nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2009‒03‒28
three papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Evidence for increasing concentration in plant breeding industries in the United States and the European Union By Nolan, Elizabeth; Santos, Paulo
  2. Managing R&D Alliance Portfolios By Engel Nielsen, Lars; Mahnke, Volker
  3. What Is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Identification of a Static Model of Licensing and Some Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers By Mario Pagliero

  1. By: Nolan, Elizabeth; Santos, Paulo
    Abstract: There is evidence of an increase in market concentration and in the importance of private plant breeding in the seed industry following the widespread adoption of Intellectual Property Rights regimes for the industry in the developed world. We use data from the US Patent and Trademark Office, US Plant Variety Protection Office and various European Plant Variety Protection databases to estimate the extent of these changes in the seed corn industry.
    Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, R&D, market concentration, germplasm,
    Date: 2009
  2. By: Engel Nielsen, Lars (Department of Informatics, Copenhagen Business School); Mahnke, Volker (Department of Informatics, Copenhagen Business School)
    Abstract: Many companies in high technology fields engage with alliance partners to reduce risks, create synergies and learn. While the challenges of managing individual alliances are well documented, little is known on how to manage several R&D alliances simultaneously. Multiple alliance strategies can be observed in several companies engaged in the cross section of telecommunication and mobile technology where increased complexity magnifies managerial challenges. Drawing on modern portfolio theory, this paper offers a model for managing portfolios of R&D alliances. In particular, an analysis of a technology platform leader reveals how companies can reduce several types of risks associated with new technology and gain synergies by engaging in several alliances simultaneously
    Keywords: na
    JEL: H00
    Date: 2009–03–18
  3. By: Mario Pagliero
    Abstract: According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for lawyers. The results imply that lawyers' salaries have a large weight relative to social welfare in the objective function of licensing boards.
    Keywords: professional licensing, legal market, bar exam
    JEL: L4 L5 K2
    Date: 2009

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