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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Svensson, Roger |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate the process of creative destruction by increasing the entrepreneurial effort allocated to high-quality invention projects. Using data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under bidding competition. Asymmetric information problems are shown to be solved by verification through entry for sale. |
| Keywords: | Acquisitions; Entrepreneurship; Innovation; Ownership; Patent; Start-ups |
| JEL: | G24 L1 L2 M13 O3 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8281&r=ipr |
| By: | Kretschmer, Tobias; Miravete, Eugenio J; Pernías, Jose C |
| Abstract: | Liberalization of the European automobile distribution system in 2002 limits the ability of manufacturers to impose vertical restraints, leading to a substantial increase in competitive pressure among dealers. We estimate an equilibrium model of profit maximization to evaluate how dealers change their innovation adoption strategies following the elimination of exclusive territories. Using French data we evaluate the existence of complementarities between the adoption of software applications and the scale of production. Firms view these innovations as substitutes and concentrate their effort in one type of software as they expand their scale of production. Results are robust to the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | Competitive Pressure; Complementarity; Product and Process Innovation |
| JEL: | C35 L86 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8289&r=ipr |
| By: | Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy); Davide Fantino (Bank of Italy); Guido Pellegrini (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza") |
| Abstract: | To evaluate the effect of an R&D subsidy one needs to know what the subsidized firms would have done without the incentive. This paper studies an Italian programme of subsidies for the applied development of innovations, exploiting a discontinuity in programme financing due to an unexpected shortage of public money. To identify the effect of the programme, the study implements a regression discontinuity design and compares firms that applied for funding before and after the shortage occurred. The results indicate that the programme was not effective in stimulating innovative investment. |
| Keywords: | R&D, public policy, evaluation |
| JEL: | O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_792_11&r=ipr |