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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Ghafele , Roya; Gibert, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | Current mechanisms to compensate inventors and improve legal access to their inventions remain ineffective. Manufacturers encounter significant transaction costs in the process of licensing the multitude of patent rights implicated in their products. High-technology product manufacturing requires access to a diverse pool of technologies that are owned by different organizations all over the world. The transaction costs of licensing these disparate rights are inhibiting unlicensed manufacturers in emerging economies from entering important markets and simultaneously limiting the revenue patent owners can generate from non-exclusive licenses. As communications technologies improve, innovative licensing mechanisms are emerging that can help firms avoid many of these transaction costs. Search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, enforcement costs and adjustment costs all limit the value generated from licensing transactions. These costs are particularly severe for smaller firms that lack complementary assets to develop their products, lack experience with licensing and do not have large human and financial resources to invest in negotiation outcomes. The transaction costs of licensed manufacturing increase exponentially when having to license multiple rights among disparate rightsholders in a global market. By identifying, grouping, and valuing different rights into a single license, PatentBooks, an illustration of an electronic patent licensing platform, reduces search and information transaction costs. Firms instantaneously identify appropriate license rights from all over the globe without investing considerable resources in hundreds of discrete negotiations. Patent owners are able to generate greater non-exclusive licensing revenue from manufacturers than they could by licensing their rights in isolation. In doing so, they permit firms of all sizes and nationalities to generate more returns from technology and accelerate innovation by facilitating access to valuable inventions. |
| Keywords: | Transaction cost economics; patent Licensing; patent archives; electronic trading platforms |
| JEL: | O34 O32 M21 |
| Date: | 2011–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:36010&r=ipr |
| By: | Jing-Yuan Chio (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies); Laura Magazzini (Department of Economics, University of Verona); Fabio Pammolli (IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies and CERM Foundation; IMT Lucca Institute for Advanced Studies and Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, K.U. Leuven) |
| Abstract: | We build a cumulative innovation model in which both success and failure provide valuable information for future research. To test this learning mechanism, we use a dataset covering outcomes of world-wide R&D projects in the pharmaceutical industry, and proxy knowledge flows with forward citations received by patents associated with each project. Empirical results confirm theoretical predictions that patents associated with successfully completed projects (i.e., leading to drug launch on the market) receive more citations than those associated to failed (terminated) projects, which in turn are cited more often than patents lacking clinical or preclinical information. We therefore offer evidence of the value of failures as research inputs in (pharmaceutical) innovation |
| Keywords: | R&D competition, patent policy, pharmaceutical industry |
| JEL: | D23 D83 O3 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ial:wpaper:1&r=ipr |
| By: | Carsten Burhop (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and University of Cologne); Thorsten Lübbers (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts. |
| Keywords: | Economic History, Germany, pre-1913, Licensing contracts, Technology transfer |
| JEL: | N83 L14 O32 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_18&r=ipr |
| By: | Sidonia von Proff (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg); Thomas Brenner (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg) |
| Abstract: | The paper at hand investigates how co-patenting over distance develops when aggregating inventive activities on a regional level. That means, the object of analysis is a link between two regions in contrast to other studies, where links between two individuals or firms are investigated. We analyse which regional characteristics influence the creation and continuation of such links. The main focus lies on different types of distance. The approach adds a dynamic view to the existing, often static literature about collaboration behaviour. The regressions are done for all patent-relevant industries in Germany. We find that several distance types decrease – as expected – the likelihood of link creation but also - not in all cases expected - of link continuation. |
| Keywords: | patents, research collaboration, collaboration dynamics, inter-regional links, Germany |
| JEL: | R11 O34 L14 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pum:wpaper:2011-06&r=ipr |
| By: | Abraham Garcia (JRC-IPTS) |
| Abstract: | The effect of the EU Research Framework Programme (FP) on European company innovation performance is analysed for the period 1998-2000. The possibility of applying for the grant might make companies engage in new projects which they would not have considered if the fund was not there. In addition, the FP programme increases collaboration with other innovation agents (e.g., universities, research labs, governments and other firms). Both the existence of FP and collaboration are simultaneously modelled when innovation performance is studied. To measure innovation performance, an input indicator (level of R&D expenditure) is used in combination with an output indicator (increase in the innovation sales). Following Crepon et al. (1998) a simultaneous equations system is used with four equations (FP, collaboration, R&D and Innovation sales). The paper finds a positive impact for the FP on collaboration, and both factors positively affect the innovation performance (R&D and Innovation sales) of European firms. No crowding-out effect is found in the analysis. |
| Keywords: | Funding, Framework Programme, R&D investment, CIS, CDM model |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:wpaper:201107&r=ipr |