nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2011‒07‒27
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. [2010-2011 WTO Case Review Series No. 2]China—Measures for Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS362/R): Concerning Disciplinary Rules on Enforcement Under the TRIPS Agreement (Japanese) By SUZUKI Masabumi
  2. [2010-2011 WTO Case Review Series No. 3]China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (WT/DS363/R, WT/DS363/AB/R): Can the Violation of Non-GATT Provisions be Justified by Article XX of the GATT? (Japanese) By OZAKI Masahiko; NAKANISHI Hodaka
  3. Patent Protection, Technological Change and Wage Inequality By Shiyuan Pan; Heng-fu Zou; Tailong Li
  4. An insight into the patent systems of fast developing asian countries By Anh Vu Tuan
  5. Patent regimes, firms and the commodification of knowledge By Benjamin Coriat; Olivier Weinstein
  6. Parallel Imports and Mandatory Substitution Reform - A Kick or A Muff for Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals? By Granlund, David; Köksal, Miyase Yesim
  7. Competitive Price Coordination in Technology Sharing Agreements By Gallini, Nancy
  8. Carbon emission and production technology: evidence from the US By Dinda, Soumyananda
  9. Between collaboration and competition. Global public-private partnerships against intellectual property crimes By Paun, Christopher

  1. By: SUZUKI Masabumi
    Abstract: Using its accession to the WTO as momentum, China has been rapidly developing its systems related to intellectual property. However, many countries and organizations point out that there are still many problems with intellectual property protection in China. In 2007, the United States made a request for bilateral consultations, and eventually the establishment of a panel, under the WTO dispute settlement procedures, concerning measures for protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights taken by China, and a panel report was adopted on this issue in March 2009. While this issue is noteworthy in the sense that the two superpowers of the United States and China are contesting the intellectual property system in China, which as noted has been attracting considerable international concern, it also has significant implications from a legal perspective, particularly in the way that the WTO panel revealed its interpretation of the enforcement rules under the TRIPS Agreement for the first time. In addition, specific details of the WTO panel report are seen as including matters that should prompt Japan to reexamine its own system. This paper introduces the details of the WTO panel report and discusses their significance.
    Date: 2011–03
  2. By: OZAKI Masahiko; NAKANISHI Hodaka
    Abstract: First, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body's report, <i>China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products</i>, is the first ever interpretation on the obligation to grant trading rights in China's Protocol on WTO Accession. Second, through clarifying the scope to which the obligation is applied, they offer an important interpretation on the scope of "goods." Third, the Appellate Body's report has clearly found for the first time that GATT Article XX can be resorted to with respect to violations of non-GATT provisions. Fourth, they offered for the first time an interpretation of Article XX (a), which permits the justification of "measures necessary to protect public morals," and they touched upon a very sensitive issue, namely, WTO consistency of the ways to apply the censorship mechanism. Fifth, they interpreted that "sound recoding distribution services" in China's GATS Schedule extends to the distribution of sound recordings in electronic form. This policy discussion paper introduces the factual background and the findings of the reports, analyzes the reports' interpretation of WTO agreements including China's Protocol, and lastly examines what suggestions the reports may offer in terms of future disputes.
    Date: 2011–04
  3. By: Shiyuan Pan (School of Economics and Center for Research of Private Economy, Zhejiang University); Heng-fu Zou (Central University of Finance and Economics CEMA; Wuhan University IAS; Peking University; China Development Bank); Tailong Li (School of Economics & Management, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University)
    Abstract: We develop a directed-technological-change model to address the issue of the optimal patent system and investigate how the optimal patent system influences the direction of technological change and the inequality of wage, where patents are categorized as skill- and labor-complementary. The major results are: (i) Finite patent breadth maximizes the social welfare level; (ii) Optimal patent breadth increases with the amount of skilled (unskilled) workers; (iii) Optimal patent protection is skill-biased, because an increase in the amount of skilled workers increases the dynamic benefits of the protection for skill-complementary patents via the economy of scale of skill-complementary technology; (iv) Skill-biased patent protection skews inventions towards skills, thus increasing wage inequality; And, (v) international trade leads to strong protection for skill-complementary patents, hence increasing skill premia.
    Keywords: Patent Breadth, Skill-Biased Patent Protection, Skill-Biased Technological Change, Wage Inequality, Growth
    JEL: O31 O34 J31
    Date: 2010–08–14
  4. By: Anh Vu Tuan
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to describe the patent systems of fast developing Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and understand the factors that drive the demand for patent in these countries. Patent systems in these countries have strengthened to a large extent, the number of patent applications has increased drastically, although at very different pace across countries. The policy mixes that seem to be associated with a strong increase in demand for patents are: i) policies aiming at attracting FDI; ii) low relative costs (or fees); and iii) a relatively low quality of the examination processes. The significant differences in the patent systems of fast developing countries echo the differences observed between the patent systems in Europe, the USA and Japan.
    Keywords: patent cost; patent quality; patent systems; fees,; FDI
    JEL: P14 P51 O34
    Date: 2011–07
  5. By: Benjamin Coriat; Olivier Weinstein
    Abstract: This paper analyses the evolution of the intellectual property regime (IPR), and more precisely the patent regime, in the USA since the 19-th century. To do so, we consider intellectual property laws within the context of wider changes in capitalism, focusing on two main historical phases: firstly, the period covering the formation and development of 'corporate capitalism' dominated by large corporations and then the new phase, which opened up in the 1980s, marked by the rise to power of finance. From a perspective of institutional complementarities, we seek to show how the characteristics and implications of patent regimes can only be understood in relation to changes in the main institutional forms of capitalism: forms of the firm, the status of labour (the 'wage-labour nexus') and market forms.
    Keywords: firms, financialization, institutional complementarities, knowledge based economy, labor law, property rights
    JEL: O34 P1
    Date: 2011–07–19
  6. By: Granlund, David (The Swedish Retail Institute (HUI)); Köksal, Miyase Yesim (University of Gothenburg)
    Abstract: What has been the effect of competition from parallel imports on prices of locally-sourced onpatent drugs? Did the 2002 Swedish mandatory substitution reform increase this competition? To answer these questions, we carried out difference-in-differences estimation on monthly data for a panel of all on-patent prescription drugs sold in Sweden during the 40 months from January 2001 through April 2004. On average, facing competition from parallel imports caused a 15-17% fall in price. While the reform increased the effect of competition from parallel imports, it was only by 0.9%. The reform, however, did increase the effect of therapeutic competition by 1.6%.
    Keywords: parallel imports; pharmaceutical drugs; price competition; reference pricing; therapeutic competition
    JEL: I11 L51 L65
    Date: 2011–04–01
  7. By: Gallini, Nancy
    Abstract: This paper examines technology-sharing arrangements, the incentives to join them and the type of products that develop when they are anticipated. Particular attention is given to patent pools that admit members with overlapping ownership; that is, patentees with a stake in both complementary pooled inputs and downstream products that do not depend on the pool but compete with products that do. We ask whether this ownership structure under which pool members are vertically and horizontally related, facilitates anticompetitive price collusion. In a Bertrand framework it is shown that if the downstream products inside and outside the pool are strategic complements, then technology-sharing agreements are both privately and socially efficient in making the market more competitive, although prices increase in the degree to which pool members are involved in competing products. For strong substitutes and asymmetric outside ownership, efficient patent pools may not be profitable in which case allowing full coordination in which the pool sets the prices of both inside and outside products owned by its members will encourage the formation of efficient pools and, possibly, the selection of more complementary products. In analyzing the efficiencies of cooperative agreements for sharing technologies, this paper makes a case for incorporating private incentives to cooperate, as well as to innovate and litigate, into the debate on effective systems for encouraging innovation and its diffusion.
    Keywords: Patent Pools, Intellectual Property, Antitrust Policy
    JEL: L2 L44
    Date: 2011–07–14
  8. By: Dinda, Soumyananda
    Abstract: Production technology is the main driving force of economic growth while upgraded technology reduces carbon emission. This paper investigates the long run relation with short run dynamics using the USA data for the period of 1963 -2007. This paper observes that production technology is the cause of reduction of CO2 emission only in short run. The impulse response of production technology suggests shortening the patent protection right that might encourage redesigning low carbon production processes to curve down carbon emission with raising income. Continuous change and adaption of production technology is the main driving force for sustainable development.
    Keywords: Production Technology; Innovation; Design Patent; Patent Right; Technological Progress; Co-integration; Causality; Carbon Emission; Income; CO2 Emission; Impulse Response; R&D
    JEL: O11 C32 O51 Q53 O33 O14
    Date: 2011–02–26
  9. By: Paun, Christopher
    Abstract: This paper explores the issue area of global public-private partnerships (PPPs) against intellectual property (IP) crimes. It is based on preliminary findings from a PhD research project that included interviews with more than 30 participants of such PPPs from different countries around the world. Key factors that influence the formation, maintenance, termination, and reform of such partnerships are identified by comparing more and less successful PPPs over a period of time. First, the paper introduces the topic of IP crime, also known as counterfeiting and piracy. The paper then proposes a typology of different PPPs, as the term is used in very different ways in the literature. In the subsequent sections of the paper, empirical examples of global PPPs against IP crimes are analyzed, whose secretariats are hosted by three public international organizations: Interpol, the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). By comparing the different paths of these three international organizations and their PPPs, five key factors are identified that influence the formation, maintenance, termination, and reform of such PPPs: (1) common ground, (2) absolute and/or relative gains of resources, (3) the management of the PPP and its discretion, (4) the representation of stakeholders, and (5) the policy pursued by the PPP. -- Dieses Arbeitspapier untersucht das Themenfeld der globalen Öffentlich-Privaten Partnerschaften (ÖPPs) gegen Produktpiraterie. Es basiert auf vorläufigen Erkenntnissen aus der Forschung für eine Doktorarbeit, für die Experteninterviews mit mehr als 30 Teilnehmern solcher ÖPPs in unterschiedlichen Ländern der Welt durchgeführt wurden. Durch den Vergleich unterschiedlich erfolgreicher ÖPPs über einen längeren Zeitraum wurden Schlüsselfaktoren identifiziert, welche die Gründung, Erhaltung, Beendung und Reform von solchen ÖPPs beeinflussen. Zunächst führt das Arbeitspapier in die Materie Produktpiraterie ein. Dann wird eine Typologie von ÖPPs vorgestellt, welche notwendig ist, weil der Begriff sehr unterschiedlich in der Literatur verwendet wird. In den anschließenden drei Sektionen des Arbeitspapiers werden drei empirische Beispiele von globalen ÖPPs untersucht, die bei drei verschiedenen Internationalen Organisationen angesiedelt sind. Dies sind Interpol, die Weltzollorganisation und die Weltgesundheitsorganisation. Durch den Vergleich der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen, die diese Internationalen Organisationen und ihre ÖPPs gemacht haben, werden fünf Schlüsselfaktoren identifiziert, welche die Gründung, Erhaltung, Beendung und Reform dieser ÖPPs beeinflussen: (1.) eine gemeinsame Bezugsebene, (2.) das Streben nach absoluten und/oder relativen Gewinnen, (3.) das Management der ÖPP und ihr Handlungsspielraum, (4.) die Repräsentation der Interessengruppen in der ÖPP und (5.) die Politik, welche von der ÖPP verfolgt wird.
    Date: 2011

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