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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Julien Pénin |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the consequences of university patenting by using an original source of information: The point of view of French academic inventors, i.e. French university professors who are also inventors of European patents. Via a survey we collected information about 280 French academic inventors. This enables us to put forward new insights with respect to the effect of university patenting on the diffusion of scientific research, incentives to do basic research, commercialization of university inventions and access to upstream knowledge. In particular, the study suggests a tradeoff between enabling the transfer of university inventions to industry in some sectors and delaying the dissemination of scientific research. On the one hand, most academic inventors acknowledge a lag in their publication process directly attributable to the patent application but, on the other hand, in life science disciplines a large majority of respondents who have had one of their inventions commercialized, believe that this would not have been the case had a patent not been there. |
| Keywords: | University patenting, open science, intellectual property rights, technology transfer, university-industry relationships, Bayh-Dole Act. |
| JEL: | O3 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-04&r=ipr |
| By: | Elsa Martin (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Hubert Stahn (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | : In knowledge economies, patent agencies are often viewed as a relevant instrument of an efficient innovation policy. This paper brings a new support to that idea. We claim that these agencies should play an increasing role in the regulation of the relation between heterogeneous private R&D labs and public fundamental research units, especially concerning the question of the appropriation of free basic research results. Since these two institutions work with opposite institutional arrangements (see Dasgupta and David [9]), we essentially argue that there is, on the one hand, an over-appropriation of these results while, on the other hand, there is also an under-provision of free usable results issued from more fundamental research. We show how a public patent office can restore efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Science and technology; patent agency; innovation policy |
| Date: | 2009–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00360997_v1&r=ipr |
| By: | Bronwyn H. Hall; Grid Thoma; Salvatore Torrisi |
| Abstract: | We take a first look at financial patents at the European Patent Office (EPO). As is the case at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the number of financial patents in Europe has increased significantly in parallel with significant changes in payment and financial systems. Scholars have argued that financial patents, like other business methods patents, have low value and are owned for strategic reasons rather than for protecting real inventions. We find that established firms in non-financial sectors with diversified patent portfolios own a large share of financial patents at the EPO. However, new specialized technology providers in the financial area also hold a number of such patents. Decisions on the financial patent applications take longer and they are more likely to be refused by the patent office, suggesting greater uncertainty over validity than for other patents. They are also more likely to be opposed, which is consistent with the fact that their other economic value indicators are higher. |
| JEL: | G20 L86 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14714&r=ipr |
| By: | Benedikt Schnellbächer; Johannes Stephan |
| Abstract: | We integrate international business theory on foreign direct investment (FDI) with institutional theory on intellectual property rights (IPR) to explain characteristics and behaviour of foreign investment subsidiaries in Central East Europe, a region with an IPR regime-gap vis-à-vis West European countries. We start from the premise that FDI may play a crucial role for technological catch-up development in Central East Europe via technology and knowledge transfer. By use of a unique dataset generated at the IWH in collaboration with a European consortium in the framework of an EU-project, we assess the role played by the IPR regimes in a selection of CEE countries as a factor for corporate governance and control of foreign invested subsidiaries, for their own technological activity, their trade relationships, and networking partners for technological activity. As a specific novelty to the literature, we assess the in influence of the strength of IPR regimes on corporate control of subsidiaries and conclude that IPR-sensitive foreign investments tend to have lower functional autonomy, tend to cooperate more intensively within their transnational network and yet are still technologically more active than less IPR-sensitive subsidiaries. In terms of economic policy, this leads to the conclusion that the FDI will have a larger developmental impact if the IPR regime in the host economy is sufficiently strict. |
| Keywords: | Foreign Direct Investment, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer, Corporate Governance and Control, R&D and Innovation |
| JEL: | F21 F23 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:4-09&r=ipr |
| By: | Coccia Mario (Ceris - Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, Moncalieri (Turin), Italy) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between public and private research funding. Data from Eurostat are used. The methodology applies econometric models based on regression analyses. The main results are: public R&D expenditure is a complement for private R&D one, but the latter has to be higher than the former to be a determinant for economic growth of countries. These results can be affected by several factors concerning the structure of National System of Innovation as well as Triple Helix interaction. In addition this research shows that the composition of public and private magnitude of national investment in research depends on the level of country development. |
| Keywords: | Research Funding, Economic Growth, Comparative Study, Research Policy |
| JEL: | C00 E00 E60 H50 O38 O40 O57 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csc:cerisp:200804&r=ipr |
| By: | Annamaria Conti (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | We consider a policy regime allowing academic institutions to grant industry the intellectual property rights (IPRs) over invention resulting from collaborations. If a firm plays an important role in generating an invention, the researcher offers the IPRs to the firm, as an incentive to collaborate. However, he retains certain domains where he can exploit an invention without having to apply for a license. The choice of these domains involves a tradeoff. In fact, the researcher either induces the firm's effort, by assigning a broad field of use, or he ensures that he can use an invention in other applications, by granting a narrow field of use. The reverse occurs if it is the researcher who plays an important role in generating an invention. The main difference, however, is that if effort were contractible, the firm could reward the researcher for supplying the first best level of effort, because, unlike the researcher, it is not cash constrained. An empirical analysis, based on École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne research contracts, supports the role of broad fields in bolstering a firm's effort, when the latter is important for generating an invention. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property rights, field of use, university-industry relations |
| JEL: | L26 I23 O31 D81 D86 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmi:wpaper:cemi-workingpaper-2009-002&r=ipr |
| By: | Giovanni Villani |
| Abstract: | Cooperative investments in R&D are a significant driving force of the modern economy. As it well-known, the R&D investments are uncertain and the strategic alliances create synergies and additional information that increase the success probabilities about R&D projects. The theory of real option games takes into account both the flexibility value of an investment opportunity and the strategic considerations. In particular way, while the non-cooperative options are exercised in the interest of the option holders' payoffs, the cooperative ones are exercised in order to maximize the total partnership value. In our model we develop an interaction between two firms that invest in R&D and we show the effects of cooperative synergies on several equilibriums. Moreover, we consider that the R&D investments are characterized by positive network externalities that induce more benefits in case of reciprocal R&D success. |
| Keywords: | Real Exchange Options; Cooperation games; Information Revelation; R&D investments. |
| JEL: | G13 C71 D80 O32 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:19-2008&r=ipr |
| By: | Intan Hamdan-Livramento (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs an intellectual property rights (IPR) index based on the World Trade Organization's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement for 53 developing countries. TRIPS agreement attempts to standardize the minimum level of IPR protection for all 153 WTO member countries regardless of their income levels, and allows recourse to an effective dispute settlement mechanism, unlike previous international IPR agreements. The Agreement is thus applicable to a large number of countries and enforceable both at the national and international levels, making it an important legal agreement to study. This TRIPS-specific index takes into consideration the seven IPR categories defined by TRIPS agreement and the transition period for their implementation. In addition, it assumes the governments of the developing countries investigated would not necessarily implement the legislations for the seven IPR categories simultaneously. National IPR legislations, various IPR-specific reports and legal experts and practitioners, whenever possible, are consulted to build the index. Analysis of the data collected show three implementation trends. Firstly, almost all developing country members availed themselves to the transition period afforded by the Agreement, and in some cases have exceeded the time limit imposed by the transition period. Secondly, implementation efforts of developing countries vary, and not necessarily because of their income levels. And lastly, countries in regional trade agreements (RTAs) that specify IPR obligations tend to comply with the TRIPS agreement earlier than the rest. The results collected in this study show that TRIPS does imply a convergence of global IPR protection across countries, and that the implementation of this Agreement is an external factor, not influenced by the countries' level of economic development. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property rights, developing countries |
| JEL: | O34 K33 C43 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmi:wpaper:cemi-workingpaper-2009-001&r=ipr |
| By: | Clark, Derek J. (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø); Foros, Øystein (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sand, Jan Yngve (Dept. of Economics and Management, University of Tromsø) |
| Abstract: | We consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. The result of this may be foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction. We present conditions under which this transfer will be expected to occur, and show that the dominant firm will prefer to grant some rivals the maximum cost reduction even if a partial transfer can be made. Furthermore we consider the welfare properties of excluding some rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure. |
| Keywords: | Foreclosure; contest |
| JEL: | D21 L24 |
| Date: | 2009–02–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_027&r=ipr |
| By: | Crescenzio Gallo; Michelangelo De Bonis |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:26-2008&r=ipr |