nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒12‒19
five papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Search Patterns and Absorptive Capacity: A Comparison of Low- and High-Technology Firms from Thirteen European Countries By Grimpe, Christoph; Sofka, Wolfgang
  2. Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral Hazard By Isabel Maria Medalho Pereira
  3. On Platforms, Incomplete Contracts, and Open Source Software By Andras Niedermayer
  4. Human capital and university-industry linkages ' role in fostering firm innovation : an empirical study of Chile and Colombia By Thorn, Kristian; Blom, Andreas; Mark, Michael; Marotta, Daniela
  5. Measuring the Effectiveness of R&D tax credits in the Netherlands By Boris Lokshin; Pierre Mohnen

  1. By: Grimpe, Christoph; Sofka, Wolfgang
    Abstract: Searching for externally available knowledge has been characterised as a vital part of the innovation process. Previous research has, however, almost exclusively focused on hightechnology environments, largely ignoring the substantial low- and medium-technology sectors of modern economies. We argue that low- and high-technology firms differ in their search patterns and that these moderate the relationship between innovation inputs and outputs. Based on a sample of 4,500 firms from 13 European countries we find that search patterns in low-technology industries focus on market knowledge while they are built around differences in technology sourcing activities for high-technology industries.
    Keywords: Absorptive capacity, search strategies, low-, medium- and high-technology sectors, open innovation
    JEL: L60 O32
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Isabel Maria Medalho Pereira
    Abstract: I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio
    Keywords: collaboration, basic research, applied research, project, firms, universities, partnership governance
    JEL: L21 L24 L31 L33 O31 O32
    Date: 2007–09–07
  3. By: Andras Niedermayer
    Abstract: We consider a firm A initially owning a software platform (e.g. operating system) and an application for this platform. The specific knowledge of another firm B is needed to make the platform successful by creating a further application. When B’s application is completed, A has incentives to expropriate the rents. Netscape claimed e.g. that this was the case with its browser running on MS Windows. We will argue that open sourcing or standardizing the platform is a warranty for B against expropriation of rents. The different pieces of software are considered as assets in the sense of the property rights literature (see Hart and Moore (Journal of Political Economy, 1990)). Two cases of joint ownership are considered beyond the standard cases of integration and non-integration: platform standardization (both parties can veto changes) and open source (no veto rights). In line with the literature, the more important a party’s specific investments the more rights it should have. In contrast to Hart and Moore, however, joint ownership can be optimal in our setting. Open source is optimal if investments in the applications are more important than in the platform. The results are driven by the fact that in our model firms invest in physical (and not in human) capital and that there is non-rivalry in consumption for software.
    Keywords: Platforms; open source; standardization; incomplete contracts; property rights; joint ownership
    JEL: C70 D23 L13 L22 L86
    Date: 2007–10
  4. By: Thorn, Kristian; Blom, Andreas; Mark, Michael; Marotta, Daniela
    Abstract: A firm ' s absorptive capacity, human capital and linkages with knowledge institutions have been shown to increase the firm ' s probability of innovating in OECD economies. Despite its importance for national- and firm-level competitiveness, few papers examine the impact of the same variables for firms innovation in Latin America. This paper investigates the link between firm innovation and its absorption capacity as proxied by the presence of a R & D department, the firm ' s human capital, and its interaction with research centers and universities. We analyze the case of Chilean and Colombian manufacturing firms using data from innovation surveys. A probit regression model is applied to identify the determinants of innovation activity. We find that collaboration with university and research institutions is associated with an increase in the probability of introducing a new product in Chilean and Colombian firms of 29 and 44 percent, respectively, and it can increase up to 58 percent in the case of Colombian firms interacting with research centers. Moreover, firms whose employees have a higher level of education, or whose managers/supervisors have a higher (perceived) level of knowledge, are more likely to innovate. Although the estimates could be affected by biases and suffer from shortcomings in data, the findings suggest that policies and incentives to increase firm-level human capital and industry-university linkages are important to increase innovation in Latin America.
    Keywords: E-Business,Education for Development (superceded),Innovation,Agricultural Knowledge & Information Systems,Labor Policies
    Date: 2007–12–01
  5. By: Boris Lokshin; Pierre Mohnen
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the Dutch R&D fiscal incentive program, known as WBSO, on R&D capital formation. Taking a factor-demand approach we measure the elasticity of firm R&D capital accumulation to its user cost. An econometric model is estimated using a rich unbalanced panel covering the period 1996-2004 with firm-specific R&D user costs varying with tax incentives. Using the estimated user cost elasticity, we examine the impact of the R&D incentive program. We find evidence that the program of R&D incentives in the Netherlands has been effective in reducing the user cost of R&D and in stimulating firms’ investment in R&D. <P>Cette étude analyse l’effet du programme d’incitations fiscales à la recherche aux Pays-Bas, connu sous le nom de WBSO, sur la formation du capital de recherche. À partir d’une approche de demande de facteurs de production, nous mesurons l’élasticité du stock de capital de recherche au coût d’usage de la recherche. L’estimation économétrique se base sur un panel d’entreprises non-cylindré, couvrant la période 1996-2004, avec des coûts d’usage de la recherche variables. Nous trouvons que les incitations fiscales à la recherche ont effectivement baissé le coût d’usage de la recherche et ainsi stimulé les investissements en recherche et développement aux Pays-Bas.
    Keywords: R&D tax credits; panel data; crowding out; user-cost elasticity., crédit d’impôt à la recherche, données panel, coût d’usage à la recherche, crowding-out.
    JEL: O32 O38 H25 H50 C23
    Date: 2007–12–01

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