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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Kenji Azetsu (Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences); Seiji Yamada (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | Recently, patent pools have been often established by the patent holders in order to promote research and development (R&D) and set technological standards. Patent pools are one of the administration methods for licensing, whereby many patent holders assemble their own patents and the administrator of the patent pools offers the licenses to users. This paper investigates the patent holders' incentive to form a patent pool, the patent pool's licensing behavior, and the anticompetitive effect of a patent pool. Our model is characterized by the following two features. First, we consider different two types of patent: basic and optional. Second, we consider not only a patent pool that offers a single package license, but also a patent pool that offers multiple package licenses. The single package license includes both basic and optional patents in the patent pool. The multiple package licenses involve two licenses: one includes only basic patents, whereas the other includes both basic and optional patents. The results of our analysis yield some implications for a patent pool that is characterized by the strength of complementarity between basic and optional patents. |
| Keywords: | patent pools, multiple package licenses, antitrust laws, bundling goods |
| JEL: | K11 K21 L4 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1015&r=ipr |
| By: | Chu, Angus C.; Pan, Shiyuan |
| Abstract: | This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model to analyze the effects of different patent instruments on innovation. We first analyze patent breadth that captures the traditional positive effect of patent rights on innovation. Then, we consider a profit-division rule between entrants and incumbents. Given the division of profit, increasing the share of profit assigned to incumbents reduces entrants' incentives for innovation. This aspect of blocking patents captures the recently proposed negative effect of patent rights on innovation. Finally, blocking patents generate a non-monotonic effect on innovation when the step size of innovation is endogenous due to a novel escape-infringement effect. Calibrating the model to aggregate data, we find that a marginal increase in the blocking effect of patent protection is likely to raise economic growth. |
| Keywords: | economic growth; innovation; intellectual property rights |
| JEL: | O34 O31 O40 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27233&r=ipr |
| By: | Geuna Aldo; Rossi Federica (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | Most European countries since the end of the 1990s have been moving away from inventor ownership of patent rights towards different systems of institutional ownership. This shift is based on the objectives of policymakers to make conditions similar to those in the US, where the 1980 Bayh–Dole Act allows universities to retain intellectual property rights (IPR) over inventions that come out of federally funded research. This article challenges the view that direct comparisons with US experience will enable us to predict the effects of the implementation of institutional IPR ownership systems in Europe. We provide an overview of the current state of regulation on academic patent ownership in selected European countries which shows that, despite the changes to institutional ownership that have been implemented, there is wide diversity in national systems and several important differences with the US framework. Our analysis of patterns of ownership of academic patents shows that there has not been a general increase in university patenting since 1990, and seeming increases may be due to more complex dynamics in academic patenting and academic patents ownership. The paper concludes with a discussion of how changes in IPR regulations and management of technology transfer by universities, and public policies supporting technology transfer are affecting academic patenting and research activities in universities |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201015&r=ipr |
| By: | Andersen Birgitte; Rossi Federica (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | The public discourse advocating increased patenting of academic discoveries, which has led to the approval of legislative measures (such as the Bayh Dole Act, which is now adopted world-wide in various forms) is based on a set of theoretical arguments, mainly related to knowledge transfer and financial reward. Using an original survey of 46 universities (about 27%) in the United Kingdom, we investigate whether some of these arguments are supported by evidence. We focus on the extent to which patents, as opposed to other forms of intellectual property (IP) protection mechanisms, enhance knowledge circulation, and especially contribute to universities’ own knowledge creation processes. We also investigate whether universities consider the markets for ideas and creative expressions to function efficiently. We find that universities use all forms of IP intensively in order to transfer their knowledge to industry or government. However, they mainly rely on non-proprietary IP (open source and no-patent strategies) when aiming to enhance their own knowledge creation processes. Also, universities do not find that markets for patents or copyrights function more smoothly than non-proprietary IP marketplaces. The results challenge the orthodox theories on the rationales for patents and other proprietary intellectual property rights (IPRs). Thus, we question the assumptions and arguments underpinning the implementation of patents on academic research outcomes via political reforms since the 1980s |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201016&r=ipr |
| By: | Andersen Birgitte; Rossi Federica (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | In recent years, much emphasis has been placed in the policy discourse on the patenting of academic research outcomes. However, universities produce a wide variety of IP, not all of which is suitable to be patented, or which universities may choose not to patent. The present article, building upon an original survey of 46 universities (about 27% of total) in the United Kingdom, investigates universities’ knowledge transfer processes through the exchange of a variety of forms of IP: patents, copyright, open source and non-patented innovations. The analysis concerns: (i) the extent to which universities exchange these forms of IP; (ii) whether they are used in a complementary or substitute way; and how relatively (iii) strategic effective and (iv) market efficient they are, in allowing universities to reach certain objectives (relating to knowledge transfer, competitive positioning, innovation and financial gain). We find that most universities perceive a variety of types of IP to be effective, usually in order to reach different strategic objectives. Certain forms of IP are use more than others for particular purposes, and no IP exchanges in the marketplace are exempt from institutional problems. Our results challenge the Bayh-Dole Act (now adopted in many OECD countries and elsewhere); i.e. whether patents and patent markets are the best tool for knowledge dissemination from research base into use, and other benefits, and whether instead it would be more appropriate to encourage universities to a variety of IP |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:201017&r=ipr |
| By: | Hiroaki Ino (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | Which is better off for the patentee to license its technology by fixed fee or unit royalties? Kamien and Tauman [8] showed that the fixed fee scheme brings greater private value of the patent in the linear model. We extend their analysis into a general model. Then, the simple fact that the model allows a increasing marginal cost supports the unit royalties scheme. More concretely, the unit royalties scheme is superior to the fixed fee scheme when the number of firms is large. |
| Keywords: | licensing, Cournot competition, convex cost, limit theorem |
| JEL: | D45 L13 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:65&r=ipr |
| By: | Cassi, Lorenzo; Plunket, Anne |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of co-inventor tie formation using micro-data on genomic patents from 1990 to 2006 in France. We consider in a single analysis the relational and proximity perspectives that are usually treated separately. In order to do so, we analyse the determinants of network ties that occur within existing components and between two distinct components (i.e. bridging ties). We test the argument that formation of these two different types of ties results from distinct strategies in accessing resources. Doing so, we contrast network and proximity determinants of network formation and we investigate if social network allows economic actors to cross over geographical, technological and organizational boundaries. |
| Keywords: | Social networks; relational perspective; proximity; co-patenting; network formation |
| JEL: | R12 Z13 D85 O31 |
| Date: | 2010–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27303&r=ipr |
| By: | Iske, Paul Louis (Maastricht University) |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-24597&r=ipr |
| By: | Link, Al (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics); Wessner, Charles (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | N/A |
| Keywords: | university; universities; entrepreneur |
| JEL: | O30 |
| Date: | 2010–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2010_012&r=ipr |