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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia |
| Abstract: | To foster innovation and growth should basic research be publicly or privately funded? This paper studies the impact of the gradual shift in the U.S. patent system towards the patentability and commercialization of the basic R&D undertaken by universities. We see this movement as making universities becoming responsive to "market" forces. Prior to 1980, universities undertook research using an exogenous stock of researchers that were motivated by "curiosity." After 1980, universities patent their research and behave as private firms. This move, in a context of two-stage inventions (basic and applied research) has an a priori ambiguous effect on innovation and welfare. We build a Schumpeterian model and match it to the data to assess this important turning point. |
| Keywords: | R&D and Growth; Sequential Innovation; Basic Research; Patent Laws. |
| JEL: | O41 O34 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29710&r=ipr |
| By: | Thomas D. Jeitschko (Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice); Byung-Cheol Kim |
| Abstract: | The decision to request a preliminary injunction—a court order that bans a party from certain actions until their lawfulness are ascertained in a final court ruling at trial—is an important litigation instrument in many areas of the law including antitrust, copyright, patents, trademarks, employment and labor relations as well as contracts. The process of filing for a preliminary injunction and the court's ruling on such a request generates information that can affect possible settlement decisions. We consider these implications when there is uncertainty about both the plaintiff's damages as well as the merits of case in the eyes of the court. Both plaintiff and defendant revise their beliefs about the case strength in dispute once they observe the court's ruling on preliminary injunctive relief. We study how such learning affects the likelihood of settlement. A precursor to this analysis is the study of the strategic role of preliminary injunctions as a means to signal the plaintiff's willingness to settle. |
| Keywords: | preliminary injunction, learning, signaling, screening, litigation, pre-trial motion, settlement |
| JEL: | D8 K12 K21 K41 J53 L4 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:doj:eagpap:201102&r=ipr |
| By: | Roberto Piazza |
| Abstract: | I construct an endogenous growth model where R&D is carried out at the industry level in a game of innovation between leaders and followers. Innovation costs for followers are assumed to increase with the technological lag from leaders. We obtain three results that contrast with standard Schumpeterian models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992). First, leaders may innovate in equilibrium, in an attempt to force followers out of the innovation game. Second, policies (such as patents) that allow for strong protections of monopolies can reduce the steady state growth rate of the economy. Third, multiple equilibria arise when monopolies' protection is large. |
| Date: | 2011–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/63&r=ipr |
| By: | Aoshima, Yaichi; Matsushima, Matsushima; Eto, Manabu |
| Abstract: | Drawing on data obtained from the questionnaire survey for the 242 private R&D projects supported by NEDO (New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization), Japan’s public management organization promoting R&D, this paper explores how the private R&D projects’ dependence on public supports affects their R&D processes and, in turn, projects’ performance and the commercialization of developed technologies. Our analyses show that dependence on government resources gives rise to some ―isolation. of the projects from the other parts of companies that they belong to. Such isolation, mainly derived from projects’ unique positions in ―double dependence. structures, negatively affects R&D performance especially related to commercialization. First, high dependence on public resources prevents project members from interacting with people outside the projects within the company. This precludes the projects to effectively leverage internal resources in overcoming technological problems. Secondly, high dependence weakens governance or control on project’s activities by internal management. This deters development of commercialization technologies and makes it difficult for the projects to acquire legitimacy for further investment towards commercialization. Our findings suggest that both companies and public funding agencies should promote projects to keep intimate relationships with the other parts of their organization for successful R&D leading to commercialization. |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:iirwps:11-02&r=ipr |
| By: | D. Engel; T. Mitze; R. Patuelli; J. Reinkowski |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we evaluate the R&D enhancing effects of two large public grant schemes aiming at encouraging the performance of firms organized in clusters. These are Germany's well known BioRegio and BioProfile contests for which we compare the research performance of winning regions in contrast with non-winning and non-participating comparison regions. We apply Difference-in-Difference estimation techniques in a generalized linear model framework, which allows to control for different initial regional conditions in the biotechnology related R&D activity. Our econometric findings support the view that winners generally outperform non-winning participants during the treatment period, thus indicating that exclusive funding as well as the stimulating effect of being a “winner" seems to work in the short-term. In contrast, no indirect impacts stemming from a potential mobilizing effect of the contest approaches have been detected. Also, we find only limited evidence for long-term effects of public R&D grants in the post-treatment period. The results of our analysis remain stable if we additionally augment the model to account for the particular role of spatial dependence in the R&D outcome variables. |
| JEL: | O38 R38 C23 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp744&r=ipr |