nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒01‒16
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Patent Protection with Licensing By Che, Xiaogang; Yang, Yibai
  2. Patent Protection with Cooperative R&D Option By Che, Xiaogang; Yang, Yibai
  3. Knowledge spillovers in U.S. patents: a dynamic patent intensity model with secret common innovation factors By Szabolcs Blazsek; ALvaro Escribano
  4. Patents, Entrepreneurship and Performance By Christian Helmers; Mark Rogers
  5. The dominance of fee licensing contracts under asymmetric information signaling By Manel Antelo
  6. A Discrete Model for Patent Valuation By Roy Cerqueti; Marco Ventura
  7. The Nature of Inventive Activities : Evidence from a Data-Set of R&D Awards By Fontana, Roberto; Nuvolari, Alessandro; Shimizu, Hiroshi; Vezzulli, Andrea
  8. The Interaction between Antitrust and Intellectual Property : the Interoperability Issue in the Microsoft Europe Case By Scopelliti, Alessandro Diego
  9. Citation Success: Evidence from Economic History Journal Publications By Waldenström, Daniel; Di Vaio, Gianfranco; Weisdorf, Jacob

  1. By: Che, Xiaogang; Yang, Yibai
    Abstract: This note gives a short proof that both fixed-fee and royalty licensing under patent protection can always create higher R&D investment.
    Keywords: R&D investment; Patent protection; Licensing
    JEL: O38 O34 O32
    Date: 2009–12–19
  2. By: Che, Xiaogang; Yang, Yibai
    Abstract: We investigate R&D incentive under patent protection with cooperation option. Chowdhury [Economics Letters, 2005, 89(1), 120-126] claims that patent protection may decrease R&D incentive when the tournament effect (TE) is negative. However, We show that patent protection in the presence of R&D cooperation option always increases R&D incentive. In addition, to increase R&D incentive, this option strictly dominates imitation and may dominate royalty licensing under patent protection, introduced by Mukherjee [Economics Letters, 2006, 93(2), 196-201].
    Keywords: R&D investment; Patent protection; Cooperative R&D
    JEL: O38 O34 O32
    Date: 2009–12–19
  3. By: Szabolcs Blazsek; ALvaro Escribano
    Abstract: During the past two decades, innovations protected by patents have played a key role in business strategies. This fact enhanced studies of the determinants of patents and the impact of patents on innovation and competitive advantage. Sustaining competitive advantages is as important as creating them. Patents help sustaining competivite advantages by increasing the production cost of competitors, by signaling a better quality of products and by serving as barriers to entry. If patents are rewards for innovation, more R&D should be reflected in more patents applications but this is not the end of the story. There is empirical evidence showing that patents through time are becoming easier to get and more valuable to the firm due to increasing damage awards from infringers. These facts question the constant and static nature of the relationship between R&D and patents. Furthermore, innovation creates important knowledge spillovers due to its imperfect appropriability. Our paper investigates these dynamic effects using U.S. patent data from 1979 to 2000 with alternative model specifications for patent counts. We introduce a general dynamic count panel data model with dynamic observable and unobservable spillovers, which encompasses previous models, is able to control for the endogeneity of R&D and therefore can be consistently estimated by maximum likelihood. Apart from allowing for firm specific fixed and random effects, we introduce a common unobserved component, or secret stock of knowledge, that affects differently the propensity to patent of each firm across sectors due to their different absorptive capacity.
    Keywords: Point process, Conditional intensity, Latent factor, R&D spillovers, Patents, Secret innovations
    JEL: C15 C31 C32 C33 C41
    Date: 2009–12
  4. By: Christian Helmers; Mark Rogers
    Abstract: This paper provides an overview of a new database that uses intellectual property data to track the innovative activity of firms in the UK. The paper looks at the extent and nature of patenting activity, focusing on micro firms and SMEs. Over the period 2000 to 2007, SME patenting has increased whereas large firm patenting has fallen and micro firm patenting has been roughly con- stant. Most micro and SMEs patent while relatively young (aged ten or less) and this tendency is becoming more pronounced over time. The paper provides a descriptive analysis on micro firms and SMEs that become high growth firms (defined as having greater than 20 percent growth per annum). Overall, 28.0 percent of young micro and SMEs achieve high growth (over 2002 to 2007). In comparison, 29.4 percent of young micro or SMEs that patent achieve high growth. This difference is much greater for firms in the high-tech industries. Moreover, the analysis shows that due to the skewed nature of the firm-level growth distribution, standard conditional mean estimators may fail to uncover important differences in the association between patenting and firm growth across the conditional growth distribution.
    Keywords: Firm growth, patents
    JEL: L25 O12
    Date: 2009–12
  5. By: Manel Antelo (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela)
    Abstract: This paper compares different licensing contracts defined by the type of payment (fees or royalties) and contract duration (short- or long-term) in a setting in which an outside patent holder that owns a patented innovation lasting for two periods licenses it to downstream Cournot firms; further, there is asymmetric information about firms' costs emerged from the use of innovation, but they are signaled through the output produced in period 1. In this context, if we concentrate on fee contracts, the patent holder prefers short-term (revealing) contracts rather than long-term contracts.
    Keywords: Licensing, signaling, fees, royalties, short- and long-term contracts, welfare
    JEL: D45
    Date: 2009
  6. By: Roy Cerqueti (University of Macerata, Italy. Department of Economic and Financial Institutions); Marco Ventura (ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses)
    Abstract: This article evaluates patents in a stochastic discrete time framework following the real options approach. By modeling the dynamics of the underlying as a spatial point process both size and time of the jumps can be treated as random variables. The propagation of the jumps from the underlying security to the patent value is not restricted to be immediate, but can occur with a random delay and with varying intensity, depending on the time to maturity. These actual features lead to a more generalized formula for patent value, that in turn may give rise to a non trivial difference in patent value, not accounted for in the existing literature.
    Keywords: patent value; spatial mixed Poisson process; real options.
    JEL: O34 C65
    Date: 2009–12
  7. By: Fontana, Roberto; Nuvolari, Alessandro; Shimizu, Hiroshi; Vezzulli, Andrea
    Abstract: This paper presents an exploratory study on the characteristics of inventive activities as captured on the basis of the analysis of a data-set of R&D awards. Our data source is the "R&D 100 Awards" competition organized by the journal Research and Development. Since 1963, the magazine (which at that time was called Industrial Research) has been awarding this prize to 100 most technologically significant new products available for sale or licensing in the year preceding the judgment. The jury is composed of university professors, industrial researchers and consultants with a certified level of competence in the specific areas they are called to asses. The main criteria for assessment are: i) technological significance (i.e., whether the product can be considered a major breakthrough), ii) competitive significance (i.e., how the product compares to rival solutions available on the market). Throughout the years, key breakthroughs inventions such as Polacolor film (1963), the flashcube (1965), the automated teller machine (1973), the halogen lamp (1974), the fax machine (1975), the liquid crystal display (1980), the printer (1986), the Kodak Photo CD (1991), the Nicoderm antismoking patch (1992), Taxol anticancer drug (1993), lab on a chip (1996), and HDTV (1998) have received the prize. We use these data to study the shifts in the distribution of innovative activities across countries, sectors and types of institutions and the changes in the sources of inventive activities over time. Our preliminary findings show: i) the emergence of a challenge to US technological leadership from other rival nations such as Japan and Germany, ii) the critical role of scientific instrumentation as a powerful source of technological breakthroughs, iii) a change in the institutional arrangements where innovative activities take place, from individual corporations, to partnerships increasingly involving public research organizations and universities, iv) a large chunk of inventive activities undertaken without patent protection.
    JEL: O34 O31 O32 N80
    Date: 2009–12
  8. By: Scopelliti, Alessandro Diego (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)
    Abstract: The present work analyzes the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual property protection, with particular reference to the cases of refusal to supply, when it concerns ideas or inventions protected by an IP right. For this purpose, the paper preliminarily discusses the governing principles of antitrust policy on abuse of dominance and refusal to deal, as they have been implemented in the decisions of the EU Competition Authority, and it presents the specific issues related to the implementation of antitrust policy in the innovative industries. Then, the paper examines in particular the Microsoft Europe Case, as decided by the European Commission in 2004, focusing on the issue of the interoperability between the operating systems for personal computers and the operating systems for work group servers. The theoretical model, developed as an extension of the framework proposed by Choi and Stefanadis (2001) to the case of refusal to deal, suggests an explanation of the case, alternative to the one adopted by the Commission, if not necessarily in the final outcome of the decision, at least in the analytical arguments and in the dynamics of the market structure. In particular, we show that the refusal to supply the compatibility between the two complementary products was determined not only by the intention to leverage its dominant position to the adjacent market of server operating systems, but especially by the concern for keeping the monopoly on its core market, that is the one of PC operating system, given the future evolution of the software market, due to the diffusion of cloud computing.
    Keywords: abuse of dominance ; intellectual property ; refusal to supply ; computer software market ; interoperability ; dynamic leverage JEL Codes: K21 ; L12 ; L41 ; L86
    Date: 2010
  9. By: Waldenström, Daniel (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Di Vaio, Gianfranco (University of Perugia); Weisdorf, Jacob (University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This study analyses determinants of citation success among authors publishing in economic history journals. Bibliometric features, like article length and number of authors, are positively correlated with the citation rate up to a certain point. Remarkably, publishing in top-ranked journals hardly affects citations. In regard to author-specific characteristics, male authors, full professors and authors working economics or history departments, and authors employed in Anglo-Saxon countries, are more likely to get cited than others. As a ‘shortcut’ to citation success, we find that research diffusion, measured by number of presentations and people mentioned in acknowledgement, boosts the citation rate.
    Keywords: Bibliometrics; Citation Analysis; Citation Success; Economic History; Scientometrics; Poisson Regression
    JEL: A10 A11 A14 N10
    Date: 2010–01–04

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