nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒01‒10
eight papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Patent Productivity of German Professors over the Life Cycle By Sidonia von Ledebur
  2. Catching-up and falling behind: knowledge spillover from American to German machine tool makers By Richter, Ralf; Streb, Jochen
  3. International Harmonization of the Patent-Awarding Rules By Kaz Miyagiwa
  4. Royalty Licensing. By Marta San Martin; Ana I. Saracho
  5. Do Competitively Acquired Funds Induce Public Research Institutions to Behave Efficiently? By Thomas Bolli; Frank Somogyi
  6. The Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons from the Spread of Illegal Transgenic Cotton Seeds in India By Bharat Ramaswami
  7. Economists in the PITS? By Bruno S. Frey
  8. Crowdsourcing: What can be Outsourced to the Crowd, and Why ? By Eric Schenk; Claude Guittard

  1. By: Sidonia von Ledebur (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg)
    Abstract: The paper studies the patent productivity of scientists over their life cycle. The incentives for patenting and for publishing are compared and how they shape life cycle productivity. In most empirical studies, publication productivity decreases at the end of the scientific career. In contrast, the analytical model given here suggests an increase of patent productivity over the life time. In the empirical part the patents of nearly 1000 German patent active professors are analyzed. The empirical findings support the theoretical prediction that patent productivity does not decline for older scientists.
    Keywords: : university patenting, patent productivity, scientific productivity, age and productivity, Germany
    JEL: O33 O34 J24
    Date: 2009
  2. By: Richter, Ralf; Streb, Jochen
    Abstract: In our days, German machine tool makers accuse their Chinese competitors of violating patent rights and illegally imitating German technology. A century ago, however, German machine tool makers used exactly the same methods to imitate American technology. To understand the dynamics of this catching-up process we use patent statistics to analyze firms' activities between 1877 and 1932. We show that German machine tool makers successfully deployed imitating and counterfeiting activities in the late 19th century and the 1920s to catchup to their American competitors. The German administration supported this strategy by stipulating a patent law that discriminated against foreign patent holders and probably also by delaying the granting of patents to foreign applicants. Parallel to the growing international competitiveness of German firms, however, the willingness to guarantee intellectual property rights of foreigners was also increasing because German firms had now to fear retaliatory measures in their own export markets when violating foreign property rights within Germany. --
    Date: 2009
  3. By: Kaz Miyagiwa
    Abstract: While the rest of the world issues patents to those who file applications first the U.S. do so to those who can demonstrate to have made inventions first. The U.S. has recently been under pressure to conform to the international rule. In this paper I examine the effect of international harmonization of the patent-awarding rules. In a dynamic two-country model of R&D competition for sequential inventions, I find that harmonization to the first-to-file rule can undermine innovation. This result is more like to arise if secondary innovations are relatively easy and their commercial successes are predominantly in the U.S. markets.
    Date: 2009–12
  4. By: Marta San Martin (UPV/EHU); Ana I. Saracho (UPV/EHU)
    Abstract: A patent provides its holder the monopolist´s right to sell licenses that allow the use of new technology. Empirically, most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per unit or ad valorem royalties. The theoretical literature, however, has focused most of its attention to attempt to explain the presence of royalties by considering per-unit royalties. In this paper, we show that an internal patentee may prefer licensing by means of ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties and other licensing mechanism traditionally considered in the literature. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be less aggressive since its licensing revenues become increasing in the price of output. As a result, licensing hurts consumers.
    Keywords: Patent Licening; Royalty; Cournot Duooly
    JEL: D45
    Date: 2009–12–16
  5. By: Thomas Bolli (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Frank Somogyi (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of public and private third-party funds on the efficiency of departments of Swiss public research institutions. Estimating an output distance function assuming that labor is used to produce master students and scientific publications, we find no statistically significant effectcant effect of private or public third-party funding on research effciency. However, once we include technology transfer as an additional output, the coeffcient of private funding is statistically significant. We further find that this disciplining effect of private funding is qualitatively robust in a setting controlling for endogeneity.
    Keywords: Efficiency, Research, University, Technology Transfer, Third-Party Funding, Public Finance
    Date: 2009–11
  6. By: Bharat Ramaswami
    Abstract: This paper examines these difficulties of regulation in the context of spread of unapproved transgenic Bt cotton seeds in India. This paper also examines the impact of the cultivation of approved and unapproved seeds on farmers and also examines the farmers' valuation of Bt seeds.
    Keywords: Gujarat, cotton seeds, India, bt seeds, cultivation, seeds, regulation, farmers, Intellectual propoerty rights, transgenic, institutions, transgenic crops, developing countries, hybrids, labour intensive, Andhra Pradesh
    Date: 2009
  7. By: Bruno S. Frey
    Abstract: Academic economists today are caught in a "Publication Impossibility Theorem System" or PITS. In order to further their careers, they are required to publish in A-journals, but for the vast majority this is impossible because there are few slots open for them in such journals. Such academic competition maybe useful to generate hard work; however, there may be serious negative consequences: the wrong output may be produced in an inefficient way, the wrong people may be selected, and losers may react in a harmful way. This article suggests several ways to remedy this situation.
    Keywords: Academia; Economists; Publication; Journals; Incentives; Economic methodology
    JEL: A1 D02 I23
    Date: 2009–12
  8. By: Eric Schenk (LGeco - Laboratoire de Génie de la Conception - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Strasbourg, BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université de Strasbourg); Claude Guittard (BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université Louis Pasteur - Strasbourg I)
    Abstract: Why should a firm outsource certain activities in countries where labor is inexpensive, when by using the Internet, firms are a mouse click away from an eclectic, university educated, population ready to invest in intellectually stimulating projects for little or no remuneration ? The word Crowdsourcing –a compound contraction of Crowd and Outsourcing, was used by Howe in order to define outsourcing to the crowd. Beyond cost, benefits for the company can be substantial. It can externalize the risk of failure and it only pays for products or services that meet its expectations. The aim of this paper is to characterize Crowdsourcing from a management science perspective. Our approach is mainly theoretical, although we rely on extensive illustrations. First we discuss the definition of Crowdsourcing, and provide examples that illustrate the diversity of Crowdsourcing practices. Then, we present similarities and differences between Crowdsourcing and established theories (Open Innovation, User Innovation) and a phenomenon that has inspired many studies in Economics and Management, Open Source Software. Our goal is to avoid future misunderstandings and to show that Crowdsourcing is a concept per se. Finally, we propose and illustrate a typology of Crowdsourcing practices based on two criteria: the integrative or selective nature of the process and the type of tasks that are crowdsourced (routine, complex and creative tasks). In either case, the client firm seeks to mobilize external competencies. Relying upon the crowd can be an adequate method, because of its unique characteristics that are fostered by the Internet.
    Keywords: Web 2.0; Crowdsourcing; Open Source: Open Innovation; User Innovation
    Date: 2009–12–07

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