nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2012‒09‒03
five papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Quantity or quality? Collaboration strategies in research and development and incentives to patent By Hottenrott, Hanna; Lopes-Bento, Cindy
  2. (When) Do Stronger Patents Increase Continual Innovation? By Chen, Yongmin; Pan, Shiyuan; Zhang, Tianle
  3. Research grants, sources of ideas and the effects on academic research By Hottenrott, Hanna; Lawson, Cornelia
  4. Tax incentives or subsidies for R&D? By Busom, Isabel; Corchuelo, Beatriz; Martinez Ros, Ester
  5. Parallel imports of hospital pharmaceuticals: An empirical analysis of price effects from parallel imports and the design of procurement procedures in the Danish hospital sector By Hostenkamp, Gisela; Kronborg, Christian; Arendt, Jacob Nielsen

  1. By: Hottenrott, Hanna; Lopes-Bento, Cindy
    Abstract: This study shows for a large sample of R&D-active manufacturing firms that collaborative R&D has a positive effect on firms' patenting in terms of both quantity and quality. When distinguishing between alliances that aim at joint creation of new knowledge and alliances that aim at exchange of existing knowledge, the results suggest that the positive effect on patent quantity is driven by knowledge exchange rather than joint R&D. Firms engaged in joint R&D, on the other hand, receive more forward citations per patent indicating that joint R&D enhances patent quality. In light of literature on strategic patenting, our results further suggest that knowledge creation alliances lead to patents that are filed to protect valuable intellectual property, while exchange alliances drive portfolio patenting, resulting in fewer forward citations. --
    Keywords: R&D Collaboration,Knowledge Exchange,Patents,Innovation,Count Data Models
    JEL: O31 O32 O33 O34
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12047&r=ipr
  2. By: Chen, Yongmin; Pan, Shiyuan; Zhang, Tianle
    Abstract: Under continual innovation, greater patent strength expands innovating firms’ profit against imitation, but also shifts profit from current to past innovators. We show how the impact of patents on innovation, as determined by these two opposing effects, varies with industry characteristics. When the discount factor is sufficiently high, the negative profit division effect is negligible, and innovation monotonically increases in patent strength; otherwise, innovation has an inverted-U relationship with patent strength, and stronger patents are more likely to increase innovation when the discount factor or the fixed innovation cost is higher. We also show how the impact of patents on innovation may change with firms’ innovation capability and with the intensity of competition from imitators.
    Keywords: Continual innovation; patents; patent strength; profit expansion; profit division
    JEL: O3 L1
    Date: 2012–08–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40874&r=ipr
  3. By: Hottenrott, Hanna; Lawson, Cornelia
    Abstract: Based on a sample of research units in science and engineering at German universities, this study reports survey evidence showing that research grants impact research content. Research units that receive funds from industry are more likely to source ideas from the private sector. The higher the share of industry funding on the units' total budget, the more likely that large firms influenced the research agenda. Public research grants, on the other hand, are associated with a higher importance of conferences and scientific sources. What is more, the different sources of ideas impact scientific output. Research units that source research ideas from small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) patent more, but not more successful than others in terms of the impact of their inventions on future patents. If, on the other hand, research units source ideas from large firms we find them to publish less and with lower impact on future scientific work. --
    Keywords: University Research,Scientific Productivity,Research Funding,Academic Patents,Technology Transfer
    JEL: C23 I23 O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12048&r=ipr
  4. By: Busom, Isabel (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona); Corchuelo, Beatriz (Universidad de Extremadura); Martinez Ros, Ester (UNU-MERIT/MGSoG, and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
    Abstract: This paper studies whether firms' use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives are correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies. SMEs using legal methods to protect their intellectual property are more likely to use tax incentives. Results are ambiguous for large firms. For both having previous experience in R&D increases the likelihood of using tax incentives, while it reduces the likelihood of using exclusively subsidies, suggesting that the latter induce entry into R&D. Results imply that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same ability to address each source of R&D underinvestment, and that on average subsidies may be better suited than tax credits at least for SMEs. From a policy perspective these tools may be complements rather than substitutes
    Keywords: Research and Development, R&D, tax incentives, subsidies, policy mix
    JEL: H25 L60 O31
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012056&r=ipr
  5. By: Hostenkamp, Gisela (COHERE); Kronborg, Christian (COHERE); Arendt, Jacob Nielsen (Danish Institute of Governmantal Research)
    Abstract: We analyse pharmaceutical imports in the Danish hospital sector. In this market medicines are publicly tendered using first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions. We analyse whether parallel imports have an effect on pharmaceutical prices and whether the way tenders were organised matters for the competitive effect of parallel imports on prices. Our theoretical analysis shows that the design of the procurement rules affects both market structure and pharmaceutical prices. Parallel imports may induce price competition for patented medicines if tenders are organised in a first-price sealed–bid format. In addition splitting a national supply contract into several regional tenders increases parallel importers’ incentives to enter the market, but decrease original producers’ incentives to engage in price competition so that their net effect on pharmaceutical prices needs to be established empirically. We exploit a unique panel dataset containing contract prices of hospital medicines in Denmark between 2005 and 2009 to empirically analyse the effect of parallel imports on pharmaceutical prices and the role of the procurement rules for attracting parallel imports. Controlling for unobservable product characteristics using fixed effect estimation, parallel imports appear to have decreased pharmaceutical prices, but their effect on prices is smaller in regional tenders. Our results also support the conjecture that regional tenders increase parallel importers’ propensity to participate in the bidding process. Our results imply that the design of the procurement rules affect parallel importers’ propensity to participate in the bidding process and that centralising pharmaceutical procurement may not always lead to lower prices than decentralised regional procurement.
    Keywords: Parallel imports; hospital pharmaceuticals; procurement auctions; Denmark
    JEL: D44 I11 K23
    Date: 2012–08–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_016&r=ipr

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