|
on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi; Chiara Strozzi |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study theoretically and empirically the role of the interaction between skilled migration and intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in determining innovation in developing countries (South). We show that although emigration from the South may directly result in the well-known concept of brain drain, it also causes a brain gain effect, the extent of which depends on the level of IPRs protection in the sending country. We argue this to come from a diaspora channel through which the knowledge acquired by emigrants abroad can flow back to the South and enhance the skills of the remaining workers there. By increasing the size of the innovation sector and the skill-intensity of emigration, IPRs protection makes it more likely for diaspora gains to dominate, thus facilitating a potential net brain gain. Our main theoretical insights are then tested empirically using a panel dataset of emerging and developing countries. The findings reveal a positive correlation between emigration and innovation in the presence of strong IPRs protection. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual property rights; Migration; Technology transfer; Brain gain; Diaspora. |
| JEL: | O34 F22 O33 J24 J61 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:068&r=ipr |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi; Julia Spies; Farid Toubal |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we propose the technological complexity of a product and the level of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection to be the co-determinants of the mode through which multinational firms purchase their goods. We study the choice between intra-firm trade and outsourcing given heterogeneity at the product- (complexity), firm- (productivity) and country- (IPRs) level. Our findings suggest that the above three dimensions of heterogeneity are crucial for complex goods, where firms face a trade-off between higher marginal costs in the case of trade with an affiliate and higher imitation risks in the case of sourcing from an independent supplier. We test these predictions by combining data from a French firm-level survey on the mode choice for each transaction with a newly developed complexity measure at the product-level. Our fractional logit estimations confirm the proposition that although firms are generally reluctant to source highly complex goods from outside the firm’s boundaries, they do so when a strong IPR regime in the host country guarantees the protection of their technology. |
| Keywords: | sourcing decision; product complexity; intellectual property rights; fractional logit estimation |
| JEL: | F12 F23 O34 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:067&r=ipr |
| By: | Maria Comune; Alireza Naghavi; Giovanni Prarolo |
| Abstract: | With the rise of the knowledge economy; delivering sound innovation policies requires a thorough understanding of how knowledge is produced and diffused. This paper takes a step to analyze a new form of globalization; the so-called system of Global Innovation Networks (GINs); to shed light on how the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) influences their creation and development. We focus on the role of IPR protection in fostering international innovative activities in emerging economies (South); such as China and India; and more generally; how IPRs affect the development of GINs between newly industrialized countries and OECD countries. Using both survey-based firm-level and country-level global data; we find IPRs to be an important determinant of participation in GINS from a Southern perspective. We find IPR protection at home and its harmonization across county pairs foster South-North formation of GINs. We also find that a stringent regime in the destination country discourages foreign international innovative activities that originate in NICs. Both levels of our analysis confirm the ICT industry; particularly the hardware segment; to rely on IPRs when engaging in the international outsourcing and offshoring of innovation or in patenting activities abroad. |
| Keywords: | Gravity Model; Information Communication Technology; Innovation; Intellectual Property Rights; International collaborations; Networks |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:069&r=ipr |
| By: | Poddar, Sougata; Bouguezzi , Fehmi |
| Abstract: | We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an insider patentee in a circular city of Salop’s model and in a linear city of Hotelling’s model when firms have asymmetric pre-innovation marginal costs of production and compete in prices. We completely characterize the optimal licensing policies using a fixed fee and per-unit royalty under the drastic and non-drastic innovations. We find that when the innovative firm is efficient compared to the licensee at the pre-innovation stage then the results regarding optimal licensing policy coincide with the results described in the literature with symmetric firms. However, this is not true when the innovative firm is inefficient in the pre-innovation stage compared to the licensee. To that end, we show that even a drastic innovation can be licensed using a royalty scheme when the patentee is highly inefficient compared to licensee in the pre-innovation stage and the size of the innovation is intermediate. We also show that in this set-up, fixed fee licensing is never optimal. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; Technology transfer; Salop model; Hotelling model; Patent licensing; symmetric and asymmetric costs |
| JEL: | L13 D45 D43 |
| Date: | 2011–08–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32764&r=ipr |
| By: | Ghafele, Roya |
| Abstract: | While tourism has been praised by a variety of international organizations as a means to promote the local economy in developing countries, tourism led growth has never been seen to be supported by a developing countries’ intellectual property regimes. Intellectual property rights, particularly if owned collectively, accelerate cluster creation, an organizational form particularly beneficial for tourism. The positive externalities associated with clusters can be reinforced through the assignment of collective marks. A region’s intangible assets, its social cohesion, can be fostered through the introduction of collective marks, since it is an intellectual property rights that can be owned collectively by a given community. This paper is one of the first of its kind to flesh out a more differentiated economic value proposition of collective marks, while at the same time illustrating the economic opportunities that the intellectual property system provides to developing countries’ economies. |
| Keywords: | Economies of agglomeration; externalities of cluster creation; economic value proposition of collective marks |
| JEL: | O34 F59 Z10 |
| Date: | 2011–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:32762&r=ipr |
| By: | CZARNITZKI Dirk; LOPES BENTO Cindy |
| Abstract: | Applying a variant of a non-parametric matching estimator, we consider European funding and national funding as heterogeneous treatments, distinguishing and simultaneously analyzing the effect these treatments have on innovation input and performance. In terms of input, getting funding from both sources yields the highest impact. If funding from only one source is received, EU grants have higher effects. In terms of output, holding innovation expenditures constant, funding from both sources display higher sales of market novelties and future patent applications at the firm level. If only one grant is obtained, we find superiority for national funding. |
| Keywords: | Subsidies; Innovation; Policy Evaluation; Treatment effects; Nonparametric matching estimation |
| JEL: | C14 H50 O38 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2011-42&r=ipr |