nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒09‒02
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. A Survival Analysis of the Approval of U.S. Patent Applications By Ying Xie; David E. Giles
  2. Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete By Lukach, R.; Kort, P.M.; Plasmans, J.E.J.
  3. Innovation Policy as cargo cult: Myth and Reality in knowledge-led Productivity Growth By Alan Hughes
  4. Prior knowledge and entrepreneurial innovative success By Uwe Cantner; Maximilian Goethner; Andreas Meder
  5. Intellectual Property Disclosure as “Threat” By Scott Baker; Pak Yee Lee; Claudio Mezzetti
  6. Too much R&D? - Vertical differentiation in a model of monopolistic competition By Jan Kranich
  7. Overcoming the Natural Resource Constraint Through Dedicated R&D Effort with Heterogenous Labor Supply By AMIGUES Jean-Pierre; MOREAUX Michel; RICCI Francesco
  8. Organisation of Innovation in High-Tech Industries: Acquisitions as Means for Technology Sourcing. By Marcus Wagner
  9. The Economics of Citation By Jeong-Yoo Kim; Insik Min; Christian Zimmermann

  1. By: Ying Xie (Department of Economics, University of Victoria); David E. Giles (Department of Economics, University of Victoria)
    Abstract: We model the length of time that it takes for a patent application to be granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, conditional on the patent actually being awarded eventually. Survival analysis is applied and both the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier and parametric accelerated failure time models are used to analyze the data. We find that the number of claims a patent makes, the number of citations a patent makes, the patent’s technological category, and the type of applicant all have significant effects on the duration that a patent is under consideration. A log-normal survival model is the preferred parametric specification, and the results suggest that the hazard function is non-monotonic over time.
    Keywords: Patents, research and development, survival analysis, hazard function
    JEL: C16 C29 C46 L10
    Date: 2007–08–24
  2. By: Lukach, R.; Kort, P.M.; Plasmans, J.E.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.
    Keywords: R&D Investment;Competition;Preemption;Attrition.
    JEL: C72 D21 O31
    Date: 2007
  3. By: Alan Hughes
    Abstract: This paper questions the current emphases in innovation policy on a particular interpretation of US performance which emphasises R&D intensive high technology producing sectors, spin-offs from the science base and private sector venture capital. Whilst recognizing the important role they may play it is argued that it has been greatly exaggerated to the neglect of other key factors. One is the importance of the diffusion and use of ICT as a general purpose technology beyond the ICT and other R&D intensive high-tech producing sectors. A second is the dominant role which performance transformation in existing firms plays in driving industry level productivity compared with the direct role of new entrants. A third is the diversified role played by universities in knowledge exchange which extends beyond a narrow focus on spin offs and licensing to encompass the creation of human capital and a wide range of formal and informal business interactions. Finally there is the major role that public R&D procurement policy has played in the US in the effective provision of public rather than private sector venture capital. The paper provides a broad overview of evidence on each of these factors and considers some broad implications for innovation policy which might be drawn on the basis of that review. In particular it concludes by arguing that the crafting of innovation policy in the context of any specific national innovation system requires a careful consideration of the structural features of that context and the particular opportunities and challenges facing policy practitioners in it. An imperfect interpretation of the experience of one country's system is unlikely to be an appropriate guide to innovation system failure or success elsewhere.
    Keywords: Innovation Policy, University-Industry Links, Productivity Growth
    JEL: O31 O33 O38
    Date: 2007–06
  4. By: Uwe Cantner (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany); Maximilian Goethner (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany); Andreas Meder (School of Business and Economics, Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: This paper is concerned with the relationship between innovative success of entrepreneurs and their prior knowledge at the stage of firm formation. We distinguish between different kinds of experience an entrepreneur can possess and find evidence that the innovative success subsequent to firm formation is enhanced by entrepreneur's prior technological knowledge but not by prior market and organizational knowledge. Moreover we find that prior technological knowledge gathered through embeddedness within a research community has an additionally positive influence on post start-up innovative success. This is a first hint towards the importance of collective innovation activities.
    Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Networks, Prior knowledge
    JEL: L25 O31 Z13
    Date: 2007–08–27
  5. By: Scott Baker; Pak Yee Lee; Claudio Mezzetti
    Abstract: This paper models the disclosure of knowledge as a "threat", useful in ensuring firms keep their commitments. We show that firms holding knowledge are better able to enforce agreements than firms that don’t. In markets requiring innovation to make a product, disclosure is a more powerful threat than entry by the punishing firm alone. Occasionally, the punishing firm won’t be able to innovate, making it impossible for it to enter the cheating firm’s market and punish. The punishing firm, however, can through disclosure credibly ensure that one, if not many, firms enter the cheating firm’s market. In the model, firms contract explicitly to exchange knowledge and tacitly to coordinate the introduction of innovations to the marketplace. We find conditions under which firms can self-enforce both agreements. The enforcement conditions are weaker when (1) firms possess knowledge and (2) knowledge is easily transferable to other firms. The disclosure threat has implication for antitrust law generally, which are considered.
    Date: 2007–08
  6. By: Jan Kranich (Leuphana Universität Lüneburg)
    Abstract: This paper discusses a model of vertical an horizontal product differentiation within the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition. Firns coompete not only in prices and horizontal attributes of their products, but also in the quality that can be controlled by R&D activities. Based upon te results of a general equilibrium model, intra-sectoral trade and the welfare implications of public intervention in terms of research promotion are considered. The analysis involves a numerical application to ten basic European industries.
    Keywords: R&D, Monopolisitc Competition, Product Differentiation
    JEL: D43 F12 L13 L16
    Date: 2007–08
  7. By: AMIGUES Jean-Pierre (LERNA, University of Toulouse); MOREAUX Michel (LERNA, University of Toulouse); RICCI Francesco (LERNA, University of Toulouse)
    Date: 2006–08
  8. By: Marcus Wagner
    Abstract: Innovation activities in the semiconductor industry provide considerable challenges for technology and innovation management. In particular, firms frequently face make-or-buy decisions and such decisions have considerable management implications. The semiconductor industry has a long history of radical innovations which are taking place through distinct industry cycles of high and low demand. The paper investigates these issues for the Electronic Design Automation industry which is a specific sub-segment of the semiconductor industry. Based on database searches and structured interviews, the paper analyses empirically the reasons for make or buy decisions with regard to innovation and the level of acquisition activities of innovative small firms in the Electronic Design Automation industry. This analysis is supported by an analysis of the SEC filings of large firms in the Electronic Design Automation industry.
    Date: 2007
  9. By: Jeong-Yoo Kim (Kyun Hee University); Insik Min (Kyun Hee University); Christian Zimmermann (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: In this paper, we study the citation decision of a scientific author. By citing a related work, authors can make their arguments more persuasive. We call this the correlation effect. But if authors cite other work, they may give the impression that they think the cited work is more competent than theirs. We call this the reputation effect. These two effects may be the main sources of citation bias. We empirically show that there exists citation bias in Economics by using data from RePEc. We also report how the citation bias differs across regions (U.S., Europe and Asia).
    Keywords: citation bias, correlation effect, reputation effect, signal, strategy, RePEc
    JEL: D81
    Date: 2007–08

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