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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Dillen, K; Demont, M.; Tollens, E. |
| Abstract: | After more than a decade of GM crops, literature reports farmers and consumers can gain significantly from the technology, despite the intellectual property rights assigned to the innovator. In this paper we assess the effect of heterogeneity on this distribution of benefits. A two dimensional framework is created to assess the ex ante benefits of an innovation. Given this setting and the scarce data often available, a parametric modelling approach is taken. The two dimensions of heterogeneity, spatial and temporal, are explicitly modelled as they have a different importance for different technologies. Using this framework we can simulate different corporate pricing strategies and evaluate the benefits generated under changing heterogeneity. The framework is tested on the introduction of HT sugar beet in the EU-27. |
| Keywords: | Heterogeneity, Parametric modelling, ex ante, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae08:43945&r=ipr |
| By: | Nisvan Erkal; Deborah Minehart |
| Abstract: | This paper builds a theoretical foundation for the dynamics of knowledge sharing in private industry. In practice, research and development projects can take years or even decades to complete. We model an uncertain research process, where research projects consist of multiple sequential steps. We ask how the incentives to license intermediate steps to rivals change over time as the research project approaches maturity and the uncertainty that the firms face decreases. Such a dynamic approach allows us to analyze the interaction between how close the firms are to product market competition and how intense that competition is. If product market competition is relatively moderate, the lagging firm is expected never to drop out and the incentives to share intermediate research outcomes decreases monotonically with progress. However, if product market competition is relatively intense, the incentives to share may increase with progress. These results illustrate under what circumstances it is necessary to have policies aimed at encouraging cooperation in R&D and when such policies should be directed towards early vs. later stage research |
| Keywords: | Multi-stage R&D; innovation; knowledge sharing; licensing; dynamic games |
| JEL: | L24 O30 D81 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1038&r=ipr |
| By: | Bodas Freitas, Isabel Maria (Grenoble Ecole de Management, and DISPEA); Tommy Clausen (University of Oslo, and Nordland Research Institute); Roberto Fontana (University of Pavia, and CESPRI, Bocconi University); Bart Verspagen (Maastricht University, and UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | Firms increasingly rely upon external actors for their innovation process. Interaction with these actors may occur formally (i.e. through a collaboration agreement) or informally (i.e. external actors acts as sources of knowledge). This paper analyses the reasons why firms consider it to be important to develop formal and informal external linkages in the innovation process by looking at the role played by firms’ innovative strategies and by taking into account that a complementarity or substitutive relationship might exist between formal and informal linkages. Data come from the Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3), where we have access to firm level micro-data from Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. |
| Keywords: | External knowledge sources, Innovation strategy, Formal cooperation, Multinomial Probit |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2008065&r=ipr |
| By: | DEHEZ, Pierre (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); TELLONE, Daniela (CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis) |
| Abstract: | A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how should agents be compensated for the goods they own. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game – called "data game" – to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can then be applied and compared. |
| Keywords: | cost sharing, compensation, Shapley value. |
| JEL: | C71 D46 M41 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2008010&r=ipr |
| By: | Nestor Duch-Brown; Jose Garcia-Quevedo; Daniel Montolio (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | The implementation of public programs to support business R&D projects requires the establishment of a selection process. This selection process faces various difficulties, which include the measurement of the impact of the R&D projects as well as selection process optimization among projects with multiple, and sometimes incomparable, performance indicators. To this end, public agencies generally use the peer review method,which, while presenting some advantages, also demonstrates significant drawbacks. Private firms, on the other hand, tend toward more quantitative methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in their pursuit of R&D investment optimization. In this paper, the performance of a public agency peer review method of project selection is compared with an alternative DEA method. |
| Keywords: | peer review, dea, subsidies, r&d |
| JEL: | H25 O32 C61 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2008207&r=ipr |
| By: | Sipos, Gabriela Lucia; Ciurea, Jeanina Biliana |
| Abstract: | Starting an innovation project assumes to state some competitive objectives referring to the allocated budget, time limit for project’s ending and also to the quality and performance parameters of the new obtained product. Referring to the innovation project development, the risk of unfulfilling the stated competitive objectives referrers to the exceeding the project’s budget and terms, and also to unfitting in the quality and performance parameters established in the innovation project planning stage. The large diversity of risk sources can be expressed by the possibility of appearance of some unexpected variations of the cost, time and quality of the new products. The innovation projects risk is settled by the variations of the cost, time and quality objectives effective values comparing to the planned values. Those variations are determined by purely random factors. The innovation projects characterized by uniform variations of the cost, time and quality objectives effective values around the mean are considered to be under statistic control. Those projects’ risk may be quantified and the risk impact over the project can be limited. The innovation projects characterized by fluctuant variations of the cost, time and quality objectives effective values around the mean are considered to be out of statistic control. The aim of this paper is to present two categories of statistic methods for innovation projects risk quantifying. The first statistic methods that quantify the risk of unfitting the quantitative objectives referrers to the time risk, cost risk and the risk of unfitting established performance parameters. The second category of methods represents statistic methods that quantify the risk of unfitting the qualitative objectives of the projects – the risk of appearance major quality deficiencies. |
| Keywords: | innovation project; risk evaluation; cost; time and quality objectives |
| JEL: | O32 G32 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11663&r=ipr |
| By: | Duysters, Geert (UNU-MERIT); Lemmens, Charmianne (UNU-MERIT); Letterie, Wilko (Maastricht University); Vanhaverbeke, Wim (Hasselt University) |
| Abstract: | The primary goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the complex relationship between the positioning of companies in alliance networks and their innovative performance. In particular, we expect that a firm’s innovative performance depends partly on its position in specific network settings (block membership or nonblock membership), with additional effects caused by the technology positioning strategies firms pursue in terms of technological specialization in alliance blocks. Alliance groups derive their competitive advantage from their superior and particular technologies, which they develop and exploit together in the alliance blocks. 4 Incorporating this moderating effect of the degree of technological specialization in alliance blocks (exploitation or exploration) seems to give more insight in the contextual issues in this stream of literature. |
| Keywords: | strategic technology alliances, alliance block membership strategy, microelectronics industry, innovative performance, technology strategies |
| JEL: | L14 L63 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2008064&r=ipr |
| By: | Gautier Duflos (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics); Etienne Pfister (BETA-Règles - Université de Nancy II) |
| Abstract: | This article analyzes the individual determinants of acquisition activity and target choices in the pharmaceutical industry over the period 1978-2002. The "innovation gap" hypothesis states that acquiring firms lack promising drug compounds and acquire firms with more promising drug prospects. A duration model implemented over a panel of more than 400 firms relates the probabilities of being an purchaser or a target to financial, R&D ant patent data to investigate this explanation more deeply. Results show that purchasers are firms with a lower Tobin's Q and decreasing sales, which could indicate that acquisitions are used to compensate for low internal growth prospects. Firms with a higher proportion of radical patents in their portfolio, especially in pharmaceutical and biothechnological patent classes, face a higher probability of being targeted, indicating that acquiring firms are indeed searching for innovative competencies. However, acquiring firms also present a significant absorptive capacity : their R&D investment increases in the year preceding the operation and their patent stock is larger and more diversified than for non-acquiring firms. Finally, we observe that over the last ten years of the sample period, firms have paid a greater attention to the size of the target's portfolio. |
| Keywords: | M&A, pharmaceutical, innovations, patent citations. |
| JEL: | G34 L15 L21 O3 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:bla08057&r=ipr |
| By: | Nisvan Erkal; Suzanne Scotchmer |
| Abstract: | We consider a model of the innovative environment where there is a distinction between ideas for R&D investments and the investments themselves. We investigate the optimal reward policy and how it depends on whether ideas are scarce or obvious. By foregoing investment in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to different people, there is a conflict between private and social optimality. We argue that private incentives to create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are scarce." We then explore how rewards should be structured when the value of an innovation comes from its applications, and ideas for the innovation may be more or less scarce than ideas for the applications. |
| Keywords: | Ideas; patents; intellectual property, innovation; options; nonobviousness |
| JEL: | O34 K00 L00 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1035&r=ipr |
| By: | Albert Banal-Estañol (Department of Economics, City University, London); Inés Macho-Stadler (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards from commercialisation on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how academic and market incentives affect the allocation of the researcher’s time between research and development. We argue, however, that technology transfer objectives also affect the choice of research projects. Although commercialisation incentives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the “skewing problem” would presage. Monetary rewards induce a more intensive search for (ex-post) path-breaking innovations, which are more likely to be generated through (ex-ante) basic research programs. These results are shown to hold even if development delays publication. |
| Keywords: | Faculty behaviour, basic vs. applied research |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cty:dpaper:0813&r=ipr |