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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Brian Jacob; Lars Lefgren |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we estimate the impact of receiving an NIH grant on subsequent publications and citations. Our sample consists of all applications (unsuccessful as well as successful) to the NIH from 1980 to 2000 for postdoctoral training grants (F32s) and standard research grants (R01s). Both OLS and regression discontinuity estimates show that receipt of either an NIH postdoctoral fellowship or research grant leads to about one additional publication over the next five years. The estimates represent about 20 and 7 percent increases in research productivity for F32 and R01 recipients respectively. The limited research impact of NIH grants may be explained in part by a model in which the market for research funding is competitive, so that the loss of an NIH grant simply causes researchers to shift to another source of funding. |
| JEL: | H0 H51 I1 I12 I18 O3 O38 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13519&r=ipr |
| By: | Michael R. Ward (University of Texas, Arlington); ; |
| Abstract: | Psychology studies of the effects of playing video games have found emotional responses and physical reactions associated with reinforced violent and anti-social attitudes. It is not clear, however, whether these markers are associated with increases in one's preferences for anti-social behaviors or whether virtual behaviors act to partially sate one's desire for actual antisocial behaviors. Violent or criminal behaviors in the virtual world and in the physical world could plausibly be either complements or substitutes. A finding of one versus the other would have diametrically opposing policy implications. I study the incidence of criminal activity as related to a proxy for increased gaming, the number of game stores, from a panel of US counties from 1994 to 2004. With fixed county and year effects, I can examine if changes relative increases in gaming in an area are associated with relative increases or decreases in criminal activity. For six of eight categories of crime, more game stores are associated with significant declines in crime rates. Proxies for other leisure activities, sports and movie viewing, do not have a similar effect. For confirmation, I also find that mortality rates, especially mortality rates stemming from injuries, also are negatively related to the number of game stores. |
| Keywords: | Video Games, Violence, Crime |
| JEL: | L86 D18 I18 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:0718&r=ipr |
| By: | Jiahua Che; Giovanni Facchini |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of a multinational corporation's optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. |
| Date: | 2007–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:645&r=ipr |
| By: | Anja Lambrecht (London Business School); Katja Seim (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Catherine Tucker (MIT) |
| Abstract: | Online applications and services automate communications and transactions between firms and consumers, promising large efficiency gains. However, consumers have been slow to use these online technologies intensively, despite widespread adoption of the internet. Customers frequently undergo a staggered adoption process that may involve sign-up, experimentation, trial, and substantial usage until they fully embrace internet services. We ask whether delays in moving through the initial stages of this adoption process contribute to consumers ultimately not using the service intensively. Such behavior would be consistent with laboratory findings on consumer memory. We explore this question using data from a German retail bank where only 24% of the customers who sign up for the bank's online banking service use it substantially. We use exogenous variation in delays in the adoption process, caused by vacations and public holidays in different German states, to identify this effect. We find that delays in the early stages of adoption significantly reduce a customer's probability of moving to substantial usage: A 10-day delay of a customer's first online login reduces the likelihood that she will ever use the technology substantially, by 33%. This effect is more severe for demographic groups with less online experience. |
| Keywords: | patents, technology adoption, adoption process, online services, banking |
| JEL: | M3 M30 M31 L1 L16 L86 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:0740&r=ipr |
| By: | Paul Levine (University of Surrey); Klaus Moessner (University of Surrey); Neil Rickman (University of Surrey and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This paper combines models and ideas from radio-engineering literature and economics to address the need for regulation of spectrum allocation in a commons scenario. It discusses under what conditions a laissez-faire policy towards spectrum usage would engender the inefficiencies of a spectrum com- mons allocation regime; to overcome such potential inefficiency, centralised allocation or a formal market for spectrum (with well-defined property rights) is required. |
| Keywords: | mesh networks, spectrum allocation, spectrum commons model |
| JEL: | L10 L50 L96 |
| Date: | 2007–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sur:surrec:0607&r=ipr |