nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2008‒11‒11
eight papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Commercializing Academic Research: The Quality of Faculty Patenting By Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Schneider, Cédric
  2. Incumbent Innovation and Entry by Spinoff By Oliver Falck; Stephan Heblich
  3. Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion. By DEHEZ, Pierre; TELLONE, Daniela
  4. The Marriages of Intellectual Property & Insurance By Jayant Kumar, Jayant Kumar; Neeraj Parnami, Neeraj Parnami
  5. Research and development, profits and firm value: a structural estimation By Missaka Warusawitharana
  6. Labor Mobility and Patenting Activity By Ulrich Kaiser; Hans Christian Kongsted; Thomas Rønde
  7. Consumer Welfare and Market Structure in a Model of Competition Between Open Source and Proprietary Software By Alexia Gaudeul
  8. Should R&D Champions be Protected from Foreign Takeovers? By Bertrand, Olivier; Nilsson Hakkala, Katariina; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars

  1. By: Czarnitzki, Dirk; Hussinger, Katrin; Schneider, Cédric
    Abstract: The knowledge produced by academic scientists has been identified as a potential key driver of technological progress. Recent policies in Europe aim at increasing commercially orientated activities in academe. Based on a sample of German scientists across all fields of science we investigate the importance of academic patenting. Our findings suggest that academic involvement in patenting results in greater knowledge externalities, as academic patents appear to generate more forward citations. We also find that in the European context of changing research objectives and funding sources since the mid-90’s, the “importance” of academic patents declines over time. We show that academic entrants have patents of lower “quality” than academic incumbents but they did not cause the decline, since the relative importance of patents involving academics with an existing patenting history declined over time as well. Moreover, a preliminary evaluation of the effects of the abolishment of the “professor privilege” (the German counterpart of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act) reveals that this legal disposition led to an acceleration of this apparent decline.
    Keywords: academic inventors, faculty patenting, patent quality
    JEL: O31 O32 O34
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Oliver Falck (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, CESifo and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jna, Germany); Stephan Heblich (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: This paper takes a different perspective toward the escape entry incentive of incumbent firms to innovate. New entrants spawned from incumbents are not necessarily a threat; they can complement incumbents' production by commercializing knowledge incumbents are not willing or able to exploit. Accordingly, incumbent innovation determines exploitable knowledge externalities for spinoffs while, at the same time, spinoffs are expected to influence incumbent innovation. To overcome this problem of endogeneity, we apply an IV approach to analyze a rich industry-level dataset (1987–2000) for Germany. We find evidence that entry by spinoffs does, indeed, have a positive impact on incumbent innovation.
    Keywords: Innovation, Entry, Spinoff
    JEL: O3 L16 M13
    Date: 2008–11–04
  3. By: DEHEZ, Pierre (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); TELLONE, Daniela (CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
    Abstract: A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how should agents be compensated for the goods they own. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game – called "data game" – to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can then be applied and compared.
    Keywords: cost sharing, compensation, Shapley value.
    JEL: C71 D46 M41
    Date: 2008–02
  4. By: Jayant Kumar, Jayant Kumar; Neeraj Parnami, Neeraj Parnami
    Abstract: The marriages of Intellectual Property and Insurance may sound a magical word for all those companies which are playing the game of intellectual property in their business. These companies manage their intellectual property under the guidance of IP management and an IP policy in the company. These companies earn a huge amount of money in this game; but there are also chances for the companies to face the risks ahead. These expected risks can be minimized to some extent, if the companies understand the meaning and the importance of this new term “Intellectual Property Insurance”. In order to make the companies appreciate the depth significance of the term, the paper is written and the paper emphasizes the need of IP insurance in the business, the role of IP insurance in mitigating the risks involved in the business and the framework of IP insurance policy etc.
    Keywords: Intellectual Property; Insurance; Intellectual Property Insurance
    JEL: O3 M13
    Date: 2008–04–01
  5. By: Missaka Warusawitharana
    Abstract: Is the return to private R&D as high as believed? This study identifies a flaw in the production function approach to estimating the return to R&D. I provide new estimates based on a structural estimation approach that incorporates uncertainty about the outcome from R&D. The results shed light on the rate of innovation, the impact of an innovation on profits, and the market value of the R&D stock. The parameter estimates imply a mean return to R&D of 3.7-5.5%, much lower than previous values. The analysis also demonstrates the unsuitability of using the return to R&D as a basis for policy decisions on tax subsidies to R&D.
    Date: 2008
  6. By: Ulrich Kaiser (University of Zurich); Hans Christian Kongsted (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Thomas Rønde (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: We measure the quantitative importance of labor mobility as a vehicle for the transmission of knowledge and skills across firms. For this purpose we create a unique data set that matches all applications of Danish firms at the European Patent Office to linked employer-employee register data for the years 1999-2002. The Danish workforce is split into "R&D workers", who hold a bachelor's or a master's degree in a technical field, and "non{R&D workers". We find that mobile R&D workers ("R&D joiners"') contribute more to patenting activity than immobile R&D workers. Furthermore, R&D workers who have previously been employed by a patenting firm ("patent exposed workers") have a larger effect on patenting activity than R&D workers without this experience. Patent exposed R&D joiners constitute the most productive group of workers: for firms that patented prior to 1999, one additional worker of this type relates to an increase in the number of patent applications of the new employer by 0.0646. This corresponds to a 14 percent increase in the mean number of yearly patent applications. We also find that mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting activity of the donor and recipient firms, confirming the importance of labor mobility for innovation in the economy.
    Keywords: labor mobility; dynamic count data; patents
    JEL: O33 O34 C23
    Date: 2008–10
  7. By: Alexia Gaudeul (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: I consider a Vickrey-Salop model of spatial product differentiation with quasi-linear utility functions and contrast two modes of production, the proprietary model where entrepreneurs sell software to the users, and the open source model where users participate in software development. I show that the OS model of production may be more efficient from the point of view of welfare that the proprietary model, but that an OS industry is vulnerable to entry by entrepreneurs while a proprietary industry can resist entry by OS projects. A mixed industry where OS and proprietary development methods coexist may exhibit large OS projects cohabiting with more specialized proprietary projects, and is more efficient than the proprietary model of production from the point of view of welfare.
    Keywords: open source, proprietary, software industry, copyright, non-profit organization, mixed market, welfare, spatial product differentiation
    JEL: D23 H44 L17 L22 L86 O34 O38
    Date: 2008–10
  8. By: Bertrand, Olivier (Graduate School of Management of St Petersburg State University and Toulouse School of Economics); Nilsson Hakkala, Katariina (Helsinki School of Economics and Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT)); Norbäck, Pehr-Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Persson, Lars (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: We analyze how the entry mode of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) affects affiliate R&D activities. Using unique affiliate level data for Swedish multinational firms, we first present empirical evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of R&D intensity than greenfield (start-up) affiliates. This gap persists over time and with the age of the affiliates, as well as for different firm types and industries. To explain this finding, we develop an acquisition-investment-oligopoly model where we show that for a foreign acquisition to take place in equilibrium, the acquiring MNE must invest sufficiently in sequential R&D in the affiliate. Otherwise, rivals will expand their business, thus making the acquisition unprofitable. Two additional predictions of the model – that foreign firms acquire high-quality domestic firms and that the gap in R&D between acquired and greenfield affiliates decreases in acquisition transaction costs – are consistent with the data.
    Keywords: FDI; M&A; Multinational firms; R&D
    JEL: F23 L10 L20 O30
    Date: 2008–10–17

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