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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Daniele Sabbatini (Banca d'Italia) |
| Abstract: | The Italian and European regulatory framework for patents would benefit from further improvements in order to foster dynamic competition between Italian firms. At the national level the exclusive allocation of the right to patent inventions to universities, rather than to researchers, would promote better commercial exploitation. At the European level a more integrated system of protection (provision of a single patent that is valid in all Member States, the abolition of translation requirements, a unitary system of fees, and the integration of the litigation system) is essential to lower costs and expand the geographic scope of the protection, thus fostering dynamic competition. Further improvements in the language requirements are needed. The objective of reducing the cost of patenting inventions without raising costs for competitors would be better achieved were English the sole official language of the system (instead of the present choice between English, French and German), to make it easier for competitors to know which is the valid version of the patent. |
| Keywords: | patents, industrial inventions, judicial trial, European patent |
| JEL: | K11 K41 L51 O31 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_109_11&r=ipr |
| By: | Brunt, Liam (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Lerner, Josh (Harvard Business School); Nicholas, Tom (Harvard Business School) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of prizes on innovation using data on awards for technological development offered by the Royal Agricultural Society of England at annual competitions between 1839 and 1939. We find large effects of the prizes on competitive entry and we also detect an impact of the prizes on the quality of contemporaneous patents, especially when prize categories were set by a strict rotation scheme, thereby mitigating the potentially confounding effect that they targeted only “hot” technology sectors. Prizes encouraged competition and medals were more important than monetary awards. The boost to innovation we observe cannot be explained by the re-direction of existing inventive activity. |
| Keywords: | Awards; Patents; Contests. |
| JEL: | N40 O30 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2011_025&r=ipr |
| By: | Ben Youssef, Slim; Breton, Michèle; Zaccour, Georges |
| Abstract: | We consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in both innovative and absorptive R&D to reduce their unit production cost, and where they benefit from free R&D spillovers between them. We analyze the case where firms act non cooperatively and the case where they cooperate by forming a research joint venture. We show that, in both modes of play, there exists a unique symmetric solution. We find that the investment in innovative R&D is always higher than in absorptive R&D. We also find that the value of the learning parameter has almost no impact on innovative R&D, firms profits, consumer's surplus and social welfare. Finally, differences in investment in absorptive research and social welfare under the two regimes are in opposite directions according to the importance of the free spillover. |
| Keywords: | Innovative R&D; Absorptive R&D; Learning Parameter; Spillover; Research Joint Venture |
| JEL: | C7 C61 O32 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35326&r=ipr |
| By: | Juana Kuramoto |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes quantitative findings on the innovative behavior of firms in the production chains of pisco and shoe manufacture in Peru, which are served by the network of Technological Innovation Centers (CITEs), the most important technology policy instrument available in Peru. These two chains, in low and medium-technology industries, are representative of Peru’s manufacturing sector. Of particular interest is the role of technical standards as a means of technological diffusion, which is stressed in the work of the CITEs. For the pisco chain, that role involves the definition of the product itself, for which Peru is seeking a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) denomination. In the shoe chain, the technical standard should act as a coordination mechanism that will help increase efficiency throughout the chain, which at present is often fractured. |
| JEL: | O14 O25 O33 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:wpaper:4741&r=ipr |
| By: | Christin, Clémence |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we highlight new conditions under which R&D agreements may have anti-competitive effects. We focus on cases where two firms compete with each other and with a competitive fringe. R&D activities need a specific input available to all firms on a common market, the price of which increases with demand for the input. In such a context, if a firm increases its R&D expenses, it increases the cost of R&D for its rivals. This induces exit from the fringe and may increase the final price. Therefore, by contrast to the case where the cost of R&D for one firm is independent of its rivals' R&D decisions, cooperation between strategic firms on the upstream market may induce more R&D by strategic firms, in order to exclude firms from the fringe and increase the final price. -- |
| Keywords: | Competition policy,Research and Development Agreements,Collusion,Entry deterrence |
| JEL: | L13 L24 L41 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:38&r=ipr |
| By: | Van Reenen, John |
| Abstract: | Competition and labour market flexibility are key for spurring productivity growth, but there are other ways in which policymakers can influence innovation more directly. John Van Reenen argues that tax credits for business spending on research and development can increase UK firms’ market value, productivity and innovation. |
| Date: | 2011–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:lselon:http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/40257/&r=ipr |
| By: | Thomas K. Bauer; Barbara S. Grave |
| Abstract: | German universities are regarded as being under-financed, inefficient, and performing below average if compared to universities in other European countries and the US. Starting in the 1990s, several German federal states implemented reforms to improve this situation. An important part of these reforms has been the introduction of indicator-based funding systems. These financing systems aimed at increasing the competition between universities by making their public funds dependent on their relative performance concerning different output measures, such as the share of students obtaining a degree or the amount of third party funds. This paper evaluates whether the indicator-based funding created unintended incentives, i.e. whether the reform caused a grade inflation. Estimating mean as well as quantile treatment effects, we cannot support the hypothesis that increased competition between universities causes grade inflation. |
| Keywords: | Grade inflation; higher education funding; university competition |
| JEL: | H52 I21 I22 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0288&r=ipr |