nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2009‒08‒16
four papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. How to play the “Names Game”: Patent retrieval comparing different heuristics By Julio Raffo; Stéphane Lhuillery
  2. Are Patent Laws Harmful to Developing Countries? Evidence from China By Belton M. Fleisher; Mi Zhou
  3. On the Real Effects of Private Equity Investment: Evidence from New Business Creation. By Alexander Popov; Peter Roosenboom
  4. Government Oversight of Public Universities: Are Centralized Performance Schemes Related to Increased Quantity or Quality? By A. Abigail Payne; Joanne Roberts

  1. By: Julio Raffo (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, MTEI, CDM, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne / CEPN, Université Paris Nord); Stéphane Lhuillery (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, MTEI, CDM, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
    Abstract: Patent statistics represent a critical tool for scholars, statisticians and policy makers interested in innovation and intellectual property rights. Many analyses are based on heterogeneous methods delineating the inventors’ or firms’ patent portfolios without questioning the quality of the method employed. We assess different heuristics in order to provide a robust solution to automatically retrieve inventors in large patent datasets (PATSTAT). The solution we propose reduces the usual errors by 50% and casts doubts on the reliability of statistical indicators and micro-econometric results based on common matching procedures. Guidelines for researchers, TTOs, firms, venture capitalists and policy makers likely to implement a names game or to comment on results based on a names game are also provided.
    Keywords: patents, inventors, names, matching algorithm, indicators, PATSTAT
    JEL: C63 C81 C88 O34
    Date: 2009–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmi:wpaper:cemi-workingpaper-2009-006&r=ipr
  2. By: Belton M. Fleisher (Department of Economics, Ohio State University); Mi Zhou (College of Economics and Trade, Hunan University)
    Abstract: Has upgrading and enforcing its patent laws slowed China’s economic growth? The answer we draw from detailed analysis of provincial aggregate data covering roughly the period 1990 through 2007 is strongly negative, but understanding the channels through which stricter protection of intellectual property rights has contributed to more rapid productivity growth is elusive. Our best estimate of the direct impact of the 1992 and 2001 patent laws on TFP growth amounts to not quite 15 percent of the average TFP growth rate over the period, but a much larger share of TFP growth is associated with enactment of the laws in a simple interpretation of our empirical investigation. We estimate that virtually none of the laws’ impact on TFP growth can be directly associated with increased quantity of FDI or R&D, although both series are strongly positively correlated with promulgation of the patent laws. We infer that amount of technology transfer through a FDI and the focus of R&D activity, decline of state ownership and increased marketization, growth of the human capital stock, and movement of the labor force from agriculture to manufacturing and service industries are all processes that were encouraged and whose effect has been magnified by stronger IPR protection. Moreover, adopting and enforcing the patent laws probably cannot be treated as an independent event with causation running in only one direction to China’s economic development..
    Keywords: Patent law, Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS, TFP Growth
    JEL: O31 O33 O34
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osu:osuewp:09-07&r=ipr
  3. By: Alexander Popov (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Peter Roosenboom (Department of Finance, Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, NL 3062PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands.)
    Abstract: Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study how private equity affects the rate of firm entry. We find that private equity investment benefits new business incorporation, especially in industries with naturally higher entry rates and R&D intensity. A two standard deviation increase in private equity investment explains as much as 5.5% of the variation in entry between high-entry and low-entry industries. We address endogeneity by exploiting data on laws that regulate private equity investments by pension funds. Our results hold when we correct for barriers to entry, general access to credit, protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations. JEL Classification: G24, L26, M13.
    Keywords: private equity, venture capital, firm entry.
    Date: 2009–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20091078&r=ipr
  4. By: A. Abigail Payne; Joanne Roberts
    Abstract: Universities are engaged in many activities; primarily, research and teaching. Many states have instituted performance measures that focus on evaluating a university's success in teaching. We suggest that multitasking may be important in this context, and we consider research outcomes after adoption. We find striking results that depend on university status. Research activity is higher at flagship institutions after the adoption of performance measures. Most of this increase in activity is with respect to the level of research funding and the number of articles produced. In contrast, research funding and the number of publications is dramatically lower at non-flagship institutions. There is some evidence that citations per publication at non-flagship institutions are higher after the adoption of performance standards. The evidence suggests that universities have become more specialized since the introduction of these programs.
    JEL: H3 H4
    Date: 2009–01–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2009-04&r=ipr

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