increase deal-flow of new ventures, enhancing the supply of early-stage financing for new technologies may be considered. |
| Keywords: | Tertiary Education,E-Business,ICT Policy and Strategies,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education |
| Date: | 2012–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6263&r=ipr |
| By: | David Encaoua (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Thierry Madiès (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie) |
| Abstract: | Cet article propose une réflexion générale sur le système des brevets. Trois questions sont d'abord examinées: 1. Le brevet favorise-t-il l'innovation? 2. La propriété intellectuelle est-elle comparable aux autres formes de propriété? 3. La protection par le brevet est-elle complémentaire de la concurrence? Deux critiques fondamentales sont ensuite adressées: 1. L'attribution abusive d'un brevet à des nombreuses demandes ne satisfaisant pas les critères de brevetabilité, ce qui pose la question de la qualité des brevets. 2. L'incompatibilité du système unique des brevets à la diversité technologique et l'innovation cumulative, ce qui entraîne un coût excessif d'implémentation. |
| Keywords: | droit de propriété, qualité du brevet, mécanisme d'incitation, implémentation, innovation, |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00750817&r=ipr |
| By: | Napasintuwong, Orachos |
| Abstract: | This paper provides situations of aromatic rice demand, and international standards. The history and recent developments of traditional and evolved aromatic rice varieties, namely Basmati rice and Jasmine rice, are reviewed. The emerging aromatic rice innovations from developed countries such as the U.S. and other Asian countries generate a threat to these traditional aromatic rice producers such as India, Pakistan, and Thailand. Under WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, Geographical Indication (GI) provides a means to protect traditional knowledge and products that are recognized as quality or reputation attributable in the geographical areas, but only if the GI is also protected in the country of origin. India and Pakistan governments still have not registered Basmati rice as GI product though the attemp has been made by NGO, and is still pending. Thailand, on the other hand, already registered GI Thung Kula Ronghai Jasmine rice to specific areas in Northeast Thailand whre the best qualtiy jasmine rice is attributable to the location. Yet, Thung Kula Ronghai Jasmine rice is not protected under GI in other countries. Economic issues realted to GI rice are reviewed and disucssed. |
| Keywords: | Aromatic Rice, Innovation, Research and Development, Breeding, Geographical Indication, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, |
| Date: | 2012–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa131:135770&r=ipr |