nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒04‒14
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. The Value of Intellectual Property Rights to Firms By Christine Greenhalgh; Mark Rogers
  2. Human capital and successful academic spin-off By Müller, Bettina
  3. An empirical assessment of co-activity among German professors By Czarnitzki, Dirk; Glänzel, Wolfgang; Hussinger, Katrin
  4. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers By Thomas Giebe; Elmar Wolfstetter
  5. R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities By Cerquera Dussán, Daniel
  6. Dynamic R&D incentives with network externalities By Cerquera Dussán, Daniel
  7. Guide to More Effective and Efficient Building Regulatory Processes Through Information Technology By HUD - PD&R
  8. Modes, Challenges and Outcomes of Nanotechnology Transfer - A Comparative Analysis University and Company Researchers By Christopher Palmberg
  9. The Determinants of Open Source Quality: An Empirical Investigation By Ioana Popovici

  1. By: Christine Greenhalgh; Mark Rogers
    Abstract: Economists view intellectual property rights (IPRs) as policy tools for encouraging innovation. There are many types of IPRs and of institutions concerned with their administration. We begin by outlining how these complex and varied rights are supposed to work and how they interact with other characteristics of firms and markets. We then survey the available literature on patents, trade marks and copyright to assess the value of these IPRs to firms and the costs to firms of acquiring and defending their rights. The paper concludes with suggestions for topics requiring further research to better inform public policy in this field.
    Keywords: Innovation, Intellectual Property, Patents, Trade Marks, Copyright
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Müller, Bettina
    Abstract: Academic spin-offs are one way in which employability of university graduates is reflected. Using the ZEW spinoff-survey, this paper studies empirically the impact of human capital on the success of academic spinoffs founding in knowledge and technology intensive sectors. The focus is thereby on the composition of human capital which is described according to whether or not the founders have studied several subjects and whether or not they all come from the same research establishment. Additionally the impact of having founded as a team is analyzed. Success is measured by employment growth. The findings suggest that it is advantageous to found within a team, but that the human capital composition both for single entrepreneurs and team foundations is rather irrelevant.
    Keywords: Higher Education, Human Capital, Entrepreneurship, Spin-off
    JEL: C12 L25 M13
    Date: 2006
  3. By: Czarnitzki, Dirk; Glänzel, Wolfgang; Hussinger, Katrin
    Abstract: The growing importance of technology relevant non-publication output of university research has come into the focus of policy-makers’ interest. A fierce debate arose on possible negative consequences of the increasing commercialization of science, as it may come along with a reduction in research performance. This paper investigates the relationship between publishing as a measure of scientific output and patenting for German professors active in a range of science fields. We combine bibliometric/technometric indicators and econometric techniques to show that patenting positively correlates with, first, the publication output and, second, with publication quality of patenting researchers.
    Keywords: academic inventors, patents, publications
    JEL: O31 O32 O34
    Date: 2006
  4. By: Thomas Giebe (Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany.; Elmar Wolfstetter (Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany.–
    Abstract: This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.
    Keywords: patents, licensing, auctions, royalty, innovation, R&D, mechanism design
    JEL: D21 D43 D44 D45
    Date: 2007–04
  5. By: Cerquera Dussán, Daniel
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These inefficiencies are solely due to the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity.
    Keywords: Network externalities, Innovation, Imperfect Competition
    JEL: D21 D85 L13 O31
    Date: 2006
  6. By: Cerquera Dussán, Daniel
    Abstract: This paper studies the incentives to undertake uncertain R&D initiatives in a dynamic duopoly network industry. It is shown that network externalities positively affect the incentives to invest in R&D. In the model, competition resembles a preemption race and, therefore, market performance implies an overinvestment in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. Moreover, network externalities have an important impact in the dynamic evolution of the industry. Although in the long-run a single firm dominates the market (i.e. wins the race), short-run competition is very fierce and concentrated on neck-and-neck technological configurations. This short-run competition is fiercer and longer, the higher the level of network externalities. Policy measures that increase technological diffusion (i.e. mandatory licensing), increase the level of competition and/or prolong the short-run competition have an important positive impact on consumer welfare and on firms’ R&D incentives.
    Keywords: Network externalities, Innovation, Imperfect Competition, Dynamic Games
    JEL: C73 D85 L13 O31
    Date: 2006
  7. By: HUD - PD&R
    Abstract: This Guide has been produced to provide your state or community with a tool to enhance public safety and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of your oversight of construction.
    JEL: O21
    Date: 2006–08
  8. By: Christopher Palmberg
    Abstract: Nanotechnology has been proposed as the next general purpose technology and engine for growth for the 21th century. Increasing public R&D investments are foremost reflected in the growth of scientific publications, while nanotechnology still is in an uncertain phase of development with various directions of commercialization pending. This paper focuses on the challenge, modes and outcomes of nanotechnology as an emerging science-based field in Finland. The paper contributes by interrogating how challenges and modes of nanotechnology transfer differ across universities and companies and determine outcomes broadly defined. It uses an extensive survey data covering university and company researchers in the Finnish nanotechnology community. The results show significant differences in the perceptions of researchers across these organisations, and highlight specific challenges and modes as determinants of outcomes. The specificities of nanotechnology are also assessed in this context.
    Keywords: nanotechnology, technology transfer, Finland, survey data
    JEL: O31 O32 O38
    Date: 2007–04–12
  9. By: Ioana Popovici (Department of Economics, Florida International University)
    Abstract: Open source (OS) licenses differ in the conditions under which licensors and OS contributors are allowed to modify and redistribute the source code. While recent research has explored the determinants of license choice, we know little about the impact of license choice on project success. In this paper, we measure success by the speed with which programming bugs are fixed. Using data obtained from, a free service that hosts OS projects, we test whether the license chosen by project leaders influences bug resolution rates. In initial regressions, we find a strong correlation between the hazard of bug resolution and the use of highly restrictive licenses. However, license choices are likely to be endogenous. We instrument license choice using (i) the human language in which contributors operate and (ii) the license choice of the project leaders for a previous project. We then find weak evidence that restrictive licenses adversely affect project success.
    Keywords: open source software, property rights, copy-left
    JEL: L86 K39 O30
    Date: 2007–04

This nep-ipr issue is ©2007 by Roland Kirstein. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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