nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒11‒27
eight papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools By Gallini, Nancy
  2. Patent quality and value in discrete and cumulative innovation By Justus Baron; Henry Delcamp
  3. Products, patents and productivity persistence: A DSGE model of endogenous growth By Tom Holden
  4. The Limits of Economic Self-Interest: The Case of Open Source Software. By Powell, J.P.
  5. Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets By Laurent Granier; Sébastien Trinquard
  6. A theoretical and empirical contribution for a better understanding of academic spin-offs’ growth patterns By Chiara Balderi; Andrea Piccaluga
  7. Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment By Tomaso Duso; Lars-Hendrik Röller; Jo Seldeslachts
  8. A citation based ranking of German-speaking researchers in business administration with data of Google Scholar By Dilger, Alexander; Müller, Harry

  1. By: Gallini, Nancy
    Abstract: Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly infringement litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents to have “pro-competitive benefits†in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of costly infringement suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream innovation markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents. Special attention is given to the U.S. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its application to recent patent pool cases.
    Keywords: Patent pools, intellectual property, antitrust economics
    Date: 2010–11–17
  2. By: Justus Baron (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech); Henry Delcamp (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech)
    Abstract: This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literature.
    Date: 2010
  3. By: Tom Holden
    Abstract: This paper builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of endogenous growth that is capable of generating substantial degrees of endogenous persistence in productivity. When products go out of patent protection, the rush of entry into their production destroys incentives for process improvements. Consequently, old production processes are enshrined in industries producing non-protected products, resulting in aggregate productivity persistence. Our model also generates sizeable delayed movements in productivity in response to preference shocks, providing a form of endogenous news shock. Finally, if we calibrate our model to match a high aggregate mark-up then we can replicate the negative response of hours to a positive technology shock, even without the inclusion of any frictions.
    Keywords: Productivity persistence, patent protection, oligopoly, research and development
    JEL: E32 E37 L16 O31 O33 O34
    Date: 2010
  4. By: Powell, J.P. (Tilburg University)
    Date: 2010
  5. By: Laurent Granier (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines); Sébastien Trinquard (UNOCAM - Union nationale des organismes d'assurance maladie complémentaire - UNOCAM)
    Abstract: In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo- generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers' catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy.
    Keywords: Mergers; Pharmaceutical Market; Predation; Pseudo-Generics
    Date: 2010
  6. By: Chiara Balderi (Lab. MaIn – Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa); Andrea Piccaluga (Lab. MaIn – Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa)
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to contribute to the current debate about the growth patterns of academic spin-offs by focusing on the Italian context. In order to identify some growth determinants, we study the initial resource base, the firms’ market strategy and their network of relationships with the parent Public Research Organisations (PROs), by controlling for industry, competitive forces, local context, firms’ age and size. In consideration of the complexity of growth phenomena, we study three growth measures, namely employment, revenues and total asset growth. Our multivariate analysis shows that the bundle of initial assets lying at the heart of the firms’ growth prospects include the formal involvement of an industrial shareholder, the targeting of a large and broadly-defined market and the availability of a strong network of formal relationships with the parent PROs. On the contrary, the volume of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) portfolio, the experience previously ripened by the promoting partners in R&D and production functions and the availability of informal support mechanisms from the parent PROs do impact negatively and significantly on growth processes with regard to total assets. Finally, the specific New Product Development (NPD) stage, the amount of the starting capital, the formal involvement of a Venture Capital (VC), the experience previously ripened by the promoting partners in commercial and managerial functions and the breadth of the target market do not significantly affect growth processes.
    Date: 2010–04–01
  7. By: Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB)); Lars-Hendrik Röller (European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) and Humboldt University Berlin); Jo Seldeslachts (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.
    Keywords: Research Joint Ventures, Innovation, Collusion, NCRA
    JEL: K21 L24 L44 O32
    Date: 2010–11
  8. By: Dilger, Alexander; Müller, Harry
    Abstract: The quantitative evaluation of research performance in business administration has recently gained some attention in German-speaking countries. This holds especially for rankings of persons, which are discussed controversially. Rankings of academics can be constructed in two different ways, either based on journal rankings or based on citations. Despite citation based rankings promise some fundamental advantages, they are still not common in German-speaking business administration. However, the choice of the underlying data base is crucial. This paper argues that for German-speaking researchers in business administration (as an example for a non-English speaking scientific community in the social sciences) Google Scholar is an appropriate data base. Unfortunately, it contains some structural errors that require diligent corrections. With that in mind, all 1,572 members of the German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB, membership data by 2007) are ranked according to the citations of their recent publications (2005-2009). Obviously the citations follow a Pareto distribution amongst the scholars with large rank differences only at the top. The results are compared to those of the Handelsblatt-BWL-Ranking which is the most prominent journal based ranking of German-speaking academics in this discipline. It becomes clear that differences in method lead to different results. -- Die Messung von Forschungsleistungen mittels quantitativer Indikatoren hat in der deutschsprachigen Betriebswirtschaftslehre an Bedeutung gewonnen. Im Fokus des Interesses wie auch der Kritik stehen insbesondere Personenrankings, für deren Erstellung zwei Ansätze zur Verfügung stehen, entweder aufbauend auf einem Zeitschriftenranking oder direkt auf die individuellen Zitationen bezogen. Obwohl zitationsbasierte Personenrankings konzeptionelle Vorteile gegenüber zeitschriftenbasierten Rankings aufweisen, sind sie in der deutschsprachigen Betriebswirtschaftslehre bislang eher ungebräuchlich. Dabei kommt der verwendeten Datengrundlage eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu. In diesem Beitrag wird argumentiert, dass für die deutschsprachige BWL (als Beispiel für eine nicht genuin englischsprachige Sozialwissenschaft) Google Scholar eine geeignete Grundlage bilden kann. Angesichts einiger struktureller Fehler in Google Scholar erfordert die Erstellung eines Rankings allerdings eine sorgfältige Durchsicht und Nachkorrektur des Datensatzes. Auf diese Weise wurden die insgesamt 1.572 Mitglieder des Verbands der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft (VHB, Mitgliederverzeichnis 2007) entsprechend der Zitationen ihrer aktuellen Veröffentlichungen (2005-2009) gerankt. Dabei fällt auf, dass die Zitationen höchst ungleich verteilt sind und einer Pareto-Verteilung entsprechen. Die Ergebnisse werden mit denen des Handelsblatt-BWL-Rankings verglichen, wobei deutlich wird, dass methodische Unterschiede auch zu anderen Resultaten führen.
    JEL: I23 I20 A11 C81 I29 M00
    Date: 2010

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