nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2009‒07‒28
five papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. University-owned Patents in West and East Germany and the Abolition of the Professors' Privilege By Sidonia von Ledebur
  2. Meritocracy and Innovation: Is There a Link? Empirical Evidence from Firms in Brazil By Barros, Henrique M.; Lazzarini, Sergio G.
  3. Competition, imitation, and technical change : quality vs. variety By Cusolito, Ana
  4. Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their Dynamics By Raymond Wladimir; Mohnen Pierre; Palm Franz; Schim van der Loeff Sybrand
  5. The Incentive to Invest in Environmental-Friendly Technologies: Dynamics Makes a Difference By Davide Dragone; Luca Lambertini; Arsen Palestini

  1. By: Sidonia von Ledebur (Department of Geography, Philipps University Marburg)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the development of universities' patent applications in Germany before and after the abolition of the 'professors' privilege' in 2002. By means of a database with all patent applications of German universities with professors among the inventors (1990-2006), systematic changes in the trend are investigated. There are contrasts in the patenting patterns of universities with or without long patenting experience. A structural break at the point of the new legislation is found only for universities without patent activities in the past. This indicates the importance of collecting patenting experience and that the amount of patents is path-dependent.
    Keywords: university patenting, Germany, technology transfer, professors' privilege
    JEL: O34 O38 L31
    Date: 2009
  2. By: Barros, Henrique M.; Lazzarini, Sergio G.
    Date: 2009–10
  3. By: Cusolito, Ana
    Abstract: Some researchers have documented that the path of development is remarkably related to the pattern of sectoral diversification. Others have highlighted the relation between productive specialization and economic progress. This paper explores the role of product market competition and intellectual property rights protection in the pattern of sectoral diversification. The paper confirms the insight of the innovation literature, that competition induces firms to specialize and upgrade the quality of existing goods. However, it reveals a new force, called the imitation effect, through which competition biases technical change toward product diversification. The paper shows that if knowledge spillovers increase with imitation, or the degree of product substitution is high, weak protection of property rights encourages firms to create low-quality goods, thereby directing technical change toward diversification. The predictions are tested with data on Italian firms'innovation activity. They are found to be consistent with observed behavior.
    Keywords: Education for Development (superceded),Economic Theory&Research,E-Business,Markets and Market Access,Labor Policies
    Date: 2009–07–01
  4. By: Raymond Wladimir; Mohnen Pierre; Palm Franz; Schim van der Loeff Sybrand (METEOR)
    Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic relationship between input and output of innovation inDutch manufacturing using an unbalanced panel of enterprise data from five waves of the Community Innovation Survey during 1994-2004. We estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data bivariate tobit with double-index sample selection accounting for individual effects.We find persistence of innovation input and innovation output, a lag effect of the former onthe latter and a feedback effect of the latter on the former. The lag effect remains significantin the high-tech sector even after four years. Firm and industry effects are also important.
    Keywords: Economics (Jel: A)
    Date: 2009
  5. By: Davide Dragone (Department of Economics, University of Bologna); Luca Lambertini (Department of Economics, University of Bologna; ENCORE, University of Amsterdam; RCEA); Arsen Palestini (Department of Economics, University of Bologna)
    Abstract: The established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental externalities has it that, since firms neglect the external effect, their incentive to invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to some form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to this issue, using a simple differential game to show that the conclusion reached by the static literature is not robust, as the introduction of dynamics shows that firms do invest in R&D for environmental-friendly technologies throughout the game, as long as R&D is accompanied by an output restriction exhibiting a distinctively collusive flavour. We also examine the social planning case and the effects of Pigouvian taxation, to show that there exists a feasible tax rate inducing profit-seeking firms to choose a combination of output and R&D such that the resulting social welfare level is the same as in the first best
    Keywords: pollution, environmental externality, R&D, differential games, social planning
    JEL: H23 L13 O31 Q55
    Date: 2009–01

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