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on International Trade |
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Issue of 2026–08–17
twenty papers chosen by Nicola Daniele Coniglio, Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” |
| By: | Freeman, Rebecca; Garofalo, Marco; Longoni, Enrico; Manova, Kalina; Mari, Rebecca; Prayer, Thomas; Sampson, Thomas |
| Abstract: | How does dismantling deep integration affect international trade? This paper studies the consequences of economic disintegration by estimating the impact of Brexit on goods trade by UK firms. The UK’s exit from the EU’s single market and customs union in January 2021 led to an immediate, sharp drop in both exports and imports with the EU for the average UK firm, and caused many firms to stop trading with the EU altogether. But Brexit’s impact on aggregate trade was mitigated by three forces: larger firms were less hard hit; exports to non-EU countries were unaffected; and importers partially compensated for reduced EU imports by sourcing more from outside the EU. Our estimates imply that leaving the EU reduced worldwide UK exports by 6:4% and worldwide UK imports by 4:4% within the first two years. Adjustment patterns indicate that these effects were driven by higher variable and fixed UK-EU trade costs and imperfect input substitutability across origins, with little role for scale effects, capacity constraints, input cost shocks, or sourcing complementarities. |
| Keywords: | Trade policy; Brexit; Disintegration; Deep integration |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F15 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19869 |
| By: | James E. Anderson; Mario Larch; Serge Shikher; Yoto V. Yotov |
| Abstract: | We propose and implement a theory-consistent procedure to aggregate tariffs. Theory implies that (i) the import weights used for aggregation should be net of the impact of tariffs, rather than based on observed imports, and (ii) aggregation must account for trade elasticities, both at the disaggregated and aggregate levels. Our aggregator nests as special cases and corrects the deficiencies of the two existing alternatives – the simple-average and import-weighted tariffs. Our procedure can be applied at any level of aggregation. We deploy it to aggregate 6-digit HS tariffs to the industry-level of the International Trade and Production databases of the USITC. Several applications use the new Theory-Consistent Tariff Database (TCTD) to highlight the advantages of the theory-consistent tariffs. |
| Keywords: | tariffs, tariff aggregation, gravity theory, trade elasticity |
| JEL: | F11 F13 F14 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12902 |
| By: | Breinlich, Holger; Leromain, Elsa; Novy, Dennis; Sampson, Thomas |
| Abstract: | In trade models with scale economies, import liberalization reduces exports within industries by shrinking real market potential. We find this export destruction mechanism reduced US export growth following the permanent normalization of trade relations with China (PNTR). There was also an offsetting boost to exports from lower input costs. We use our estimates to calibrate a quantitative model and show that scale economies are economically important for trade policy analysis. Although PNTR increased aggregate US exports relative to GDP, exports declined in the most exposed industries. US gains from PNTR are positive but 30 percent smaller than under constant returns. |
| Keywords: | import liberalization;China shock;trade policy;scale economies;comparative advantage |
| JEL: | F12 F13 F15 |
| Date: | 2026–07–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:127595 |
| By: | Yao, Zhixiao |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first global empirical evidence on the trade effects of losing shared regional trade agreement (RTA) coverage. Moving beyond single RTA exit cases, I study worldwide bilateral trade flows from 1980 to 2016 and estimate the effect of de-coverage using a structural gravity model together with a heterogeneity-robust staggered difference-in-differences design. I find that de-coverage reduces bilateral trade by about 37% on average, a magnitude similar to the gains from RTA formation. A key contrast with the RTA entry literature is its dynamics: while trade gains from RTA formation build up gradually over time, the adjustment to de-coverage is front-loaded. Heterogeneity analysis shows larger losses for dyads with longer prior RTA histories, geographically distant partners, and country pairs with asymmetric income levels. Product-level estimates show declines concentrated in intermediate and consumption goods. |
| Keywords: | Trade Agreements, RTA Coverage Loss, Trade Disintegration, Structural Gravity, Staggered Difference-in-Differences, International Trade |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F15 F53 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tudcep:342518 |
| By: | Houssein Guimbard; Camilo Umana-Dajud |
| Abstract: | Since 2001, 76 regional trade agreements (RTAs) have incorporated provisions on electronic commerce, representing 44% of all RTAs signed over the period. We build an original dataset identifying these agreements (which we call E-RTAs) using an algorithm that combines machine learning and text analysis to detect e-commerce provisions in 449 trade agreement texts. We document that E-RTAs are geographically concentrated among a handful of developed economies and that signatory pairs trade less and are farther apart than pairs linked by other RTAs. Using a gravity framework estimated via Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood (PPML), we find that E-RTAs increase trade by less than the average RTA: conditional on the standard RTA dummy, the E-RTA coefficient is -0.245, implying approximately 22 percent less trade. Neither the number of e-commerce provisions nor their legal bindingness affects this result. However, when we interact E-RTA status with a measure of the combined development level of the trading pair, the interaction coefficient is 0.134, and e-commerce provisions increase trade between sufficiently developed country pairs. These results are robust to alternative specifications, estimators, product-level disaggregation, services trade, and tariff controls. |
| Keywords: | E-commerce;Regional Trade Agreements;Gravity Model;PPML;Digital Trade |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F15 L81 O33 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2026-08 |
| By: | Crozet, Matthieu; Hinz, Julian; Šváb, Patrik |
| Abstract: | Trade sanctions are restrictive measures that limit commercial exchange between countries to achieve political objectives. Their economics can be studied at two levels-the aggregate effects on trade and welfare, and the adjustment of individual firms-with the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in 2014 and 2022 as central case studies for both. At the macro level, a multi-country, multi-sector general-equilibrium trade model with input-output linkages is calibrated to quantify welfare effects under alternative coalition and intensity scenarios. Relative to 2014, the 2022 measures imposed substantially larger costs on Russia (about -2.6% of real income) while the average cost for EU/UK senders remained modest (around -0.1%), with larger losses concentrated in highly exposed small economies. Coalitions amplify pressure on the target at limited additional cost for most senders. Hypothetical extensions bound the potential of sanctions through global participation or embargoes. At the micro level, French customs data (monthly firm-product-destination flows, 2021-2023) and a triple-difference design reveal that exports to Russia fell by roughly three quarters after February 2022. The adjustment is dominated by the extensive margin, with smaller but significant intensive-margin declines among continuing firms. Targeted products contracted far more than non-targeted ones, with dual-use goods most severely affected. Financial channels that propagate losses beyond listed goods, the limits of "smart" sanctions when governments shield strategic firms, and political responses-including rally-around-the-flag effects in the targeted country-complete the picture. |
| Keywords: | economic sanctions, trade sanctions, international trade, embargo, export controls, Russia, extensive margin, welfare |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:342567 |
| By: | Chad P. Bown (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | Are foreign supply chains that service the US market still decoupling from China? If so, where are the new chains forming, how quickly is the process happening, and why is it unfolding the way it is? This paper provides an initial empirical assessment of the changing nature of product-level sourcing of US imports in the wake of the tariffs President Donald J. Trump imposed in 2018-19 and 2025. It establishes numerous stylized facts. For example, US imports of many consumer electronics--including smartphones, laptops, monitors, and video game consoles--did not decline sharply in 2025 despite US tariffs hitting Chinese production for the first time. Multinational firms had established alternative supply chains in India and Vietnam which they quickly sourced from instead. In contrast, US importers of clothing and footwear did not reorient their supply chains, in part perhaps because the resulting difference between US tariff increases on China and on third countries for those products was too small to motivate them to do so. Finally, much of the longer-term shift of US import sourcing toward Taiwan and Mexico reflected the increasing economic importance of imported inputs for the data center buildout for artificial intelligence, and not strictly decoupling supply chains with China. |
| Keywords: | Tariffs, supply chains, United States, China. |
| JEL: | F13 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp26-14 |
| By: | Rodriguez Castelan, Carlos (World Bank); Vazquez, Emmanuel (Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS), Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata); Winkler, Hernan (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the local effects of the 2018–19 U.S.-China trade disruptions on Mexico. Combining detailed municipal-level customs data with U.S. tariff schedules, it estimates that municipalities with greater export concentration in products targeted by U.S. tariffs on China (hereafter, tariff exposure) experienced significantly larger nearshoring dividends. An increase of 1 percent in tariff exposure led to a 4.3 percent increase in municipality-level exports to the United States. These export gains translated into broad labor market improvements: total labor income rose by 5.6 percent for each 1 percent increase in tariff exposure, driven by job creation rather than wage growth as average earnings remained unchanged. Beyond job quantity, the shock improved job quality: each 1 percent increase in tariff exposure reduced labor informality by 0.25 percentage points, with newly created jobs disproportionately being formal. Effects were driven primarily by manufacturing but extended to services through local spillovers. The findings indicate that trade policy changes between major economies can significantly reshape the spatial distribution of economic activity and the quantity and quality of jobs in third-party countries. |
| Keywords: | international trade, labor markets, trade policy |
| JEL: | F13 F14 F16 L60 O19 R23 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18791 |
| By: | Mitchener, Kris; Wandschneider, Kirsten |
| Abstract: | The Great Depression is the canonical case of a widespread currency war, with more than 70 countries devaluing their currencies relative to gold between 1929 and 1936. What were the currency war’s effects on trade flows? We use newly-compiled, high-frequency bilateral trade data and gravity models that account for when and whether trade partners had devalued to identify the effects of the currency war on global trade. Our empirical estimates show that a country’s trade was reduced by more than 21% following devaluation. This negative and statistically significant decline in trade suggests that the currency war destroyed the trade-enhancing benefits of the global monetary standard, ending regime coordination and increasing trade costs. |
| JEL: | F14 F33 F42 N10 N70 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19839 |
| By: | Toshihiro Okubo; Ilan Noy |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how identity shapes trade policy attitudes and electoral behavior during periods of geopolitical trade conflict. Using the Okubo-NIRA panel survey of Japanese workers, we study electoral preference updating around two major shocks: the April 2025 U.S. tariff shock and the November 2025 China-Taiwan shock. We argue that workers might evaluate trade policy not only as individuals or as Japanese but also through their attachment to the firms that employ them and to those firms' interests. This channel is salient for workers in internationally exposed firms - i.e., those that are directly affected by tariffs, supply-chain disruption, and economic-security concerns. Using individual fixed effects and instrumental-variable specifications based on workers' pride in their employer and its interaction with international exposure, we show that firm pride predicts changes in concrete tariff attitudes, which in turn are associated with shifts in party support. Interestingly, our results distinguish general support for free trade as a policy principle from tariff preferences contingent on geopolitical trade conflicts. Our findings suggest that geopolitical trade shocks shape political preferences through the identities of workers tied to their export-exposed employing firms. |
| Keywords: | trade, preferences, identity, pride |
| JEL: | F13 F51 P45 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12903 |
| By: | Stefano Bolatto (University of Bologna); Filippo Santi (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan); Maria Tremuli (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | International trade in waste and scrap has expanded rapidly, yet it remains underexplored in quantitative trade economics. This paper analyzes the determinants of waste flows across five major material categories (plastics, paper, glass, iron & steel, aluminum) using a gravity model enriched with bilateral tariff and non-tariff measures. Leveraging HS6 bilateral customs data for 2001–2022, we compare trade elasticities between waste and non-waste products within the same HS2 sectors to assess whether differences in trade patterns are material-specific. The results are robust to dynamic lead-lag specifications assessing systematic anticipation, and to heterogeneity analyses by income level. They are consistent with three distinct archetypes: information sensitive materials (plastics, aluminum), where technical NTMs display a pattern suggestive of certification mechanisms; complementarity-driven materials (paper), which exhibit inverted tariff elasticities reflecting technological lock-in in specialized recycling infrastructure; and commodity-like materials (glass, iron/steel), where trade responds conventionally to policy and geographic frictions. Our findings point to the value of tailoring trade and circular-economy measures to material characteristics, given the systematic differences observed across archetypes. |
| Keywords: | International trade, waste and scrap, gravity model, tariff and non-tariff barriers, circular economy, trade and environmental policy |
| JEL: | F Q |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inf:wpaper:2026.05 |
| By: | Mary E. Lovely (Peterson Institute for International Economics); Christine Y. Wan (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | Using Asian Development Bank multiregional input-output tables for 2007-24, this Policy Brief traces Chinese value added throughout the US import basket. It argues that genuine US economic security requires a more disciplined strategy--identifying actual chokepoints, building competitive alternative suppliers and the infrastructure connecting them to markets, and cooperating with allies rather than forcing them into separate supply chains. The appendix explains the method and databases that the authors used in their analysis. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb26-12 |
| By: | Mr. JaeBin Ahn; Lorenzo Rotunno; Michele Ruta |
| Abstract: | We study how U.S. tariff hikes in 2025 have transmitted to import prices. Consistent with recent evidence, we find that duty-exclusive import prices at the variety (country-product) level do not adjust to tariffs, implying full pass-through to duty-inclusive prices at the border. At the product level, however, duty-exclusive aggregate import prices decline significantly with tariff increases. We show that this product-level decline is driven by within-product reallocation toward lower-priced sources—stronger in products facing larger tariff hikes—and operates primarily through the entry of lower-priced varieties and the exit of higher-priced ones. Estimates of variety appeal indicate that part of this reallocation reflects shifts toward lower-quality varieties, a channel that is also present in the 2018–19 U.S.–China tariff episode. These reallocation effects carry implications for consumer welfare and productivity through the quality of imported goods and inputs. |
| Date: | 2026–07–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2026/149 |
| By: | Lokshin, Michael M. |
| Abstract: | Can energy-rich developing countries convert cheap electricity into AI compute exports? This paper develops a capacity-constrained trade model of AI compute services with bilateral frictions in delivery, regulation, and trust. Calibrating the model across 85 countries shows that several developing economies can produce compute at low cost, but this advantage rarely becomes export competitiveness. Because hardware dominates unit costs and is globally priced, cross-country production costs differ by only 12–20 percent. Modest regulatory, financing, and trust frictions can therefore erase the gains from cheap power. The binding constraint is institutional credibility rather than electricity prices, including enforceable data governance, stable regulation, credible power contracts, access to finance, and geopolitical alignment with buyers. |
| Date: | 2026–07–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11426 |
| By: | Houssein Guimbard |
| Abstract: | This paper asks how a legally durable tariff regime could reproduce the "ideal" structure that the second Trump administration had assembled by November 2025 high, country-differentiated tariffs combining Section 232 protection, IEEPA reciprocal tariffs and framework deals — after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs in February 2026. From a product-level database of every U.S. tariff action of 2025–2026, I distinguish each statutory instrument and assess five configurations through counterfactual general-equilibrium analysis, measuring how far each realistic, durable regime stands from that November 2025 target and through which instrument the administration could return to it. Every configuration lowers U.S. GDP (by 0.37 to 1.37%) while improving the terms of trade; but on the metric tied to the stated objective — the reindustrialisation of manufacturing — a prospective, legally durable Section 301 regime can produce similar results to those of the target, raising U.S. manufacturing value added by +3.6% against +4.4% for the November 2025 hybrid and +1.9% for Section 232 alone. Instrument design — coverage breadth and partner targeting — matters as much as the average tariff level for the cross-country incidence, targeted Section 301 tariffs creating winners among non-targeted economies while broad-based configurations produce near-universal losses. |
| Keywords: | Trade Policy;Tariffs (Sections 232, 301, IEEPA);Computable General Equilibrium;Reindustrialisation;Trade Diversion |
| JEL: | F13 F17 C68 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2026-07 |
| By: | Salzmann, Leonard; Schulz, Philipp |
| Abstract: | The relationship between global economic growth and German goods exports has weakened substantially since 2010. Using rolling regressions, we show that the elasticity of German exports with respect to global GDP declined from 1.4 in 2010 to 0.4 in 2024. The weakening is particularly pronounced vis-a-vis China, where export elasticity fell from 1.3 to -0.2, while exports to the United States remained comparatively resilient. To explain this decline, we estimate a structural export model incorporating both price and non-price competitiveness indicators. The results suggest that deteriorating competitiveness has materially weakened Germany’s export responsiveness to global demand. In particular, rising relative labor costs and increasing similarity between German exports and those of competing economies are associated with significantly lower export elasticities. By contrast, relative export prices and labor shortages do not exhibit robust explanatory power. |
| Abstract: | Der Zusammenhang zwischen globalem Wirtschaftswachstum und deutschen Warenexporten hat sich seit 2010 deutlich abgeschwächt. Mithilfe rollierender Regressionen zeigen wir, dass die Elastizität der deutschen Exporte in Bezug auf das globale BIP von 1, 4 im Jahr 2010 auf 0, 4 im Jahr 2024 gesunken ist. Die Abschwächung ist besonders ausgeprägt gegenüber China, wo die Exportelastizität von 1, 3 auf -0, 2 fiel, während die Exporte in die Vereinigten Staaten vergleichsweise stabil blieben. Um diesen Rückgang zu erklären, schätzen wir ein strukturelles Exportmodell, das sowohl preisliche als auch nichtpreisliche Wettbewerbsindikatoren berücksichtigt. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die sich verschlechternde Wettbewerbsfähigkeit die Exportelastizität Deutschlands gegenüber der globalen Nachfrage wesentlich geschwächt hat. Insbesondere steigende relative Arbeitskosten und eine zunehmende Ähnlichkeit zwischen deutschen Exporten und denen konkurrierender Volkswirtschaften gehen mit signifikant niedrigeren Exportelastizitäten einher. Im Gegensatz dazu weisen relative Exportpreise und Arbeitskräftemangel keine robuste Erklärungskraft auf. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:341913 |
| By: | Sultan, Samina; Gros, Daniel; Rotondi, Niccolò |
| Abstract: | This Report gives an overview of the effective import tariff rates of the US on its most important trade partners in 2025 and the first months of 2026. Our analysis shows that the average effective bilateral US tariff rate on imports from the European Union (EU) was only 7.8 per cent from Liberation Day in April 2025 to February 2026. This is significantly lower than the announced tariff rates at the time. The effective tariff rates were somewhat higher for some EU Member States, where the manufacturing sector accounts for a larger share of the economy, such as Germany (10.6 per cent) or Italy (9.6 per cent). However, during the same time China faced a much higher effective US tariff rate of almost 37 per cent, while for Japan it was 14 per cent and for the UK 6.3 per cent. Imports from Canada and Mexico, in contrast, were effectively only tariffed at 3.8 per cent. At first sight the differences in average effective tariff rates seem to have had limited impact on trade flows so far as the share of US imports coming from the EU and other industrialized countries have changed only modestly. In contrast, China's share in US imports fell by almost one half between 2024 and 2026, indicating significant trade diversion to the detriment of China. The Report's focus is a deeper analysis of the effects of the US-EU deal, the so-called Turnberry Deal, effective from September 2025 to February 2026. |
| Abstract: | Dieser Report gibt einen Überblick über die effektiven US-Importzollsätze gegenüber ihren wichtigsten Handelspartnern im Jahr 2025 und in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 2026. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass der durchschnittliche effektive bilaterale US-Zollsatz auf Importe aus der Europäischen Union (EU) vom sogenannten "Liberation Day" im April 2025 bis Februar 2026 lediglich bei 7, 8Prozent lag. Dies ist deutlich niedriger als die damals angekündigten Zollsätze. Für einige EU-Mitgliedstaaten lagen die effektiven Zollsätze etwas höher, insbesondere dort, wo das verarbeitende Gewerbe einen größeren Anteil an der Wirtschaft ausmacht, wie etwa in Deutschland (10, 6Prozent) oder Italien (9, 6Prozent). Im selben Zeitraum war China hingegen mit einem deutlich höheren effektiven US-Zollsatz von nahezu 37Prozent konfrontiert, während dieser für Japan bei 14Prozent und für das Vereinigte Königreich bei 6, 3Prozent lag. Im Kontrast dazu wurden USImporte aus Kanada und Mexiko effektiv lediglich mit 3, 8Prozent verzollt. Auf den ersten Blick scheinen die Unterschiede in den durchschnittlichen effektiven Zollsätzen bislang nur begrenzte Auswirkungen auf die Handelsströme gehabt zu haben, da sich die Anteile der US-Importe aus der EU und anderen Industrieländern nur moderat verändert haben. Im Gegensatz dazu halbierte sich der Anteil Chinas an den US-Importen zwischen 2024 und 2026 nahezu, was auf eine erhebliche Handelsumlenkung zulasten Chinas hindeutet. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Reports liegt auf einer vertieften Analyse der Auswirkungen des US-EU Deals, des sogenannten Turnberry Deals, der von September 2025 bis Februar 2026 bereits in Kraft war. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkrep:342421 |
| By: | Alberto Cavallo; Olena Kostyshyna; Oleksiy Kryvtsov; Matías Vieyra |
| Abstract: | How do import tariffs affect retail prices? We combine daily product-level posted prices from seven major Canadian retailers with product-level tariff exposure to estimate tariff effects in a difference-in-differences framework. Prices of tariffed goods rose gradually, peaking at 6% after three months, implying pass-through of roughly one quarter of the 25% tariff. We find little spillover to untariffed substitutes and a rapid reversal of price effects after tariff removal. Adjustment occurred mainly through the frequency of price changes. Pass-through shifted with trade-policy news and was larger for products labeled “Tariffed”, showing that tariff-induced inflation depends on policy expectations and tariff salience. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy, Inflation dynamics and pressures |
| JEL: | E31 F13 E52 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:26-22 |
| By: | Shafik Hebous; Brendan Crowley; Rasmi Das; Tibor Hanappi; Cory Hillier; Adam Jakubik; Eric Robert; Christophe Waerzeggers |
| Abstract: | Faced with the limitations of existing tax frameworks for cross-border trade in services — particularly the lack of taxing rights over certain income from highly digital business models and the continuing scope for profit shifting through payments for cross-border services — countries and scholars have adopted or proposed a wide range of tax measures. This paper brings these measures together in a coherent framework and examines them from both an economic and a legal perspective. It documents how cross-border services trade has grown, become more digital in composition, and become increasingly concentrated across sectors, firms, and jurisdictions. It then develops a comparative synthesis covering destination-based consumption taxes such as VAT, gross-revenue taxes — notably digital services taxes — as well as income-based instruments such as nexus and withholding rules, and anti-avoidance rules aimed at limiting profit shifting through deductible cross-border payments. The paper argues that the economic incidence of each instrument is central to policy assessment and that evaluating these instruments in isolation obscures their interaction. Its main conclusion is that broader reliance on destination-based taxation can address many of the core problems raised by digitalized services trade more effectively than narrower, more distortionary alternatives. |
| Keywords: | Digital Service Taxes (DST), tax policy, trade policy, digital economy, services trade |
| JEL: | H22 H25 F13 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12845 |
| By: | Simola, Heli |
| Abstract: | We examine recent developments and outcomes from Russia's policies on import substitution and technological sovereignty utilizing official documents, statistical data, and company surveys. While Russian officials proclaim ambitious technological sovereignty targets, the reality is less impressive. Heavy investment in priority sectors in recent years has only delivered limited progress in import substitution, and output has in fact declined and import dependency increased in many industries. Russia remains highly dependent on imports of technological products, particularly sophisticated inputs and machinery. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitb:342399 |