nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2011‒07‒13
twelve papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Upstream innovation protection: common law evolution and the dynamics of wage inequality By Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
  2. Europe Lagging Behind in ICT Evolution: Patenting Trends of Leading ICT Companies By Timo Seppälä; Olli Martikainen
  3. Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust By Chen, Yongmin
  4. Filing strategies and patent value By Nicolas van Zeebroeck; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe
  5. The vulnerability of patent value determinants By Nicolas van Zeebroeck; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe
  6. The Puzzle of Patent Value Indicators By Nicolas van Zeebroeck
  7. “Singling out individual inventors from patent data” By Ernest Miguélez; Ismael Gómez-Miguélez
  8. Sui Generis Rights on Folklore Viewed From a Property Rights Perspective By Ejan Mackaay
  9. Intellectual Property Rights and South-North Formation of Global Innovation Networks By M. Comune; A. Naghavi; G. Prarolo
  10. Regulation and Welfare: Evidence from Paragraph IV Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry By Lee G. Branstetter; Chirantan Chatterjee; Matthew Higgins
  11. Entry and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Market following Patent Expiry By Appelt, Silvia
  12. Learning by doing in science linkages By Broström, Anders

  1. By: Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia
    Abstract: The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, and this question has not been explored in much detail so far. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? In the US, what does the common law system imply on the macroeconomic responses to institutional change? This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We consider three issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators; and (c) the implications of strengthening patent protection on wage inequality and growth. We show analytically and numerically how the jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be related to the well-known changes in wage inequality and in education attainments. Basic research patents may have grown disproportionately due increasing jurisdictional protection, eventually compromising applied innovation, education, and growth. By simulations, we show that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may mislead the econometric assessment of the temporary vs persistent effects IPR policy.
    Keywords: Basic and Applied R&D; Two-Stage Sequential Innovation; Skill Premium; Inequality and Education; Common Law.
    JEL: K40 O34 O31
    Date: 2011–03–22
  2. By: Timo Seppälä; Olli Martikainen
    Abstract: In this paper, we examine new Internet ecosystem strategies through compre-hensive OECD PATSTAT patent data analyses focusing on mobile operating system software firms. We also describe current patent disputes between mobile hardware firms and mobile operating system software firms in the US and their relevant intellectual property in order to highlight the changes and decisions made within current mobile value chains, which may then enable the further examination of strategic decisions of individual firms. Based on OECD PATSTAT and our descriptive analyses, we find that the latest strategic decisions made by the mobile hardware and operating system firms target industry-level competition on intellectual property and control over new industry convergence, whereas the value of hardware-based intellectual property is measured and evaluated against software and heuristics related intellectual property. This industry convergence includes the evolution of new ecosystems based on Apple, Google and Microsoft technologies that will change the role of several firms in the mobile value chain.
    Keywords: Apple, Microsoft, Google, Nokia, ICT, ecosystems, intellectual property, patenting
    JEL: L86 L8 L25
    Date: 2011–06–27
  3. By: Chen, Yongmin
    Abstract: A vertically integrated firm, having acquired the intellectual property (IP) through innovation to become an input monopolist, can extract surplus by supplying efficient downstream competitors. That the monopolist would refuse to do so is puzzling and has led to numerous debates in antitrust. In this paper, I clarify the economic logic of refusal to deal, and identify conditions under which prohibiting such conduct would raise or lower consumer and social welfare. I further show how IP protection (as determined by IP laws) and restrictions on IP holders' conduct (as determined by antitrust laws) may interact to affect innovation incentive and post-innovation market performance.
    Keywords: Refusal to Deal; Intellectual Property Rights; IP protection; Antitrust; innovation
    JEL: O3 L1 L4
    Date: 2011–06
  4. By: Nicolas van Zeebroeck; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe
    Date: 2011
  5. By: Nicolas van Zeebroeck; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe
    Date: 2011
  6. By: Nicolas van Zeebroeck
    Date: 2011
  7. By: Ernest Miguélez (Faculty of Economics, University of Barcelona); Ismael Gómez-Miguélez (Technical University of Catalonia)
    Abstract: An increasing number of studies in recent years have sought to identify individual inventors from patent data. A variety of heuristics have been proposed for using the names and other information disclosed in patent documents to establish “who is who” in patents. This paper contributes to this literature by describing a methodology for identifying inventors using patents applied to the European Patent Office (EPO hereafter). As in much of this literature, we basically follow a three-step procedure: (1) the parsing stage, aimed at reducing the noise in the inventor’s name and other fields of the patent; (2) the matching stage, where name matching algorithms are used to group similar names; and (3) the filtering stage, where additional information and various scoring schemes are used to filter out these similarly-named inventors. The paper presents the results obtained by using the algorithms with the set of European inventors applying to the EPO over a long period of time.
    Keywords: “Names game”, patent data, unique inventors, name matching algorithms. JEL classification:C8, J61, O31, O33, R0.
    Date: 2011–05
  8. By: Ejan Mackaay
    Abstract: This paper looks at <i>sui</i> generis rights claimed for the protection of folklore. Since rights should not be created in any which way if one is to avoid privileges and rent-seeking, it is important to be clear about design constraints stemming from such rights being species of property rights, adapted to deal with the particular content of information structures that need special encouragement or protection. Examination of the logic of property rights in general and of intellectual property rights in particular reveals that intellectual property rights are sought because of their decentralised incentive and information effects, but that they need to be circumscribed because of the monopolistic effects they entail. The trouble with monopoly is that whilst it is in place, one does not realise the creativity that is prevented from emerging. All intellectual property rights reflect compromises of these contradictory tendencies and as a result, more and stronger intellectual property rights are not necessarily better from a general welfare point of view. The forms of sui generis rights proposed for folklore appear modelled on copyright, but with the removal of several key features that define the equilibrium inherent in copyright: no originality requirement; no known creation date or creators; indefinite duration. Folklore kept secret is altogether taken out of commerce. As a result, these rights strike a balance very much more to the monopoly side of the spectrum than do existing intellectual property rights and hence risk severely constraining creativity. This may seem like an acceptable constraint given the objective of preservation, but one must realise that it will affect the future carriers of the protected information. Faced with severe restrictions on ways they can improve their lives within the protected setting, they may well opt for the exit option and head for greener pastures. This would severely strain efforts to preserve whatever the sui generis rights aim to protect. Information lock-up may not be the most promising formula for preservation <P>
    Keywords: Property rights, intellectual property, copyright, sui generis rights, folklore.,
    Date: 2011–06–01
  9. By: M. Comune; A. Naghavi; G. Prarolo
    Abstract: With the rise of the knowledge economy, delivering sound innovation policies requires a thorough understanding of how knowledge is produced and diffused. This paper takes a step to analyze a new form of globalization, the so-called system of Global Innovation Networks (GINs), to shed light on how the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) influences their creation and development. We focus on the role of IPR protection in fostering international innovative activities in emerging economies (South), such as China and India, and more generally, how IPRs affect the development of GINs between newly industrialized countries and OECD countries. Using both survey-based firm-level and country-level global data, we find IPRs to be an important determinant of participation in GINS from a Southern perspective. We find IPR protection at home and its harmonization across county pairs foster South-North formation of GINs. We also find that a stringent regime in the destination country discourages foreign international innovative activities that originate in NICs. Both levels of our analysis confirm the ICT industry, particularly the hardware segment, to rely on IPRs when engaging in the international outsourcing and offshoring of innovation or in patenting activities abroad.
    JEL: D23 F53 O34
    Date: 2011–06
  10. By: Lee G. Branstetter; Chirantan Chatterjee; Matthew Higgins
    Abstract: With increasing frequency, generic drug manufacturers in the United States are able to challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs even before their patents expire. The legal foundation for these challenges is found in Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act. If successful, these Paragraph IV challenges generally lead to large market share losses for incumbents and sharp declines in average market prices. This paper estimates, for the first time, the welfare effects of accelerated generic entry via these challenges. Using aggregate brand level sales data between 1997 and 2008 for hypertension drugs in the U.S. we estimate demand using a nested logit model in order to back out cumulated consumer surplus, which we find to be approximately $270 billion. We then undertake a counterfactual analysis, removing the stream of Paragraph IV facilitated generic products, finding a corresponding cumulated consumer surplus of $177 billion. This implies that gains flowing to consumers as a result of this regulatory mechanism amount to around $92 billion or about $133 per consumer in this market. These gains come at the expense to producers who lose, approximately, $14 billion. This suggests that net short-term social gains stands at around $78 billion. We also demonstrate significant cross-molecular substitution within the market and discuss the possible appropriation of consumer rents by the insurance industry. Policy and innovation implications are also discussed.
    JEL: I11 I38 O3
    Date: 2011–06
  11. By: Appelt, Silvia
    Abstract: This dissertation encompasses three essays on entry and competition in the German generic drug market. The first paper examines the market entry decisions of generic companies and finds that original drug producrs do not create barriers to entry by launching a generic version of the brand drug prior to patent expiry. The second paper examines generic market share dynamics and patients‘ switching behaviors among generic drugs. The analysis shows that generic market shares are little influenced by prices and highly persistent over time, conferring a substantial advantage to first generic entrants. Price differentials likewise have a negligible impact on the likelihood that patients switch to a generic drug offered by a different manufacturer. The third paper investigates generic price differentials and provides evidence of economies of scope and reputation effects.
    Keywords: Generic Entry; Generic Market Share Dynamics; Patient Switching Behavior; Generic Price Dispersion
    Date: 2011–06–01
  12. By: Broström, Anders (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: Since the contribution of Cohen et al. (2002), it is well established that linkages between firms and public research organisations (PROs) serve purposes of both suggesting new R&D projects and completing existing projects. However, the extant literature has little to say about whether these two types of outcomes are linked or independent effects. This paper examines how a firm’s ability to absorb useful impulses to new R&D projects from interaction with public research organisations depends on how and how well the firm is able to utilise such linkages in project completion. An analysis of Swedish firms suggests that interaction provides impulses to further R&D primarily when it is successfully linked to achieving objectives in ongoing R&D projects of the firm. However, linkages which are focused on contributions to short-term projects are less likely to generate useful impulses. Moreover, not only are linkages which support both long-term and short-term objectives better than linkages which solely serve short-term objectives; firm-PRO linkages in which short-term objectives play a less accented role are most likely to facilitate valuable impulses to further R&D and innovation.
    Keywords: university-industry; externalities from public research; impulses to innovation
    JEL: O32 O33 O38
    Date: 2011–06–30

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