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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Duggan, Mark; Goyal, Aparajita |
| Abstract: | The enforcement of stringent intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector of developing countries generates considerable controversy, due to both the extensive research investment and the public policy importance of this sector. This paper explores the likely effects of enforcing product patents on prices and utilization of drugs in the Central Nervous System market in India. The Central Nervous System segment is the second largest therapeutic category in terms of retail sales in the world and is one of the fastest growing segments in India. Using information on product patents granted by the government and panel data on pharmaceutical prices and utilization from 2003-2008, the paper finds limited evidence of overall price increase following the introduction of product patents. However, there appear to be heterogeneous effects on prices by the type of product patent granted on drugs, implying the need for a careful examination of the product patent portfolio. |
| Keywords: | Markets and Market Access,Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics,Real&Intellectual Property Law,E-Business,Access to Markets |
| Date: | 2012–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6063&r=ipr |
| By: | Bidisha Chakraborty |
| Abstract: | The present paper develops a product cycle model of North South trade and integrates Romer (1990) model and Helpman (1993) model. In this paper, North innovates the variety of intermediate good and South immitates it. Final goods are not traded while variety of capital intensive intermediate goods are traded. The effect of intellectual property rights on economic growth is studied. It is shown that there may exist a unique steady state balanced growth equilibrium or there may exist multiple steady state equilibria and tighter intellectual property rights may lead to both higher and lower steady state balanced growth rate depending on the human capital endowment of both the countries. This contradicts the result obtained by Helpman (1993). |
| Keywords: | North-South trade, Product development, Intellectual property rights, Human Capital, Endogenous growth, Steady state equilibrium |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:deg:conpap:c016_051&r=ipr |
| By: | Hughes, A. |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses science policy resource allocation in the light of a comparison of the open innovation and Mode 2 new production of knowledge conceptual frameworks. It provides a brief historical review of the evolution of science funding and the application of the Haldane principle in the UK. The core of the paper analyses academic and business attitudes to university-industry links using two recent large scale surveys and argues that there is a largely false dichotomy drawn between applied and basic research. University-industry links are already extensive and encompass a wide range of interactions than those captured by the usual debate over science engineering and narrow conceptions of commercialisation based on patenting and spin-outs. |
| Keywords: | Science Policy, Haldane Principle, Open Innovation, University-Industry Links |
| JEL: | O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp425&r=ipr |
| By: | Giovanni Immordino; Michele Polo |
| Abstract: | We study the interaction between a ?rm that invests in research and, if successful, undertakes a practice to exploit the innovation, and an enforcer that sets legal standards, ?nes and accuracy. In innovative industries deterrence on actions interacts with deterrence on research. A per-se legality rule prevails when the practice increases expected welfare, moving to a discriminating rule combined with type-I accuracy for higher probabilities of social harm. Moreover, discriminating rules should be adopted more frequently in traditional industries than in innovative environments; patent and antitrust policies are substitutes; additional room for per-se (illegality) rules emerges when ?nes are bounded. Keywords: legal standards, accuracy, antitrust, innovative activity, enforcement. JEL classi?cation: D73, K21, K42, L51. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:434&r=ipr |