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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Bastian Westbrock |
| Abstract: | Empirical work suggests that the network of research and development alliances is asymmetric, with a small number of firms involved in the majority of partnerships. This paper relates the structure of the collaboration network to a fundamental characteristic of the demand for research output: the benefits of knowledge accumulation create private and social incentives for a concentration of collaborative activities. I theoretically investigate the formation of bilateral collaborative links in two different industry settings, one socially managed, the other oligopolistic. I find that in both cases a concentrated network is the typical equilibrium structure as well as the socially efficient structure. |
| Keywords: | R&D collaboration, market structure, networks |
| JEL: | D43 D85 L13 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0815&r=ipr |
| By: | Andreas Meder (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | A key issue of different streams of economic literature is to determine the impact of certain dimensions of proximity on the cooperative behavior of actors and, thus, on interactive learning processes. This paper is a quantitative study on the impact of technological and geographical proximity on the choice of the cooperation partner. Patents that were filed for Germany in the years 1998 to 2003 are used to identify the impact of both dimensions of proximity as well as their interplay. It can be shown that an increasing proximity in either of these dimensions has an independent positive impact on the cooperation probability. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, cognitive proximity, geographical proximity |
| JEL: | C30 L14 O32 |
| Date: | 2008–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-054&r=ipr |
| By: | Tåg, Joakim (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies an industry in which firms can choose to provide open or closed platforms. Open platforms, as opposed to closed, are extendable so third-party producers can develop extensions for them. Building on a two-sided market model, I show that firms might prefer to commit to keeping their platforms closed despite the fact that opening the platform is costless and open platforms are more valuable to consumers. The reason is that opening the platform may lead to intensified competition for consumers. |
| Keywords: | Platforms; Software; Two-sided Markets |
| JEL: | D40 D42 D43 L10 L12 L13 L14 |
| Date: | 2008–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0747&r=ipr |
| By: | Henrekson, Magnus (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Johansson, Dan (Ratio) |
| Abstract: | High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions beneficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. |
| Keywords: | Competence Bloc; Dynamic Capitalism; Entrepreneurship; Flyers; Gazelles; High-growth Firms; Industrial Policy; Innovation; Institutions; Labor Security; Product Market Regulations; Property Rights; Sclerotic Capitalism; Self-employment; Tax Policy |
| JEL: | H32 L25 L50 M13 O31 P14 |
| Date: | 2008–06–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0757&r=ipr |