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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Schneider, Cédric |
| Abstract: | Patent pendencies create uncertainty in research and development (R&D) collaboration agreements, resulting in a threat of expropriation of unprotected knowledge by potential partners, reduced bargaining power and enhanced search costs. In this paper, we show that - depending of the type of partner - uncertain intellectual property rights (IPR) lead to reduced collaboration between firms and may hinder the production of knowledge. This has implications for technology policy as R&D collaborations are exempt from anti-trust legislation in order to increase R&D in the economy. We argue that a functional IPR system is needed for successful utilization of this policy. -- |
| Keywords: | R&D collaboration,intellectual property,uncertainty,patents |
| JEL: | O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11010&r=ipr |
| By: | Ãlvaro Escribano; Marco S. Giarratana |
| Abstract: | This paper introduce a list of desirable efficiency properties that any a patent system should have in order to enhance innovation, trade competitiveness, employment mobility and economic growth. We briefly overview the literature on patents and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the present and recent proposals for the future of the European Union Patents System. In particular, we discuss the costinefficiencies observed in the current design of the EU Patent System based in a double structure layer divided in a central European Patent Office (EPO) and several nationalbased patent offices. This paper analyzes the likely backlashes of creating a third layer for a subâ€sample of EU countries. The paper suggests an alternative more efficient Patent System together with some policy implications. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Patents, Knowledge spillovers, Common European patent, Welfare losses, Patents’ languages, Cultural proximity, Competitive trade |
| JEL: | O31 O34 D02 F15 L24 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we1101&r=ipr |
| By: | Yasusada Murata (Advanced Research Institute for the Sciences and Humanities, Nihon University); Ryo Nakajima (Department of Economics, Yokohama National University); Ryosuke Okamoto (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies); Ryuichi Tamura (Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba) |
| Abstract: | We develop a new approach to localized knowledge spillovers by incorporating the concept of control patents (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993) into the distancebased test of localization (Duranton and Overman, 2005). Using microgeographic data, we identify localization distance while allowing for cross-boundary spillovers, unlike the existing literature where the extent of localized knowledge spillovers is detected at the state or metropolitan statistical area level. We revisit the recent debate by Thompson and Fox-Kean (2005) and Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) on the existence of localized knowledge spillovers, and find solid evidence supporting localization, even when finer controls are used. |
| Keywords: | localized knowledge spillovers; distance-based tests; microgeographic data; K-density; patent citations; control patents |
| JEL: | O31 R12 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:763&r=ipr |
| By: | Jiri Strelicky; Kresimir Zigic |
| Abstract: | We study the economic impacts of the interaction between a regulator's Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection policy against software piracy on the one side and the forms of IPR protection that software producers may themselves undertake to protect their intellectual property on the other side. Two developers, each offering a variety of different quality, compete for heterogeneous users who choose among purchasing a legal version, using an illegal copy, and not using a product at all. Using an illegal version violates IPR and is thus punishable when disclosed. If a developer considers the level of piracy as high, he can either introduce a form of physical protection for his product or introduce a protection in the form of restricting support and other services to illegal users. The quality of each developer's product is exogenously given, and the developers compete in prices. We examine the above issues within the framework of Bertrand and Stackelberg competition while the monopoly set-up serves as a point of reference. |
| Keywords: | vertically differentiated duopoly, software piracy, Bertrand competition, private and public intellectual property rights protection |
| JEL: | D43 L11 L21 O25 O34 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp435&r=ipr |
| By: | Saiz, J. Patricio (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | La capacidad de competir globalmente ha sido algo cambiante en el tiempo. Los procesos de innovación tecnológica y la educación condicionan en gran medida el crecimiento económico y esa competitividad internacional. La evolución y desarrollo histórico de los derechos de propiedad industrial han sido parte esencial de la gestión de la I+D+i y de la capacidad creativa e innovadora de las distintas sociedades. La historia económica y tecnológica se convierte, de este modo, en una herramienta esencial para el analista especializado en política económica. Y el archivo histórico de la Oficina Española de Patentes y Marcas en un laboratorio del pasado en el que reflexionar sobre el futuro |
| Keywords: | intellectual property rights; Spanish economic history; national innovation systems; patents; trademarks. |
| JEL: | N73 N74 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpapeh:201102&r=ipr |
| By: | Jianu (Dumitru), Ionela; Dumitru, Ionut |
| Abstract: | In a more and more global world, universities compete for both students and faculty staff. Do university rankings offer a good perspective when it comes to choosing a university, as a student or university professor/researcher? This paper presents an analysis of well-known university rankings, trying to answer to the above mentioned question. It also presents an alternative to such rankings, namely intellectual capital evaluation models. |
| Keywords: | university rankings; indicators; intellectual capital |
| JEL: | M1 I23 A2 |
| Date: | 2011–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29623&r=ipr |
| By: | Czarnitzki, Dirk; Grimpe, Christoph; Toole, Andrew A. |
| Abstract: | The viability of modern open science norms and practices depend on public disclosure of new knowledge, methods, and materials. Aggregate data from the OECD show a broad shift in the institutional financing structure that supports academic research from public to private sponsorship. This paper examines the relationship between industry sponsorship and restrictions on disclosure using individual-level data on German academic researchers. Accounting for selfselection into extramural sponsorship, our evidence strongly supports the perspective that industry sponsorship jeopardizes public disclosure of academic research. -- |
| Keywords: | Open science,research funding,industry sponsorship,disclosure,secrecy |
| JEL: | O31 O32 L33 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11009&r=ipr |
| By: | Jianu (Dumitru), Ionela; Dumitru, Ionut |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a comparative analysis of some intellectual capital models. The analysis is based on four criteria: the main concepts and classifications on which the models are based on, the analysis of functional characteristics, the analysis of operational performances, limitations. |
| Keywords: | intellectual capital; measurement; evaluation; models |
| JEL: | M1 J5 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29622&r=ipr |