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on Investment |
| By: | Oscar Iván Ávila-Montealegre; Juan J. OspinaTejeiro; Anderson Grajales-Olarte; Mario A. Ramos-Veloza |
| Abstract: | We analyze how the minimum wage affects a typical emerging economy with high labor informality. Using an extended New Keynesian small open economy model, we find that an unexpected increase in the minimum wage disproportionately affects low-skilled workers, with limited effects on inflation and the monetary policy rate. A higher minimum wage raises production costs and induces the substitution of formal workers with informal labor and machinery, leading to lower output, employment, and net exports. We also find that the existence of a minimum wage alters the transmission of productivity, demand, and monetary shocks, resulting in a more persistent impact on macroeconomic variables and lower effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation. While the minimum wage mitigates consumption inequality in the short run, it increases employment volatility. The macroeconomic implications of minimum wages are significant, and the mechanisms differ from those highlighted in the literature for advanced economies. |
| Keywords: | DSGE model, minimum wage, informal labor markets, monetary policy, heterogeneous agents |
| JEL: | E13 E50 J31 J46 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rbp:wpaper:2025-018 |
| By: | José Aguilar (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú y Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.); Ricardo Quineche (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú y Universidad del Pacífico.) |
| Abstract: | Despite being an emerging economy, Peru has achieved superior post-pandemic disinflation compared to major developed economies, making its regional inflation dynamics globally instructive for monetary policy design. This study investigates Lima’s suitability as Peru’s inflation-targeting anchor by analyzing regional spillovers across nine economic regions using monthly CPI data (2002-2024). Employing both Diebold-Yilmaz time-domain and Baruník-Kˇrehlík frequency-domain frameworks, we quantify the direction, magnitude, and persistence of inflation transmission. Results reveal strong regional interdependence (73.60% total spillover index) with Lima as the dominant net transmitter (23.94 percentage points). However, frequency decomposition uncovers striking cyclical heterogeneity: Lima receives short-run shocks from food-producing regions but dominates long-run transmission (44.70% vs. 28.99% frequency spillover index). Rolling-window analysis during COVID-19 shows temporary spillover disruption (connectivity declining from 75% to 68%) followed by recovery during 2022’s inflationary surge. Robustness checks across specifications, granular city-level data, and three-band frequency segmentation confirm Lima’s structural centrality at lower frequencies. These findings validate the Central Reserve Bank’s Lima-centered approach for long-run targeting while revealing asymmetric frequency-dependent spillovers. The presence of short-run regional shocks suggests integrating upstream agricultural signals could enhance near-term forecasting and policy responsiveness. |
| Keywords: | Inflation spillovers, Regional inflation dynamics, Frequency-domain analysis, Diebold-Yilmaz methodology, Baruník-Krehlík framework |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rbp:wpaper:2025-016 |
| By: | König, Jörg; Meyer, Tim |
| Abstract: | Plans to introduce a digital euro are becoming increasingly concrete. The European Parliament is expected to vote on the proposal in May 2026, with the European legislative process set to be completed by the end of the year. However, the digital euro is likely to be primarily a prestige project of European institutions, whose benefits are difficult to discern. Its introduction would, with a high degree of probability, entail distortions of competition and risks to the financial system. It could also lead to a gradual displacement of cash, quietly driven forward by the various interested parties. Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, the digital euro is also unlikely to significantly foster technological progress or strengthen the euro's role as a global reserve currency. For this reason, an open-ended process without time pressure is needed-one that allows for the possibility of ultimately deciding against the introduction of a digital euro. Instead, alternative options should be incorporated into the decision-making process. In addition to the possibility of entrusting the ECB with the provision of digital infrastructure, priority should be given to private initiatives in the development of digital payment services. One point appears clear: Europe's shortcomings and dependencies in digital payment systems cannot be resolved through a more or less state-driven digital currency, but rather require trust in market-based processes and openness to private innovation. |
| Abstract: | Die Pläne zur Einführung eines digitalen Euros werden immer konkreter. Im Mai 2026 soll das Europäische Parlament über das Vorhaben abstimmen. Bis Ende des Jahres soll der europäische Gesetzgebungsprozess abgeschlossen sein. Der digitale Euro dürfte jedoch vor allem ein Prestigeprojekt europäischer Institutionen sein, dessen Nutzen nur schwer ersichtlich ist. Die Einführung des digitalen Euros hätte mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit Wettbewerbsverzerrungen und Risiken für das Finanzsystem zur Folge. Zudem könnte sie zu einer sukzessiven Verdrängung des Bargelds führen, die diskret von den unterschiedlichen interessierten Seiten vorangetrieben wird. Entgegen der Hoffnung seiner Befürworter dürfte der digitale Euro zudem kaum dazu in der Lage sein, technologischen Fortschritt zu befördern oder die Rolle des Euros als globale Reservewährung zu stärken. Deshalb bedarf es eines ergebnisoffenen Prozesses ohne Zeitdruck, an dessen Ende auch die Entscheidung stehen kann, den digitalen Euro nicht einzuführen. Vielmehr sollten andere Optionen in den Entscheidungsprozess einbezogen werden: Neben der Möglichkeit, der EZB die Bereitstellung der digitalen Infrastruktur anzuvertrauen, sollten private Initiativen Vorrang bei der Entwicklung digitaler Zahlungsdienstleistungen erhalten. Denn eines scheint offensichtlich: Europas Rückstände und Abhängigkeiten bei digitalen Zahlungssystemen lassen sich nicht durch eine mehr oder weniger staatliche Digitalwährung beheben, sondern erfordern Vertrauen in marktwirtschaftliche Prozesse und Offenheit gegenüber privaten Innovationen. |
| Keywords: | Bargeld, Digitalisierung, Europa, Finanzmärkte |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:smwpos:340005 |
| By: | Wloka, Michelle; Zerfaß, Ansgar |
| Abstract: | Welche neuen und bislang wenig beachteten Themen werden die Unternehmenskommunikation in Zukunft prägen? Der Communication Management Radar 2026 identifiziert interdisziplinäre Phänomene in Management, Technologie, Psychologie und Medien, die sich gerade konkretisieren und in naher Zukunft zu Herausforderungen und Chancen für die Unternehmenskommunikation führen. Als Nachfolgeprojekt des Communications Trend Radar wurde der methodische Ansatz noch stärker auf die Unternehmenspraxis ausgerichtet. Mit einer frühzeitigen Einbindung Chief Communications Officers und Mitglieder ihrer Führungsteams sowie durch eine vertiefte qualitative Analyse wurden strategisch relevante Themen für die Unternehmenskommunikation identifiziert. Das Forschungsteam der Universität Leipzig mit Dr. Michelle Wloka und Prof. Dr. Ansgar Zerfaß identifiziert für 2026 die Themen: Simulated Communication, Constrained AI agents, Cognitive Drift, Power Flux, Strategic Subtraction. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:agukci:340015 |
| By: | Francesco Crespi; Nicolò Geri; Dario Guarascio; Enrico Marvasi |
| Abstract: | This paperinvestigatestherelationshipbetweentechnologicalcapabilities, importdependency, and environmentalpolicies, focusingonthelithium-ionbatterysupplychain(LBSC)–acriticalsectorforthe net-zero transition.Wecontributetothegrowingliteratureonthedriversandbarrierstoacceleratingthe transitioninthefollowingways.First, wedevelopanoriginalanalyticalframeworkthatintegratestwo recent streamsofliterature(i.e.theoneonaccelerationofthegreentransitionandtheoneonstructural dependencies andtechnologicalsovereignty), inordertodiscusstheexistenceofpotentialtrade-offsbe- tweenthetwoobjectives.Second, wedevelopastrategicintelligenceanalysisoftheLBSCbyproposinga novelmethodologicalapproachtoidentifyimportdependenciesandtechnologicalcapacitygaps, which allowstosingleoutcriticalproductsandstageswherepolicyactionisneededtoavoidtheemergenceof bottleneckstothegreentransition.Third, weexaminehowtechnologicalcapabilitiesinfluenceimport dependency, showingunderwhatconditionstechnologicalupgradingimprovescountries’competitive positions andmitigatesdependencyissues.Finally, weanalysehowenvironmentalpolicystringencyre- lates toimportdependencyinordertodiscussinwhichcontextenvironmentalgoalsmayconflictwith thoserelatedtotechnologicalsovereigntyandstrategicautonomy.Ourfindingssuggestthattechno- logical upgradingcanreducedependencieswithoutcompromisingenvironmentalgoalssothatthepre- sumed trade-offbetweenthenet-zerotransitionandstructuraldependenciesdoesnotnecessarilyhold. In contrast, awell-designedpolicymix, aligningenvironmentalobjectiveswithtargetedinnovationand industrialpolicies, canenhancebothresilienceandtheaccelerati ontowardsthenet-zerotransition. |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0291 |
| By: | Stephen W. Salant; Diego S. Cardoso; Julien Xavier Daubanes |
| Abstract: | To reduce Russia's ability to fund its war in Ukraine, Western governments imposed a price ceiling on Russian seaborne oil exports. Policy-makers sought a ceiling level to lower Russia's oil profits without raising excessively the world price buyers pay for oil. Previous analyses have explored this problem using simulations and, with a single exception, have treated the non-Russian supply response as exogenous. We pose the problem theoretically as a constrained minimization problem of the policy maker and solve it, treating Russia as either a monopolist or an oligopolist facing heterogeneous rivals with endogenous supply. |
| Keywords: | price cap, oil price, strategic supply |
| JEL: | L13 Q41 D78 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12608 |
| By: | Marcinkowski, Frank; Keller, Birte; Lünich, Marco; Flaßhoff, Florian Golo |
| Abstract: | Der Kurzbericht präsentiert zentrale Ergebnisse der dritten von vier repräsentativen Befragungswellen der Studie Monitor Digitale Arbeitsgesellschaft, die im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts Meinungsmonitor Künstliche Intelligenz 3.0 durchgeführt wurde. Grundlage sind die Angaben von 1.647 Befragten (928 Erwerbstätige, 719 Nichterwerbstätige) im Januar 2026. Die dritte Befragungswelle zeigt, dass das im Verlauf des Jahres 2025 gestiegene Interesse an KI zu Beginn des Jahres 2026 wieder leicht zurückgeht, während die subjektive Einschätzung des eigenen Wissens auf dem erreichten Niveau stabil bleibt. Gleichzeitig nehmen Vorbehalte gegenüber bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Einsatzfeldern zu, insbesondere in Bereichen mit Bezug zu staatlichen Sicherheitsaufgaben und politischen Entscheidungen. In der Arbeitswelt bleibt die Bewertung der Auswirkungen von KI auf den eigenen Beruf insgesamt stabil und leicht nutzenorientiert. Die berufliche Nutzung von KI stagniert zuletzt weitgehend. Viele Beschäftigte berichten weiterhin keine grundlegenden Veränderungen ihrer Tätigkeitsanforderungen und nur geringe persönliche Jobunsicherheit, während die Sorge, dass KI menschliche Arbeit allgemein ersetzen oder grundlegend verändern könnte, weiterhin deutlich stärker verbreitet ist als die persönliche Jobunsicherheit. Erstmals wird zudem ein besonderes Schlaglicht auf die Regulierungspräferenzen der Bevölkerung geworfen: Während staatliche Eingriffe bei arbeitsmarktbezogenen Folgen breite Unterstützung finden, werden Eingriffe in wirtschaftliche Freiheiten und steuerpolitische Maßnahmen deutlich ambivalenter bewertet. Insgesamt deutet sich eine stärkere Ausdifferenzierung und Festigung der Einstellungen gegenüber KI an. |
| Date: | 2026–04–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:zcxje_v1 |
| By: | Alloysius Joko Purwanto (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)); Yasushi Ueki |
| Abstract: | ASEAN’s automotive industry is entering a critical transition phase as electrification, digitalisation, and decarbonisation reshape global vehicle markets. While electric vehicle (EV) adoption is accelerating across ASEAN, the region faces structural challenges: policy uncertainty, prolonged market stagnation, and fragmented industrial competitiveness. At the same time, ASEAN remains a vital production base in the global automotive value chain, particularly for internal combustion engine (ICE) and hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs). This policy brief draws on ERIA’s ongoing work under the ASEAN–Japan Co-Creation Initiative and the proposed ASEAN–Japan Next-Generation Vehicle Industry Masterplan. It argues that ASEAN’s transition should follow varied, differentiated pathways rather than a single, linear electrification trajectory. A phased and diversified approach – combining ICE, HEV, x EV, sustainable fuels, and mobility services – is essential to preserve industrial competitiveness while advancing climate objectives. The brief outlines a strategic framework built around three pillars: (i) technology and market transition pathways; (ii) industrial transformation through decarbonisation, digitalisation, and servitisation; and (iii) strengthened regional and ASEAN–Japan collaboration. It concludes with policy recommendations to enhance policy predictability, mobilise investment, and position ASEAN as a resilient and competitive hub in the global next-generation vehicle ecosystem. Latest Articles |
| Date: | 2026–03–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:era:wpaper:pb-2025-22 |
| By: | Elliott, M.; Golub, B.; Leduc, M. V. |
| Abstract: | Complex organizations accomplish tasks through many steps of collaboration among workers. Corporate culture supports collaborations by establishing norms and reducing misunderstandings. Because a strong corporate culture relies on costly, voluntary investments by many workers, we model it as an organizational public good, subject to standard free-riding problems, which become severe in large organizations. Our main finding is that voluntary contributions to culture can nevertheless be sustained, because an organization's equilibrium productivity is endogenously highly sensitive to individual contributions. However, the completion of complex tasks is then necessarily fragile to small shocks that damage the organization's culture. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Culture, Networks, Fragility |
| Date: | 2026–03–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2624 |
| By: | Metiu, Norbert; Völpel, Martin |
| Abstract: | Hybrid threats encompass a range of hostile activities aimed at achieving geopolitical objectives, including cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, espionage, economic and political coercion, disinformation, and other forms of hybrid warfare. We construct a Geopolitical Hybrid Threat (GHT) index based on newspaper coverage of these activities. The index surges from the mid-2010s, surpassing the high levels observed during the late Cold War. Using a narrative instrument in a vector autoregression, we find that hybrid threat shocks suppress aggregate demand by raising uncertainty, reducing confidence, and tightening financial conditions, while triggering policy responses in the form of increased defense spending and monetary easing. |
| Keywords: | Geopolitical Risk, Hybrid Threats, Proxy VAR, Textual Analysis |
| JEL: | E32 C43 F51 H56 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bubdps:340011 |
| By: | Sebastiano Della Lena; Alessio Muscillo; Paolo Pin |
| Abstract: | Consumers discover their preferences through experience, yet the sequence and composition of those experiences are often designed by firms, digital platforms, or policymakers. We introduce a ``data-design'' framework for preference discovery, in which the structure of consumption data shapes learning. Bundling generates correlated exposure across goods, so utility surprises propagate through the co-consumption network. When estimation errors are known, bias-targeted design can shut down learning and amplify misperceptions. Conversely, robust design uses only the geometry of past co-consumption: popularity-biased bundles slow learning, while correlation-breaking bundles accelerate preference discovery. The framework thus explains how dominant platforms can sustain biased demand through exposure design, and why effective regulation may need to intervene on the structure of exposure itself rather than only on prices or market shares. |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2604.14260 |
| By: | Giommoni, T.; Guiso, L.; Michelacci, C.; Morelli, M. |
| Abstract: | Poorly drafted laws are ambiguous, create legal uncertainty, and hinder economic activity. By processing the full corpus of Italian legislation, we show that legal uncertainty—measured by the probability that lower courts and the Supreme Court of Cassation disagree—is higher in cases involving poorly drafted laws and varies systematically across courts. To quantify the economic costs of this legal uncertainty, we exploit a court consolidation reform that exogenously reassigned firms to courts. Firms facing greater legal uncertainty invest less and experience slower growth. Italy’s GDP would be about 5% higher if laws were drafted as clearly as the Constitution (at the top-quartile threshold of the drafting quality distribution). |
| Date: | 2026–03–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2623 |
| By: | Daouia, Abdelaati; Laurent, Thibault |
| Abstract: | This chapter discusses the current state of development of robust measures for evaluating firms’ production performance, focusing on two prominent approaches: (i) partial order-m frontiers and related efficiency scores based on probability-weighted moments, and (ii) their competing order-α counterparts, which rely on quantiles. It provides a structured overview of the original concepts and their recently introduced robustified versions, analyzing their strengths and weaknesses in terms of axiomatic properties, estimation methods, and robustness. The frontiles package offers various functions for computing both order-α and order-m frontiers and efficiency scores, including their robustified analogs, in the general setting with multiple inputs and outputs. It supports different performance measurement directions, namely input, output and hyperbolic orientations. Additionally, frontiles includes procedures for inference and robustness assessment, notably through confidence intervals, gross-error sensitivity and breakdown points. It also provides diagnostic checks to assess the presence of outliers in the data and, accordingly, to guide the choice of suitable trimming levels. It further enables the visualization of robust surface estimators in three-dimensional settings involving two inputs and one output. The use of this package is illustrated with a number of empirical applications. |
| Date: | 2026–04–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131658 |
| By: | Cristiano C. Carvalho; Trine E. Vattø (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how an often-overlooked source of pay transparency—the public disclosure of tax information—affects gender wage gaps. We exploit a 2001 change in Norway that made individual tax returns searchable online. Using matched employer–employee data and a difference in-differences design, we find that within-firm gender wage gaps fell by 2.2 percentage points (8.7 percent), driven by rising female wages. Effects are strongest in private-sector firms, industries with initially larger gaps, and municipalities that previously lacked easy access to printed tax lists. Wage gains are concentrated among job-changing women, suggesting that broad-based transparency mainly operates through improved information for job search. |
| Keywords: | Gender Wage Gap; Income Transparency; Public Disclosure of Tax Information |
| JEL: | J16 J31 J38 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:1033 |
| By: | Eric Heyer (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Xavier Timbeau (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Christophe Blot (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Céline Antonin (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Elliot Aurissergues (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Amel Falah (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Ombeline Julien de Pommerol (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Sabine Le Bayon (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Catherine Mathieu (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Benoît Williatte (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | Lors de notre précédente prévision en avril, la guerre commerciale était déjà bien entamée. Le président américain avait lancé une offensive tous azimuts. Les pays qui ne voulaient pas subir les tarifs « réciproques » annoncés lors du « jour de la libération » devaient entamer des négociations. Les contreparties attendues par l'administration Trump en échange de droits de douane « allégés » n'étaient pas totalement clairs, mais de nombreux pays se sont pliés à l'exercice. Des accords commerciaux ont été conclus avec l'Union européenne, le Japon, le Royaume-Uni, la Corée du Sud et plusieurs autres pays asiatiques : Viêt Nam, Indonésie, Philippines. Des négociations sont encore en cours avec d'autres pays, notamment la Chine. Pour d'autres pays, les négociations semblent soit rompues, soit n'ont jamais commencé, l'administration américaine n'ayant pas les moyens de conclure des accords détaillés avec 170 pays. Pour ces pays, le tarif sera fixé unilatéralement par les États-Unis, vraisemblablement entre 20 et 30 %. [Premier paragraphe] |
| Keywords: | guerre commerciale, administration Trump, accords commerciaux, négociations |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05568852 |