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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Nakanishi, Yasuo; Yamada, Setsuo |
| Abstract: | This article assesses the rate of obsolescence of patents with measurements of the rate in Japan. Our study departs from Parkes and Schankerman (1989) and Schankerman (1998) because of its application of the ordered probit model. The application of this model enables us to consider the case of noncontinuous renewal fees. The estimated value of the rate of obsolescence in Chemicals is apparently large. Values of obsolescence rate in each industry except Chemicals are located above 24%. The obsolescence rate obtained by our estimates is apparently higher than in previous studies. |
| Keywords: | Obsolescence rate; Patent; Innovation; Ordered probit model |
| JEL: | O31 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10837&r=ipr |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Katja Rost |
| Abstract: | Publication and citation rankings have become major indicators of the scientific worth of universities and countries, and determine to a large extent the career of individual scholars. We argue that such rankings do not effectively measure research quality, which should be the essence of evaluation. For that reason, an alternative ranking is developed as a quality indicator, based on membership on academic editorial boards of professional journals. It turns out that especially the ranking of individual scholars is far from objective. The results differ markedly, depending on whether research quantity or research quality is considered. Even quantity rankings are not objective; two citation rankings, based on different samples, produce entirely different results. It follows that any career decisions based on rankings are dominated by chance and do not reflect research quality. Instead of propagating a ranking based on board membership as the gold standard, we suggest that committees make use of this quality indicator to find members who, in turn, evaluate the research quality of individual scholars. |
| Keywords: | Rankings; Universities; Scholars; Publications; Citations |
| JEL: | H43 L15 O38 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-22&r=ipr |
| By: | Antti-Jussi Tahvanainen; Raine Hermans |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT : This study scrutinizes the impact of value-creating practices in university-industry technology transfer that facilitate the diffusion of knowledge generated in academic research towards its successful application by companies on markets. To be more precise, the aim is to demarcate the role that US university technology transfer offices (TTOs), one of the consequential arrangements conjured into existence by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, play in matching the substance of academic research and the need-driven demand of commercial markets. In the process, they implicitly, yet strategically, guarantee the sustainability of the flow of technologies out of the laboratories towards market application, as their actions and motives uphold and sustain the incentive structures of both of the universes, the academic and the commercial. This is accomplished by performing and specializing in the very functions that neither universe has been able or willing to perform in order to take a step closer towards each other. These contributions are often hard to capture in quantitative measures, which has led to common criticism about the effectiveness of TTOs. We propose such measures to be used with care in the comparative evaluation of TTO performance, but also point at and recognize their value as parameters that can be utilized to internally monitor the performance of each TTO individually over time as a tool of management. Some alternative, Intellectual Capital based measures are suggested. |
| Keywords: | university technology transfer, technology transfer office, intellectual capital, knowledge management, Bayh-Dole Act, government intervention, value adding functions, value platform |
| Date: | 2008–09–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:dpaper:1148&r=ipr |
| By: | Federica Rossi; Margherita Russo |
| Abstract: | We investigate to what extent and how the adoption of a complexity-based perspective to innovation (Lane and Maxfield, 1996, 1997, 2005; Lane et al., 2008; Read et al, 2008; Russo, 2000) can support policymakers in their quest to implement effective interventions, able to foster innovation processes and to create structures that sustain them over time. We argue that broad attempts at theorizing innovation processes do not lend themselves to a quick translation into simple ‘policy recipes’, because conceptualizing innovation as a complex multi-level process implies that it is not possible to devise context-independent ways to support it: improved theoretical understanding of innovation processes should not aim to provide policymakers with simple encompassing solutions, but it should help them formulate and address questions that are appropriate to the particular context within which they operate. In line with this approach, we present our analysis of a specific policy experiment, the ‘Technological Innovation in Tuscany’ programme (henceforth RPIA-ITT). In this context - drawing upon a dynamic interactionist theory of innovation whose main building blocks are the concepts of generative relationships, competence networks, scaffolding structures and the role of narrative in driving action in situations characterized by ontological uncertainty (Lane, Malerba, Maxfield and Orsenigo, 1996; Lane and Maxfield, 1997, 2005, 2008; Russo, 2000, 2005) – we have been able to identify methodological and analytical tools that can be applied to policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation activities. We conclude with some broader implications for innovation policy as well as an agenda for future research. |
| Keywords: | Innovation policy; innovation networks; regional policy; complex systems |
| JEL: | O25 O31 O32 R58 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:depeco:586&r=ipr |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi; Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the parallel creation of complementary upstream and downstream innovations by independent labs to shed light on the impact of outsourcing on R&D when supply contracts are incomplete. In particular, we argue that outsourced upstream production contributes to the emergence of innovation networks by creating a demand for upstream R&D. We then analyze under which conditions this leads to faster innovation than in the case of vertically integrated production relying on integrated R&D. In the presence of incomplete supply contracts, the ex-post bargaining power of upstream and downstream parties feeds back to innovation. This determines whether outsourcing decisions leading to static gains from specialized production generate or not also dynamic gains in terms of faster innovation. |
| Keywords: | outsourcing, complementary innovations, incomplete contracts, organization of firms |
| JEL: | L14 L23 O32 D91 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:019&r=ipr |
| By: | Ramón Faulí-Oller (Universidad de Alicante); Joel Sandonís (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, regardless of the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and the type of patentee, the innovation is licensed to all firms. Moreover, we endogenize R&D investment and get that an internal patentee invests more (less) in R&D when the technological opportunity is low (high). In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, regardless of the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and the type of patentee, the innovation is licensed to all firms. Moreover, we endogenize R&D investment and get that an internal patentee invests more (less) in R&D when the technological opportunity is low (high). |
| Keywords: | patent licensing, two-part tariff contracts, R&D, product differentiation. |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L14 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-12&r=ipr |