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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Matthieu Glachant (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech); Yann Ménière (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the interplay between technology diffusion and patent law. We develop a dynamic model where initial adoptions generate learning spillovers that reduce the cost of subsequent adoptions. In this setting, we contrast technology diffusion paths under competitive supply, subsidized adoption and patent protection. Competitive supply entails various coordination failures that cannot be fully fixed through a public subsidy. We show that a patent holder can internalize externalities more efficiently, insofar as patent protection is fully effective. By contrast, fully competitive supply may be more efficient when patent enforcement is imperfect. |
| Keywords: | Technology diffusion; intellectual property rights; price discrimination; learning spillovers |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00508795_v1&r=ipr |
| By: | Janina Reinkowski; Björn Alecke; Timo Mitze; Gerhard Untiedt |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and development (R&D) activity for East German firms. Using propensity score matching, our empirical results indicate that subsidized firms indeed show a higher level of R&D intensity and a higher probability for patent application compared to non-subsidized firms for our sample year 2003. On average we find an increase in the R&D intensity of about 3.7 percentage points relative to non-subsidized firms. The probability for patent applications rises by 21 percentage points. These results closely match earlier empirical results for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation system is particularly driven by small and medium sized enterprises (SME), we put a special focus on the effectiveness of the R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here no previous empirical evidence is available so far. Our findings indicate that policy effectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, where the highest increase in terms of R&D intensity is estimated for micro businesses with up to 10 employees. |
| Keywords: | Propensity score matching; R&D subsidies; East Germany; SME |
| JEL: | C14 C21 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2010–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0204&r=ipr |
| By: | Jeongmeen Suh; Murat Yilmaz |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bou:wpaper:2010/16&r=ipr |
| By: | Alireza Abbasi (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), Seoul National University); Jorn Altmann (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), Seoul National University) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we develop a theoretical model based on social network theory to understand how the collaboration (co-authorship) network of scholars correlates to the research performance of scholars. For this analysis, we use social network analysis (SNA) measures (i.e., normalized closeness centrality, normalized betweenness centrality, efficiency, and two types of degree centrality). The analysis of data shows that the research performance of scholars is positively correlated with two SNA measures (i.e., weighted degree centrality and efficiency). In particular, scholars with strong ties (i.e., repeated co-authorships, i.e., high weighted degree centrality) show a better research performance than those with low ties (e.g., single co-authorships with many different scholars). The results related to efficiency show that scholars, who maintain a strong co-authorship relationship to only one co-author of a group of linked co-authors (i.e., co-authors that have joined publications), perform better than those researchers with many relationships to the same group of linked co-authors. |
| Keywords: | Social Network Analysis, Co-authorship Network, Researchers' Performance. |
| JEL: | C43 C44 C65 D80 D85 M12 M21 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:201066&r=ipr |
| By: | Viral V. Acharya; Ramin P. Baghai; Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian |
| Abstract: | Stringent labor laws can provide firms a commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby spur their employees to pursue value-enhancing innovative activities. Using patents and citations as proxies for innovation, we identify this effect by exploiting the time-series variation generated by staggered country-level changes in dismissal laws. We find that within a country, innovation and economic growth are fostered by stringent laws governing dismissal of employees, especially in the more innovation-intensive sectors. Firm-level tests within the United States that exploit a discontinuity generated by the passage of the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act confirm the cross-country evidence. |
| JEL: | F30 G31 J08 J5 K31 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16484&r=ipr |
| By: | Richard Watt |
| Abstract: | In the vast majority of the literature on the economics of copyright royalties, it is assumed that the copyright holder is remunerated either by a fixed payment or by a payment that amounts to an additional marginal cost to the user, or both. However, in some significant instances in the real-world, copyright holders are constrained to a compensation scheme that involves revenue sharing. That is, the copyright holder takes as remuneration a part of the user’s revenue. In essence, the remuneration is set as a tax on the user’s revenue. This paper analyses such remuneration mechanisms, establishing and analysing the optimal tax rate, and also the Nash equilibrium tax rate that would emerge from a fair and unconstrained bargaining problem. The second option provids a rate that may be useful for regulatory authorities. |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:23-2010&r=ipr |