nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2006‒11‒25
six papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. The patenting universities: Problems and perils By Baldini, Nicola
  2. R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers By Désiré Vencatachellum; Bruno Versaevel
  3. The Quest for Citations: Drivers of Article Impact By S. STREMERSCH; I. VERNIERS; C. VERHOEF
  4. Methods for Assessing Technology Transfer - An Overview By Görling, Stefan
  5. Instruments of Commerce and Knowledge: Probe Microscopy, 1980-2000 By Cyrus C. M. Mody
  6. As luck would have it : innovation and market value in "complex technology" sectors. By Alex Coad; Rekha Rao

  1. By: Baldini, Nicola
    Abstract: Starting from a review of more than 50 papers, this work will present a detailed overview of threats stemming from university patenting activity, then it will draw some policy implications and it will conclude with some suggestions for further research.
    Keywords: university patents; entrepreneurial university; open science; secrecy
    JEL: O31
    Date: 2006–03–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:853&r=ipr
  2. By: Désiré Vencatachellum (IEA, HEC Montréal); Bruno Versaevel
    Abstract: There is evidence that competing firms delegate R&D to the same independent profit-maximizing laboratory. We draw on this stylilzed fact to construct a model where two firms in the same industry offer transfer payments in exchange of user-specific R&D services from a common laboratory. Inter-firm and within-laboratory externalities affect the intensiti of competition among delegating firms on the intermediate market for technology. Whether competition is relatively soft or tight is reflected by each firm’s transfer payment offers to the laboratory. This in turn determines the laboratory’s capacity to earn profits, R&D outcomes, delegating firms’ profits, and social welfare. We compare the delegated R&D game to two other one where firms (i) cooperatively conduct in-house R&D, and (ii) non-cooperatively choose in-house R&D. The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two games, and the laboratory earns positive profits, only if within-laboratory R&D services are sufficiently complementary, but inter-firm spillovers are sufficiently low. We find no room for policy intervention, because the privately profitable decision to delegate R&D, when the laboratory participates, always benefits consumers.
    Keywords: Research and development, externalities, common agency.
    JEL: C72 L13 O31
    Date: 2005–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iea:carech:0501&r=ipr
  3. By: S. STREMERSCH; I. VERNIERS; C. VERHOEF
    Abstract: Why do some articles become building blocks for future scholars, while many others remain unnoticed? We aim to answer this question by contrasting, synthesizing and simultaneously testing three scientometric perspectives – universalism, social constructivism and presentation – on the influence of article and author characteristics on article citations. To do so, we study all articles published in a sample of five major journals in marketing from 1990 to 2002 that are central to the discipline. We count the number of citations each of these articles has received and regress this count on an extensive set of characteristics of the article (i.e. article quality, article domain, title length, the use of attention grabbers and expositional clarity), and the author (i.e. author visibility and author personal promotion). We find that the number of citations an article in the marketing discipline receives, depends upon “what one says” (quality and domain), on “who says it” (author visibility and personal promotion) and not so much on “how one says it” (title length, the use of attention grabbers, and expositional clarity). Our insights contribute to the marketing literature and are relevant to scientific stakeholders, such as the management of scientific journals and individual academic scholars, as they strive to maximize citations. They are also relevant to marketing practitioners. They inform practitioners on characteristics of the academic journals in marketing and their relevance to decisions they face. On the other hand, they also raise challenges towards making our journals accessible and relevant to marketing practitioners: (1) authors visible to academics are not necessarily visible to practitioners; (2) the readability of an article may hurt academic credibility and impact, while it may be instrumental in influencing practitioners; (3) it remains questionable whether articles that academics assess to be of high quality are also managerially relevant.
    Keywords: scientometrics, citation analysis, cite, referencing, impact.
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:06/422&r=ipr
  4. By: Görling, Stefan
    Abstract: As triple-helix like research funding is growing in popularity, the need for evaluating the success of such programs is growing. During the last 30 years, a number of attempts have been made to assess whether certain technology funding has been successful or not. The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of these attempts as well as suggest that we must look beyond simple valuemeters as patent creation rate in order to fully understand the process of technology transfer.
    Keywords: technology transfer, assessment, patent, innovation management
    Date: 2006–11–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:pinkwp:31&r=ipr
  5. By: Cyrus C. M. Mody
    Abstract: Longstanding debates about the role of the university in national culture and the global economy have entered a new phase in the past decade in most industrialized, and several industrializing, countries. One important focus of this debate is corporate involvement in academic scientific research. Proponents of the academic capitalism say that corporate involvement makes the university leaner, more agile, better able to respond to the needs of the day. Critics say that corporate involvement leaves society without the independent, critical voices traditionally lodged in universities. I argue that a science and technology studies perspective, using case studies of research communities, can push this debate in directions envisioned by neither proponents nor critics. I use the development and commercialization of the scanning tunneling microscope and the atomic force microscope as an example of how research communities continually redraw the line between corporate and academic institutions.
    JEL: N8 O17 O3 O31 O33 Z1 Z13
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12700&r=ipr
  6. By: Alex Coad (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne et LEM); Rekha Rao (LEM,Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy)
    Abstract: How do financial markets respond to firms' efforts at innovation ? To answer this question, we mesure innovation by creating a synthetic indicator based on a firm's recent history of R&D expenditure and patent applications. We focus on four 2-digit "complex technology" manufacturing sectors that have been hand-picked according to their high propensities to innovate. Whilst standard regression techniques find a positive relationship between innovation and growth, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the literature. We identify those "superstar" firms with the highest stock market valuations and show that these firms owe a lot of their success to their previous efforts at innovation. However, there are also other firms whose attempts to innovate are virtually ignored by financial markets. Our results emphasize the fundamental uncertainty of R&D.
    Keywords: Innovation, market value, quantile regression, patents, Tobin's q.
    JEL: C61 C62 D20 D46 D51
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r06069&r=ipr

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