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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Eric Bond (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University); Kamal Saggi (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we develop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compulsory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product. The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to work its patent in the South (either via entry or voluntarily licensing) while the South determines the price control and whether to issue a compulsory license. The threat of compulsory licensing benefits the South and also increases global welfare when the North-South technology gap is significant. The price control and compulsory licensing are complementary instruments from the Southern perspective. |
| Keywords: | Patented Goods, Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, Quality, Welfare |
| JEL: | F13 F53 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:1205&r=ipr |
| By: | Pierre-André Mangolte (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris XIII - Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7234) |
| Abstract: | Dans cette deuxième partie de l'étude "Patent Wars", et dans une approche toujours comparative, sont analysées les conséquences pour l'activité industrielle et le changement technique des différentes guerres des patents. Dans les trois industries émergentes du cinéma, de l'automobile et de l'aviation, cohabitent alors deux types de modèles économiques, les modèles proprement industriels, accompagnés ou non par des titres, et les modèles plus spécifiquement construits sur la détention et l'exploitation de patents. Ces deux types de modèles économiques sont clairement contradictoires. L'importance accordée aux patents et aux droits des inventeurs et propriétaires de patents aux Etats-Unis explique en effet très largement les évolutions et performances globales, c'est-à-dire la suprématie mondiale du cinéma français sur le cinéma américain jusqu'en 1914, un phénomène étonnant à bien des égards, mais aussi le retard, en dépit de l'invention majeure et de l'avance des frères Wright, et même si d'autres éléments interviennent ici, de l'industrie américaine de la construction des avions; l'automobile représentant alors une sorte de contre-exemple, explicable par le déroulement particulier de l'affaire du brevet Selden. L'étude, détaillée et comparative, montre précisément dans chacune des industries, en quoi et dans quelle mesure les différents "patents wars" ont freiné le développement des activités industrielles et même l'innovation. |
| Keywords: | guerre des brevets; industrie émergente; innovation; Edison; frères Wright; Selden; Henry Ford |
| Date: | 2012–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00682563&r=ipr |
| By: | Pierre-André Mangolte (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris XIII - Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7234) |
| Abstract: | Dans cette dernière partie sont analysés les différents pools de patents constitués dans les industries du cinéma, de l'automobile et de l'aviation, suite aux guerres des patents étudiées précédemment. L'analyse se concentre alors sur les Etats-Unis. Si les pools ou accords de licences croisées mis sur pied à l'époque relèvent bien d'une même nécessité, celle d'arrêter les litiges juridiques et d'assurer une certaine "paix des patents", leur nature et leurs buts sont bien différents. La Motion Pictures Patents Co prolonge et étend le principe du contrôle exclusif des activités de la loi des patents et constitue par ailleurs un cartel qui sera condamné au titre de la loi Sherman; ce procès étant une des premières confrontations entre la vieille loi des patents et la toute nouvelle législation antitrust. Les différentes expériences dans l'industrie automobile, comme la Manufacturers Aircraft Association de la construction des avions laissaient à l'inverse toutes les entreprises en concurrence, en mettant par contre en commun un certain nombre de techniques. Il y avait là, à l'échelle de toute une industrie, une abolition partielle et volontaire de l'institution des patents. |
| Keywords: | pool de brevet, Sherman Act, antitrust, abolition des patents, Motion Picture Patents Co, Manufacturers Aircraft Association |
| Date: | 2012–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00682591&r=ipr |
| By: | Kamal Saggi (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a North-South model in which a firm that enjoys monopoly status in the North (by virtue of a patent or a trademark) has the incentive to price discriminate internationally because Northern consumers value its product more than Southern ones. While North's policy regarding the territorial exhaustion of intellectual property rights (IPR) determines whether the firm can exercise market power across regions, Southern policy regarding the protection of IPR determines the firm's monopoly power within the South. In equilibrium, each region's policy takes into account the firm's pricing strategy, its incentive to export, and the other region's policy stance. Major results are: (i) the North is more likely to choose international exhaustion if the South protects IPR whereas the South is more willing to offer such protection if the North implements national exhaustion; (ii) the firm values IPR protection less than the freedom to price discriminate internationally if and only if its quality advantage over Southern imitators exceeds a certain threshold; and (iii) requiring the South to protect IPR increases global welfare iff such protection is necessary for inducing the firm to export to the South. |
| Keywords: | Exhaustion of IPRs, Imitation, Market power, TRIPS, Welfare |
| JEL: | F13 F10 F15 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:1204r&r=ipr |
| By: | Mark A. Lemley |
| Abstract: | How can we allow patent examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions, without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their limitations. It concludes that the system can be improved, but that we are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. The focus in reform discussions should be on understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives rather than simply spending money. |
| JEL: | K30 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18081&r=ipr |
| By: | Favaro, Donata; Ninka, Eniel; Turvani, Margherita |
| Abstract: | We study the transmission of knowledge arising from working relationships established by inventors, and its impact on firms’ innovation production. The study’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we consider those relationships that originate through inventor connections (”multi-applicant” inventors) and inventor mobility. Second, we analyse their effect on companies’ innovation production. The study focuses on the role played by geographical proximity, and the dynamic effects of knowledge flows. The geographical question is dealt with on a detailed level, by measuring knowledge spillovers observed within the same Local Labour System (LLS), between different LLSs of the region and, finally, with extra-regional LLSs. Dynamics are captured by measuring inventor mobility and connections occurring up to 20 years before patent filing. The analysis is carried out on the Italian region of Veneto and is based upon the original OECD REGPAT database of patent applications filed at the European Patent Office. The manual procedure we used to clean the data allows us to resolve some issues raised in the literature. Our results show that the impact of working relationships on innovation production depends on both geography and dynamics. Therefore, we can not conclude that productivity effects of knowledge flows occurring through the labour market are localized. However, we can conclude that working relationships have sizable productivity effects on innovation, either in the short or in the long run, depending on the geographical distance. |
| Keywords: | labour mobility; inventor connections; knowledge diffusion; innovation; geographical proximity; |
| JEL: | J61 J24 O3 |
| Date: | 2012–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38950&r=ipr |
| By: | Ejermo, Olof (CIRCLE, Lund University); Jung, Taehyun (CIRCLE, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses register-linked patent records covering an extended period 1985-2007 to analyze detailed demographic profiles of inventors. The analysis covers about 80 percent of all inventors with Swedish addresses listed on European Patent Office records. Examining temporal trends of gender, age, and education shows that the body of inventors is becoming more balanced in gender, younger, and more educated. However, the rate at which female inventors are entering into patenting has slowed down since the early 2000’s compared to the mid-1990s. Moreover, comparing the inventor sample with the entire population of Sweden reveals that 1) the closing of the gender gap in inventing is not taking place at the same rate as among Ph.D. holders and that 2) the dependence of inventing on the highly educated (especially, Ph.D. holders) is being intensified over time, but the number of highly educated is growing faster among the general population than among inventors. Finally, the analysis shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the composition and tendency of gender, age, and education of inventors across technology fields. |
| Keywords: | inventor; patent; gender; age; education |
| JEL: | I23 J16 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–04–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2012_005&r=ipr |
| By: | Cerqueti, Roy; Tramontanta, Fabio; Ventura, Marco |
| Abstract: | After deriving a model describing the law of evolution of innovators and imitators the article focuses on their relationships under two different scenarios: prey-predator, in which innovators are regarded as preys, and competing species. Analytic results show that among the feasible equilibria the coexistence equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium under the fi rst scenario. We also find conditions on the parameters allowing local stability of the coexistence equilibrium in the second scenario. Such conditions imply the existence of an inverse-U shaped relationship between innovation and imitation. |
| Keywords: | Imitation; innovation; intellectual property rights; Lotka-Volterra system |
| JEL: | C6 O34 O33 O31 |
| Date: | 2012–04–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:38949&r=ipr |
| By: | D'Este,Pablo; Rentocchini,Francesco; Manjarrés-Henríquez,Liney; Grimaldi,Rosa |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between the sources of funding for research activities and the engagement of scientists in one specific type of knowledge transfer: academic consulting. By relying on a sample of 2603 individual faculty, from five Spanish universities, who have been recipients of publicly funded grants or have been principal investigators in activities contracted by external agents over the period 1999-2004, we find a positive effect of research funding on the amount of consulting contracts obtained by academic scientists. We also find that both networking and signalling effects are present and contribute to explain the amount of consulting activity acquired by academic scientists. By offering evidence of a positive correlation between the volume of academic consulting and different types of extramural research funding, our paper shows that: a) consulting is largely a function of strong involvement in research, knowledge-generation activities; b) the positive connection is particularly strong for the social sciences, where the type of knowledge transferred is more likely to be conceptual and symbolic than instrumental. |
| Keywords: | Academic consulting, technology policy, knowledge and technology train |
| JEL: | O31 O32 I23 |
| Date: | 2012–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ing:wpaper:201203&r=ipr |