nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2008‒10‒13
seven papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Intellectual Property Rights and the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship By Zoltan J. Acs; Mark Sanders
  2. Effects of TRIPS on Growth, Welfare and Income Inequality in an R&D-Growth Model By Chu, Angus C.; Peng, Shin-Kun
  3. Access Regulation and the Adoption of VoIP By Paul de Bijl; Martin Peitz
  4. Against Intellectual Monopoly By Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
  5. Do Rankings Reflect Research Quality? By Bruno S. Frey; Katja Rost
  6. Do Patents Perform Like Property? By James Bessen; Michael J. Meurer
  7. Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures By Alireza Naghavi; Dermot Leahy

  1. By: Zoltan J. Acs; Mark Sanders
    Abstract: We develop a model in which stronger protection of intellectual property rights has an inverted U-shaped effect on innovation. Intellectual property rights protection allows the incumbent firms to capture part of the rents of commercial exploration that would otherwise accrue to the entrepreneurs. Stronger patent protection will increase the incentive to do R&D and generate new knowledge. This has a positive impact on entrepreneurship and innovation. However, after some point, further strengthening patent protection will reduce the returns to entrepreneurship sufficiently to reduce overall economic growth.
    Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Endogenous Growth, Entrepreneurship, Incentives, Knowledge Spillovers, Rents
    JEL: J24 L26 M13 O3
    Date: 2008–09
  2. By: Chu, Angus C.; Peng, Shin-Kun
    Abstract: What are the effects of the WTO's TRIPS Agreement on growth, welfare and income inequality? To analyze this question, we develop an open-economy R&D-driven endogenous-growth model with wealth heterogeneity. Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. Also, there exists a critical degree for the domestic importance of foreign goods below which global welfare decreases under TRIPS. In light of our findings, we discuss policy implications on China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
    Keywords: endogenous growth; heterogeneity; income inequality; patent policy; TRIPS
    JEL: D31 F13 O34
    Date: 2008–09
  3. By: Paul de Bijl; Martin Peitz
    Abstract: The introduction of packet-switched telephony in the form of VoIP raises concerns about current regulatory practice. Access regulation has been designed for traditional telephony on PSTN networks. In this paper, we analyze the effect of access regulation and retail price regulation of PSTN networks on the adoption of a new technology in the form of VoIP. In particular, we show that with endogenous consumer choice between PSTN and VoIP telephony, higher prices for terminating access to the PSTN network make VoIP less likely to succeed and lead to lower profits of operators that offer VoIP telephony exclusively
    Keywords: telecommunications; voice over broadband (VoB); voice over Internet protocol (VoIP); entry; access; regulation; imperfect competition
    JEL: L96 L51 L13
    Date: 2008–07
  4. By: Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
    Date: 2008–10–04
  5. By: Bruno S. Frey; Katja Rost
    Abstract: Publication and citation rankings have become major indicators of the scientific worth of universities and countries, and determine to a large extent the career of individual scholars. We argue that such rankings do not effectively measure research quality, which should be the essence of evaluation. For that reason, an alternative ranking is developed as a quality indicator, based on membership on academic editorial boards of professional journals. It turns out that especially the ranking of individual scholars is far from objective. The results differ markedly, depending on whether research quantity or research quality is considered. Even quantity rankings are not objective; two citation rankings, based on different samples, produce entirely different results. It follows that any career decisions based on rankings are dominated by chance and do not reflect research quality. Instead of propagating a ranking based on board membership as the gold standard, we suggest that committees make use of this quality indicator to find members who, in turn, evaluate the research quality of individual scholars.
    Keywords: Rankings, Universities, Scholars, Publications, Citations
    JEL: H43 L15 O38
    Date: 2008–10
  6. By: James Bessen (Research on Innovation, Boston University School of Law); Michael J. Meurer
    Abstract: Do patents provide critical incentives to encourage investment in innovation? Or, instead, do patents impose legal risks and burdens on innovators that discourage innovation, as some critics now claim? This paper reviews empirical economic evidence on how well patents perform as a property system.
    Date: 2008
  7. By: Alireza Naghavi; Dermot Leahy
    Abstract: We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or a North-South joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.
    Keywords: North-South Joint Ventures, Intellectual Property Rights, FDI Policy, Technology Transfer, R&D Spillovers
    JEL: O34 F23 O32 F13 L24 O24
    Date: 2008–05

This nep-ipr issue is ©2008 by Roland Kirstein. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.