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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Christ, Julian P. |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes with empirical findings to European co-inventorship location and geographical coincidence of co-patenting networks. Based on EPO co-patenting information for the reference period 2000-2004, we analyze the spatial configuration of 44 technology-specific co-inventorship networks. European co-inventorship (co-patenting) activity is spatially linked to 1259 European NUTS3 units (EU25+CH+NO) and their NUTS1 regions by inventor location. We extract 7.135.117 EPO co-patenting linkages from our own relational database that makes use of the OECD RegPAT (2009) Files. The matching between International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses and 44 technology fields is based on the ISI-SPRU-OST-concordance. We confirm the hypothesis that the 44 co-inventorship networks differ in their overall size (nodes, linkages, self-loops) and that they are dominated by similar groupings of regions. The paper offers statistical evidence for the presence of highly localized European co-inventorship networks for all 44 technology fields, as the majority of linkages between NUTS3 units (counties and districts) are within the same NUTS1 regions. Accordingly, our findings helps to understand general presence of positive spatial autocorrelation in regional patent data. Our analysis explicitly accounts for different network centrality measures (betweenness, degree, eigenvector). Spearman rank correlation coefficients for all 44 technology fields confirm that most co-patenting networks co-locate in those regions that are central in several technology-specific co-patenting networks. These findings support the hypothesis that leading European regions are indeed multi-field network nodes and that most research collaboration is taking place in dense co-patenting networks. -- |
| Keywords: | co-patenting,co-inventorship,networks,linkages,co-location,RegPAT |
| JEL: | C8 O31 O33 R12 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohpro:y2010i31p1-40&r=ipr |
| By: | ITO Banri; YASHIRO Naomitsu; XU Zhaoyuan; CHEN Xiaohong; WAKASUGI Ryuhei |
| Abstract: | Recently, Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) in China have increased their investment in not only production activity but also R&D activity. This paper examines the impact of spillovers from their activities on two types of innovations by Chinese domestic firms: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and invention patent application, using comprehensive industry and province-level data. We evaluate such spillovers according to FIEs' ownership structure, the origin of foreign funds, and the type of their activity: R&D, and production. We find an interesting asymmetry between spillovers to TFP and patent application; however, although we do not find significant intra-industry spillovers from FIEs, which is in line with previous studies, we find robust inter-industries spillover on TFP. We also find substantial intra-industry spillovers promoting invention patent application but no evidence of inter-industries spillovers. Furthermore, whereas spillovers from FIEs to Chinese firmsf TFP stem from their production activities, the source of spillovers to invention patent application is mostly through their R&D activity. Our findings indicate a need for multi-dimensional evaluation on the role of FDI in developing countries. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:10026&r=ipr |
| By: | Toshihiro Matsumura; Noriaki Matsushima |
| Abstract: | Innovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new products by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a firm launches a new product, product positioning is also an important matter. We consider a standard linear city model with two firms in which the licenser and the licensee negotiate on licensing and engage in Nash bargaining after they determine their product positions. We investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser affects the product positions of the firms. We find that the licenser more likely chooses the central position when its bargaining power is weak whereas the product position of the licenser accelerates price competition between the firms. We also discuss the welfare implication. We find that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0775&r=ipr |
| By: | Elisa Barbieri (Department of Economics, Institutions and Environment University of Ferrara) |
| Abstract: | Governments in western countries are seeing Universities as the key actor to promote a transition to a knowledge-based economy that can help the future competitiveness challenges posed by new entrants in the global market. In this context, specific industrial policies are designed to promote a transfer of technology, and a more general transfer of knowledge from universities to firms, in order to favour innovation, that is the economic exploitation and commercialisation of new products and processes generated by inventions within universities. Although the use of these policies is rapidly expanding, the same cannot be said of the evaluation efforts made to understand the effects of the reforms promoted in western economies. This paper offers a contribution to the existing literature and highlights some key open issues on which future research can build in order to improve the knowledge on the effectiveness of reforms we are witnessing, in particular in the U.S. and in Europe. |
| Keywords: | Evaluation of policies; university technology transfer; university patenting; university spin-off |
| JEL: | L3 O3 H5 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cme:wpaper:1001&r=ipr |
| By: | Garzarelli, Giampaolo; Fontanella, Riccardo |
| Abstract: | This work shows that the modular organization of voluntary Open Source Software (OSS) production, whereby programmers supply effort of their accord, capitalizes more on division than on specialization of labor. This is so because voluntary OSS production is characterized by an organizational learning process that dominates the individual one. Organizational learning reveals production choices that would otherwise remain unknown, thereby increasing productivity and indirectly reinforcing incentives to undertake collective problem solving. |
| Keywords: | Division of Labor; Mistake-ridden Learning; Modularity; Open Source Software; Self-selection; Voluntary Production |
| JEL: | L23 D20 L17 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22949&r=ipr |