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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Shane B. Evans |
| Abstract: | In this paper a Developer contracts with a Researcher for the production of a non-drastic innovation. Since effort is non-contractible, the Developer offers an incentive contract dependent on the observed magnitude of the innovation. It is shown that the distribution of intellectual property rights (IPR) ownership does not affect the level of effort exerted for innovations where the Developer would choose to license the innovation to its competitors. This is because the possibility of leakage of the innovation through licensing subsidies the Developer's payment when IPR is delegated to the Researcher, while at the same time eroding its profit. |
| JEL: | D23 L24 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2010-530&r=ipr |
| By: | Michael Polder; George van Leeuwen; Pierre Mohnen; Wladimir Raymond |
| Abstract: | We propose a model where both R&D and ICT investment feed into a system of three innovation output equations (product, process and organizational innovation), which ultimately feeds into a productivity equation. We find that ICT investment and usage are important drivers of innovation in both manufacturing and services. Doing more R&D has a positive effect on product innovation in manufacturing. The strongest productivity effects are derived from organizational innovation. We find positive effects of product and process innovation when combined with an organizational innovation. There is evidence that organizational innovation is complementary to process innovation. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; ICT; R&D; Productivity |
| JEL: | L25 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:10-24&r=ipr |
| By: | James Roumasset (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics); Nori Tarui (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We provide a dynamic model of natural resource management where the optimal institutional structure that governs resource use changes with resource depletion. Copeland and Taylor (2009) analyze how characteristics of a natural resource determine whether its steady-state management regime is open access, communal property, or private property. We extend this and other studies of endogenous institutions to analyze how and when resource governance may change in transition to the steady state, taking into account the fixed costs of institutional change and the variable costs of enforcement and governance. Assuming that governance cost is increasing in the difference between open-access and the actual harvest, we show that open access can be optimal if the resource is abundant relative to its demand and/or if governance costs are high. Once open access is rendered inefficient due to increased resource scarcity, further depletion warrants institutional change. In the face of set-up costs, optimal governance implies non-monotonic resource dynamics. These findings help to explain the co-evolution of resource scarcity and property rights—from open access to common property and beyond. We also extend the Demsetz/Copeland-Taylor theory of price-induced institutional change to include changing scarcity during the transition to the steady state. |
| JEL: | D23 O13 Q20 |
| Date: | 2010–09–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201015&r=ipr |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | Strong forces lead to a withering of academia as it exists today. The major causal forces are the rankings mania, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university,” and inadequate organizational forms for modern research. Academia, in a broader sense understood as “the locus of seeking truth and learning through methodological inquiry,” will subsist in different forms. The conclusion is therefore pessimistic with respect to the academic system as it presently exists but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the transformation predicted is expected to be fundamental. |
| Keywords: | Academia, universities, research, rankings, publications, fraud |
| JEL: | A1 I23 L30 Z0 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:512&r=ipr |