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on International Trade |
| By: | van der Merwe, Melissa; Zdráhal, Ivo; Lategan, Francois |
| Abstract: | Despite the free trade agreement, South Africa’s agri-food exports to the European Union (EU) are declining. Without intervention, we expect this trend to persist. The paper aims to interrogate the change in South Africa’s agri-food exports to the EU by applying the Constant Market Share (CMS) model to study South African agri-food exports to the four EU sub-regions over 20 years. This allows us to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation and the slowdown of global value chain activity on agri-food trade. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to understand the competitiveness of South African agri-food exports to the EU using the CMS model over a longer period. The agri-food products are grouped into four categories: bulk commodities, processed intermediate goods, horticulture products and consumer-ready goods. We find that South African agri-food exports were responsive to changes in the EU market demand for agri-food imports. However, South African agri-food exports were not competitive over the long period. This is because South Africa focused on slower-growing markets and agri- food commodities that show lower-than-average growth rates. South Africa is competitive in exporting specific agri-food commodities to specific markets with increasing demand. We recommend that South Africa focus on exporting commodities for which demand is growing quicker to fast-growing EU markets and invest in key priority areas to compete with other sources of supply available to the EU. |
| Keywords: | International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2024–08–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:cfcp15:344687 |
| By: | Autor, David (MIT); Dorn, David (University of Zurich); Hanson, Gordon H. (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Previous research finds that the greater geographic mobility of foreign than native-born workers facilitates labor market adjustment to shifting regional economic conditions. We examine immigration's role in enabling U.S. commuting zones to respond to manufacturing job loss caused by import competition from China. Although foreign-born population headcounts fell by a larger proportion than those of the native-born in trade-exposed regions, the contribution of immigration to labor market adjustment in this episode was small. Because most U.S. immigrants arrived in the country after manufacturing regions were already mature, few took jobs in industries that later saw import surges. The foreign-born population share in regions with high trade exposure was only three-fifths that in regions with low exposure. Immigration may do more to aid adjustment to cyclical shocks, in which job loss follows recent hiring booms, than to aid adjustment to secular decline, in which hiring booms occurred longer ago. |
| Keywords: | immigration, import competition, geographic labor mobility, manufacturing decline, job loss |
| JEL: | E24 F14 F16 J23 J31 L60 O47 R12 R23 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17213 |
| By: | Elsner, Benjamin (University College Dublin); Flaherty, Eoin T. (University College Dublin); Haller, Stefanie (University College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of the Brexit referendum on Irish exporters to the UK. The referendum triggered a sharp devaluation of the British pound vis-a-vis the euro and led to considerable uncertainty about future trade relations between the UK and the EU. Using administrative data on the universe of Irish exporters, we compare exporters with different levels of exposure to the UK market before the referendum. Our findings do not point to a significant effect of the referendum on Irish exporters. Over the period 2015-2021, the firms least exposed to the UK - but most internationalised otherwise - had considerably higher exit rates from exporting to the UK and from the market overall. They also saw greater declines in employment and sales compared to more exposed firms. We do not find significant differences for export volumes to the UK or elsewhere or for average wages. These findings are robust to controlling for a variety of firm characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, firm performance, trade, wages, employment |
| JEL: | E65 F02 F13 F14 F15 F16 F31 F40 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17229 |
| By: | Fabrizio Leone |
| Abstract: | The goal of my PhD Thesis is to understand the drivers and consequences of globalization and technological change, the interplay between them, and the key role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs). This project is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I study how MNEs foster the adoption of automation technology from the supply side. I focus on the global market of industrial robots, a leading type of automation technology, where a few MNEs dominate sales. I first collect new data on their characteristics and global sales networks. I then develop and estimate a multi-country general equilibrium model featuring oligopolistic multinational robot sellers. Using this model, I find that MNEs' market entry and pricing responses transmit internationally and amplify the aggregate and distributional effects of commonly debated policies targeting robots. In the second chapter, using a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms covering the 1990-2017 period, I take a demand-side perspective and show that firms acquired by MNEs are more likely to use industrial robots as production inputs, which allow affiliates to scale up production and expand into foreign markets but reallocate income away from labor. These findings shed new light on how globalization and technological change jointly contribute to the decline in the labor share. In the third chapter, in collaboration with Paola Conconi (ECARES), Glenn Magerman (ECARES), and Catherine Thomas (London School of Economics), we provide a novel explanation for the dominant role of MNEs in international trade: after being acquired by an MNE, firms face lower trade frictions in and around the network of countries in which their parent has a presence. We provide a model of firms' export and import choices that isolates this effect from other channels through which multinational ownership can affect trade participation. We bring the model to the data by combining rich information on the universe of Belgian firms and on MNEs' global networks. We find that acquired firms are more likely to start trading with countries that belong to---or that are exogenously added to---their parental network. Network effects extend beyond the firm boundaries and dominate traditional firm-level channels in explaining affiliates’ entry in new markets. Our analysis suggests that the growth rate of acquired firms is more than twice as large as that of the median domestic firm due to multinational network effects. |
| Keywords: | International Trade; Multinational Enterprises |
| Date: | 2024–09–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/377236 |
| By: | Luca Lodi |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effect of population density on international trade using a theoretical and empirical framework. It builds on the works of Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Allen et al. (2020) and Freeman et al. (2021) to derive a structural gravity model that identifies the impact of country-specific features on bilateral exports. The study interprets Heid et al. (2020) and Freeman et al. (2021) empirical approaches. Focusing on population density as a component of productivity and agglomeration, it explores how density influences country specialization and comparative advantages in labor-intensive or natural resource-dependent industries. The research suggests that population density significantly impacts manufacturing but negatively affects mining, with further investigation needed for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. |
| Keywords: | structural gravity model, economic geography, population density |
| JEL: | F00 F12 F14 F19 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2024_11.rdf |
| By: | Mattia Filomena (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University); Matteo Picchio (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University); Alessia Lo Turco (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (UNIVPM)) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of globalization on workplace accidents in the Italian manufacturing sector from 2008 to 2019. We focus on both the local intensity of import exposure to China and the share of foreign-born residents. To handle potential endogeneity concerns, we instrument the import exposure to China with that of other high-income countries and local immigration exposure with historical co-national local settlements. Our findings highlight a worsening of workplace safety following an increase in import competition, especially for male workers. An inspection of the channels suggests that the effect works through an increasing workload. |
| Keywords: | Workplace injuries, globalization, import competition, immigration, shift-share instruments. |
| JEL: | F16 I1 J28 J61 R11 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:488 |
| By: | Marketa Mala (Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores foreign engagements of socialist enterprises in non-socialist countries during the late stage of socialism in Central Europe. It shows that, contrary to popular belief, phenomena such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) were relevant in the context of former socialist countries. Using Å koda Works as a case study and drawing upon previously unused archival data, this paper outlines an alternative model of international expansion of firms that prioritizes securing future export markets over the typical capitalist focus on equity and profit. This paper also highlights country-level differences of Skoda Works´ activities, the bonuses tied to export quotas and profit targets incentivizing managers to pursue foreign activities, or the considerable autonomy of the enterprise in its foreign operations despite the overarching control of the socialist state, which influenced its activities through high-level bilateral agreements, financing, and foreign exchange targets. By employing the approach of a detailed case study placed within the broader context of the era and the region, the paper contributes to a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the subject and it enriches the predominantly Hungaryand Poland-focused literature with insights from Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the paper contributes to the ongoing critical debate on the challenges and impacts associated with the operations of international businesses and offers valuable perspectives for future research in this area. |
| Keywords: | International Business under Socialism, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Socialist Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Socialist Central Europe, Non-equity Foreign Operations, Skoda Works |
| JEL: | F23 N74 N84 P31 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2024_27 |
| By: | Shekhar Aiyar; Franziska Ohnsorge |
| Abstract: | Geoeconomic fragmentation—the phenomenon of international transactions being increasingly restricted to politically aligned partners—creates risks for individual countries but also opportunities that some hope to seize by becoming “connector†countries. We formalize the concept of connectedness as the property of transacting with international partners drawn from across the ideological spectrum, and explore various policy correlates of connectedness. We show that more open and financially developed countries tend to be the ones that are more connected. Higher tariffs (including those used for industrial policy) are associated with less connectedness. Using a new database of geoeconomic vulnerabilities and geoeconomic connectedness for trade and financial transactions, we document that rising fragmentation since 2016 has been accompanied by broad-based cutbacks in both vulnerability and connectedness, especially in exports and FDI. The largest cutbacks have occurred in countries that were initially the most vulnerable. |
| Keywords: | geoeconomic fragmentation, geopolitics, economic vulnerability, database, trade, international lending, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, BIS-reporting banks |
| JEL: | F02 F15 F21 F41 F60 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2024-53 |
| By: | Kossi Messanh Agbekponou (SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Angela Cheptea (SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Karine Latouche (SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses how the quality of produced goods affects firms' position in global value chains (GVCs). Extending the theoretical framework of Chor et al. (2021), we find that quality upgrading increases the span of production stages performed by the firm: it imports more upstream (less transformed) intermediate products and exports more downstream (more highly processed) products. Expansion along GVCs through quality upgrading is accompanied by an increase in input purchases, assets, value added, and profits. These theoretical predictions are tested using 2004-2017 firm-level data on French agri-food industries (from French customs and the AMADEUS database). In line with recent work, we identify firms that participate in GVCs with those that jointly import and export, and measure firms' position in value chains through the level of transformation (upstreamness) of goods they use and produce. We use several ways to measure product quality at firm level, all inspired by the commonly accepted assumption that, at equal prices, higher quality products are sold in larger quantities. Our findings confirm the prediction that higher-quality firms use more upstream inputs produced by other firms to produce more transformed outputs, and perform a larger span of intermediate production stages in-house. We find limited empirical evidence in support of other predictions. |
| Keywords: | Global value chains, Production line position, Quality upgrading, Upstreamness, Agri-food industry |
| Date: | 2024–05–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04666099 |
| By: | Appelbaum, Elie; Anam, Mahmudul; Chiang, Shin-Hwan |
| Abstract: | Using a simple duopolistic trade model with demand uncertainty and an identical traded product, we show that we can view trade in goods as implicit exports/imports of risk and risk aversion. Specifically, we show that a relatively “risk-aversion abundant” country is more likely to be a net importer of the product – hence an importer of low risk-aversion. Similarly, a “relatively high-risk abundant” country is more likely to be the net exporter of the product - hence an importer of low risk. We also show that market correlations and differences in risk aversion and risk are sources of implicit risk-sharing and diversification gains from trade. Consequently, the relatively high-risk or high-risk-aversion country always gains from trade, whereas the other country will most likely gain unless markets are highly positively correlated. Furthermore, we re-examine the (Brander-Spencer) strategic export subsidy game in the context of uncertainty and find that because both efficient risk management and rent shifting need to be considered, contrary to conventional wisdom, the equilibrium policy regime may be an export tax rather than a subsidy. |
| Keywords: | Patterns of Trade; Gains from Trade; Risk;Risk Aversion; Exports; Subsidies. |
| JEL: | D81 F12 F13 F15 |
| Date: | 2024–07–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121605 |
| By: | Aiyar, Shekhar; Ohnsorge, Franziska |
| Abstract: | Geoeconomic fragmentation—the phenomenon of international transactions being increasingly restricted to politically aligned partners—creates risks for individual countries but also opportunities that some hope to seize by becoming “connector” countries. We formalize the concept of connectedness as the property of transacting with international partners drawn from across the ideological spectrum, and explore various policy correlates of connectedness. We show that more open and financially developed countries tend to be the ones that are more connected. Higher tariffs (including those used for industrial policy) are associated with less connectedness. Using a new database of geoeconomic vulnerabilities and geoeconomic connectedness for trade and financial transactions, we document that rising fragmentation since 2016 has been accompanied by broad-based cutbacks in both vulnerability and connectedness, especially in exports and FDI. The largest cutbacks have occurred in countries that were initially the most vulnerable. |
| Keywords: | Geoeconomic fragmentation, geopolitics, economic vulnerability, database, trade, international lending, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, BIS-reporting banks. |
| JEL: | F15 F2 F21 F41 F60 |
| Date: | 2024–08–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121726 |
| By: | Chad P. Bown; Lorenzo Caliendo; Fernando Parro; Robert W. Staiger; Alan O. Sykes |
| Abstract: | We formalize the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity in workhorse quantitative trade models, characterizing reciprocal tariff cuts that hold terms of trade fixed and investigating their labor-market impacts. We provide closed-form expressions mapping reciprocal tariff cuts to labor market dislocation. We demonstrate that a country’s own tariff liberalization is a sufficient statistic for the labor-market adjustments it can expect from tariff negotiations that satisfy reciprocity. Applying our theoretical results to China’s 2001 WTO accession, we find that China’s tariff reductions exceeded reciprocity norms, increasing real incomes but amplifying the manufacturing employment dislocation – the China Shock – in the United States and globally. |
| JEL: | F02 F1 F13 F14 F16 F66 F68 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32835 |
| By: | Dogan, Aydan (Bank of England); Hjortsoe, Ida (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | Through what channels do fluctuations in the financial costs of exporting affect exports, and how important are financial conditions for export dynamics over the business cycle? We first establish, using balance sheet data for UK manufacturing firms, that exporting firms have more short-term liabilities than non-exporting firms. We find evidence consistent with exporting firms taking on these short-term loans to (partly) cover labour costs. We then build a model with heterogeneous firms in which exporters need to access external finance to export, in line with the evidence, and parameterise it to UK data. We use rich firm level data to inform the calibration of the financial costs facing exporting firms, and estimate the shock processes in our model with Bayesian methods. Our estimations show that global shocks to the financial costs of exporting are the main driver of UK export dynamics over the business cycle, alongside shocks to productivity. These two shocks each contribute to around a third of UK export dynamics. Moreover, we find that global shocks to the financial costs of exporting played a crucial role in explaining the fall in UK exports in the early stages of the Global Trade Collapse, and slowed the recovery. |
| Keywords: | Open economy macroeconomics; small open economy; exports; trade finance; heterogeneous firms |
| JEL: | F41 F44 F47 |
| Date: | 2024–08–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:1072 |
| By: | Kim, Hyun Soo (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Young Gui (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Kyu Yub (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Minji (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 이 연구에서는 일반균형모형 구축을 통해 디지털 통상협정의 경제적 효과를 정량적으로 분석한다. 이를 위해 디지털 통상협정에서 주요한 디지털 통상규범을 식별하고, 규범 도입이 가져올 변화를 정량적으로 추정한다. 그리고 디지털 경제의 특성을 포함한 일반균형모형을 구축하여 규범 도입에 따라 나타나는 거시경제적 영향을 분석하며, 장기적으로 국내 경제에 미칠 파급효과에 대해 살펴본다. Discussions to establish common rules for digital trade and to enhance cooperation in the digital economy are taking place on various platforms. At the multilateral level, WTO e-commerce negotiations are in progress, and at the bilateral level, e-commerce chapters of regional trade agreements are being revised. South Korea is also expanding its digital trade network by promoting a number of digital trade agreements. Digital trade rules introduced by digital trade agreements are expected to have an economic impact via multiple channels. Digital trade rules have the potential to facilitate digital trade by reducing trade barriers, leading to overall trade expansion. Expanding trade not only boosts production through increased imports and exports, but can also increase productivity through the spillover of new technologies and increased competition. As the digital trade network expands, the need to analyze the economic impact of digital trade agreements also grows. In recognition of these developments, this study quantitatively analyzes the economic effects of digital trade agreements through a general equilibrium model. We first identify the key digital trade rules in digital trade agreements and estimate how much they reduce trade barriers. Then we build a general equilibrium model that includes the characteristics of the digital economy to analyze the macroeconomic impacts of introducing digital trade rules. This study largely consists of five parts. In Chapter 2, we explore digital trade barriers, such as policy restrictions and technology barriers that can limit digital trade between countries and review the key provisions in digital trade agreements in order to mitigate the barriers. While there are still no explicit rules at the multilateral level such as the WTO, except for a moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, digital trade rules in RTAs have become more comprehensive over time and the level of liberalization is increasing. In addition, Digital Economy Agreements have emerged that contain provisions for cooperation in areas such as SMEs, AI, and fintech. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | digital trade agreements; digital economy; economic impact |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_025 |
| By: | Hoang, Trang (Oregon State University); Mitra, Devashish (Syracuse University); Pham, Hoang (Oregon State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of an export market expansion created by the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) on competition among manufacturing firms in Vietnam's local labor markets. Using a nonparametric production function approach, we measure distortionary wedges between equilibrium marginal revenue products of labor (MRPL) and wages. We find that the median manufacturing firm pays workers 59% of their MRPL. Following the BTA, which significantly reduced US import tariffs for Vietnamese products, firms in industries exposed more to the tariff reductions saw faster employment growth and faster declines in their MRPL-wage wedge. We find that the BTA permanently decreases labor market distortion in manufacturing by 3.4%, and the effect concentrates on domestic private firms with a magnitude of 4.9%. We exploit information on the gender composition to estimate the MRPL-wage wedges separately for men and women. We find that the median distortion is 26% higher for women relative to men, and the decline in distortion for women, amounting to more than 12%, is the driver of the overall reduction in labor market distortion attributable to the BTA. Our theory and empirics suggest that the entry of FDI firms combined with differential aggregate labor supply elasticities explains these results. |
| Keywords: | international trade, export market access, labor market distortion, misallocation, income distribution, labor share, gender inequality, monopsony, oligopsony |
| JEL: | F16 F63 O15 O24 J42 J16 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17196 |
| By: | Sabala, Ethan; Gale, Fred |
| Abstract: | Southeast Asia is a promising market for agricultural exports, with its growing population of middle-class consumers, especially for exporters such as the United States. The region consists of: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. Top markets in the region for U.S. agricultural and food products are the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Leading U.S. exports are soybean products, wheat, cotton, skim milk powder, and distillers’ grains. U.S. agricultural exports to Southeast Asia increased from $9.4 to $14.2 billion from 2012 to 2022, and the U.S. share of Southeast Asia’s agricultural imports was steady at just over 11 percent. China and Brazil, two of the top competitors, were the only exporters that gained market share over the period. China surpassed the United States to become the largest foreign supplier of agricultural goods to Southeast Asia, but few of China’s products compete directly with U.S. products; Brazil’s soybean products, cotton, poultry, and beef do compete with U.S. products. There are numerous potential reasons that U.S. competitors have gained market share, varying by commodity. They include preferential treatment through trade agreements, along with price competition, geopolitical ties, and geographic distance from Southeast Asia. Currently, the primary U.S. competitors for major agricultural commodities exported to Southeast Asia are Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, China, India, Canada, and Argentina. |
| Keywords: | International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:uersib:344803 |
| By: | Joanne Tan |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the extent to which FDI has fragmented across countries, the ways it has done so, using a modified gravity approach. The paper finds that FDI fragmentation is, for now, not a widespread phenomenon. Instead, fragmentation is circumscribed in two ways. First, the paper finds that geo-economic fragmentation has occurred only for certain industries that likely have strategic value, including computer manufacturing, information and communications, transport, as well as professional, scientific and technical services. Secondly, fragmentation appears to be more pronounced for outward FDI from the US, notably in a shift of US FDI from China to advanced Europe and the rest of Asia. This shift appears to be driven by both the intensive and extensive margin. Fragmentation is also more pronounced for immediate rather than ultimate FDI, with evidence of ultimate parent companies aligning the geopolitical mix of their intermediaries more closely to that of their final FDI host destinations. Overall, the results suggest that fragmentation, where found, may be a response to targeted policies that have placed curbs on certain types of FDI on national security grounds, rather than an indiscriminate breakup of investment links between non-ally countries. |
| Keywords: | Fragmentation; Foreign Direct Investment |
| Date: | 2024–08–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/179 |
| By: | Jin Liu; Martin Rotemberg; Sharon Traiberman |
| Abstract: | We characterize sabotage, exemplified by recent U.S. policies concerning China's semiconductor industry, as trade policy. For some (but not all) goods, completely destroying foreigners’ productivity increases domestic real income by shifting the location of production and improving the terms of trade. The gross benefit of sabotage can be summarized by a few sufficient statistics: trade and demand elasticities and import and production shares. The cost of sabotage is determined by countries' relative unit labor costs for the sabotaged goods. We find important non-monotinicities: for semi-conductors, partially sabotaging foreign production would lower US real income, while comprehensive sabotage would raise it. |
| JEL: | F10 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32798 |
| By: | La, Meeryung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Cheong, Jaewan (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Lee, Jaeho (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Shin, Mingeum (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구는 무역·통상 협력관계부터 현재 진행 중인 미중 전략 경쟁과 공급망 재편에 이르기까지 광범위한 분야에 걸쳐 미/중과 아세안의 관계를 분석하였다. 미중 경쟁에 따른 공급망 재편이 아세안과 한국에 미치는 경제적 영향을 분석하고, 이러한 변화 속에서 아세안의 경제적 역할과 대응 내용을 살펴보았다. This study aims to explore cooperation strategies between ASEAN and Korea from a mid-to-long-term perspective, ensuring that engagement in the U.S.-China strategic competition does not lead to reduction in domestic production capacity and exclusion from the supply chain. To this end, this paper analyzes the relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN, as well as between China and ASEAN, in a wide range of areas from trade and economic cooperation to the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition in the region. Additionally, the study examines the economic impact of supply chain restructuring due to U.S.-China rivalry on ASEAN and Korea, and investigates ASEAN’s responses. Finally, based on the research findings and Korea’s current policies toward ASEAN, the study suggests the direction of Korea’s supply chain cooperation with ASEAN. Chapter 2 examines the dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition in the economic and trade sectors, focusing on ASEAN, and explores the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN, as well as between China and ASEAN. While the United States is actively pursuing high-level security cooperation with ASEAN, economic and trade cooperation, including free trade agreements, is perceived as relatively favorable to China. China appears to be responding to the US strategy of containing China while ensuring a stable supply chain by establishinga regional production network with ASEAN. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | cooperation strategy; ASEAN and ROK; production capacity; supply chain; U.S. China strategic competition |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_034 |
| By: | Kossi Messanh Agbekponou (SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Ilaria Fusacchia (ROMA TRE - Università degli Studi Roma Tre = Roma Tre University) |
| Abstract: | Value creation forms the basis for the construction of global value chains (GVCs) and has received significant scholarly attention, yet the issue of value capture or power distribution along supply chains, "within" industries, is still unresolved. A recent property rights framework (Antr`as and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2019) highlights how final firms exert power over their suppliers to optimally organize their sequential production process. In such an environment, how can suppliers (exporters) act strategically to reduce the power of the buyers (importers)? We contribute, theoretically and empirically, to a better understanding of the extent to which the division of surplus in the agri-food sector is affected by manufacturing exporters' position in GVCs. We argue that: (1) further upstream specialization along agri-food GVCs increases bargaining power (the "specialization effect"); (2) expansion along GVCs by importing more upstream inputs and exporting more processed goods also increase bargaining (the "expansion effect"); and (3) the "specialization effect" outweighs the "expansion effect" so that the overall effect is similar to the former. These theoretical hypotheses are tested using firm-level data on French agri-food industries (from French customs and the AMADEUS database) over 2002-2017 period. We build on the bilateral stochastic frontier model to measure the bilateral bargaining power of manufacturers. Following recent approaches in the literature, we identify manufacturers that participate in GVCs with those that jointly import and export, and measure their position in value chains through the level of transformation (upstreamness) of goods they use and produce. Hypotheses (1) and (3) are strongly supported and are mainly driven by product mix upgrade and the reduction of the hol-up problem, while hypothesis (2) is weakly supported and is only due to the high-quality production. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining power, Division of surplus, Global value chains, Upstreamness, Agri-food industry |
| Date: | 2024–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04666067 |
| By: | Francesco Passarelli; Robert W. Staiger |
| Abstract: | The legitimacy of the world trading system is under growing attack, as challenges to its conformity with norms of fairness and social justice are increasingly voiced by citizens and their governments around the world. Taking a novel "bottom up" approach to concerns for fairness, we show how these concerns can be formalized in a general and tractable way, and we describe their implications for the purpose and design of a trade agreement. Our findings suggest that as currently designed, the GATT/WTO is well-equipped to allow its member governments to address many, but not all, of the possible trade-related fairness concerns of their citizens. More generally, our findings point to a detailed understanding of real-world perceptions of fairness in trade policy as the key input into the appropriate design of fair trade agreements. |
| JEL: | F11 F13 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32853 |
| By: | Garofalo, Marco (Bank of England); Rosso, Giovanni (University of Oxford); Vicquéry, Roger (Bank of England) |
| Abstract: | We study a unique episode of aggregate transition to dominant currency pricing: the dollarisation of UK exports in the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit referendum. Following the 2016 depreciation of the pound, the share of non‑EU UK exports invoiced in the UK domestic currency decreased sharply by more than 20 percentage points. This was mirrored by an increase of similar magnitude in the share of US dollar invoicing, which by 2019 overtook the pound as the main non‑EU export invoicing currency. Relying on transaction‑level data on the universe of UK trade and employing shift‑share and event‑study identification strategies, we show that large foreign‑exchange movements can generate an aggregate transition in invoicing choices. This is driven by firms with low levels of operational hedging, that is whose exports are not denominated in the same currency as their import. We find that this currency‑mismatch valuation channel accounts for most of the transition to dollar pricing, above and beyond effects from strategic complementarities and market power. Finally, we show that such a shift in export pricing has important aggregate consequences for export pass‑through and the allocative effects of price rigidities: a US$ appreciation depresses demand for UK exports by twice as much than before this ‘dominant currency pricing transition’. |
| Keywords: | Invoicing currency of trade; dominant currency pricing; foreign‑exchange mismatch; firm‑level data; exchange‑rate pass-through; Brexit |
| JEL: | F14 F31 F41 |
| Date: | 2024–08–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:1074 |
| By: | Luigi Lannutti (ESCP Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the presence of environmental, social and governance (ESG) regulations in a country can enhance its attractiveness for foreign direct investment (FDI). I use country-level data on ESG regulations from the United Nations (UN)-supported network of investors called Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). I find that the presence of ESG regulations in a country is significant correlated with higher FDI in high-income countries, and it is also correlated with higher FDI in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDE) when government?s policies are perceived as effective. The presence of ESG regulations is instead negatively correlated with FDI attraction in an EMDE when the quality of the regulatory environment for private business development is perceived negatively. Existing literature does not draw a firm conclusion on whether ESG regulations incentivize or deter private investments; for example, the pollution-heaven hypothesis posits that private investments are drawn where there are fewer or less stringent environmental regulations. This paper contributes to the literature on the role of ESG regulations and to that on the role of policies in FDI attraction, by providing a different perspective on a country?s FDI attraction potential related to the presence of country-level ESG regulations, offering a new range of opportunities for policy makers when considering the impact of ESG regulations in conjunction with the general quality and effectiveness of their regulatory system. |
| Keywords: | Government Policy; Climate; Sustainability; International Investment; Economic Development. |
| JEL: | Q56 Q58 F21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:14216212 |
| By: | Konstantinos Mavrigiannakis; Stelios Sakkas |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at assessing quantitatively the macroeconomic impact of EU sanctions against Russia for the economy of Cyprus. To this end, we use a medium-scale micro-founded DSGE model of a small open economy participating in a currency union like the euro area calibrated to the economy of Cyprus. The model features two sectors of production, namely the tradable and the non-tradable one. In this model, EU sanctions influence the sanctioning economy (i.e. Cyprus) through a mix of foreign shocks that hit in principle the tradable sector. In particular, to mimic the economic environment (namely, how all this started in 2022), we analyse first the effects of an energy-type shock modelled as a standard cost-push shock on imported goods. In turn, we add to this economic environment the impact of policy reactions like EU sanctions against Russia. In this context and given the strong trade ties of Cyprus with Russia we model sanctions as two simultaneous negative exogenous shocks, that is, a temporary decrease in the exported goods reflecting primarily reductions observed in tourism and financial services, and inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Contrary to the mild impacts reported in the literature for the majority of EU countries we find non negligible adverse effects for the economy of Cyprus which range from -1.28% to -3.36% in terms of average output loss in the short run. Given Cyprus’s vulnerable external position we show that the impact of sanctions depend crucially on the degree of tightening financing conditions which are likely to hit particularly more countries with high initial current account deficits and debt stocks. |
| Keywords: | Cyprus, economic sanctions, trade disintegration |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hel:greese:200 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Brazil’s foreign and trade relations with Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) date back to the Portuguese slave trade. Of the 9.5 million people captured in Africa and brought to the New World between the 16th and 19th centuries, nearly 4 million landed in Rio de Janeiro, i.e. ten times more than all those sent to the United States. Still today, about 51 % of the population see themselves as black or mixed. Racial inequality remains deeply engrained in many respects, notably concerning persistent inequality. Nonetheless, oppression and marginalization of black Brazilians have been largely ignored in modern Brazilian-African relations. Instead, a pronounced nationalism suffused Brazil’s political life. It guided Brazil’s foreign and trade relations and defined how Brazilians interpreted the opportunities of African independence movements. Only Brazil’s President Lula da Silva acknowledged the common historical roots during his first time as president from 2003 to 2011. In fact, his election was driven by the overwhelming support of Afro-Brazilians. Trade relations in the first half of the 20th century were largely limited to South Africa, which accounted for 90 % of Brazil’s African trade. Brasilia’s foreign and trade policy since the 1960s focussed on Nigeria, an important oil supplier, and the five Portuguese-speaking former Portuguese African colonies (PALOP) and the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP), founded in 1996. Up to date, Brazilian’s trade relations in West Africa, apart from Nigeria (34 % of Brazil’s African trade) remained fairly modest. Nevertheless, Ghana and Senegal played a decisive role in shaping Brazil-African relations in the early stages of African independence since the 1960s. Because Brazil has meanwhile considerable energy and commodity resources of its own, its approach concerning African trade is less commodity driven than the Chinese or European, but orientated at resource diversification, sustainable development and cooperation to develop these resources, e.g. bioethanol plants in Ghana and other African countries. Therefore, African governments see a greater sense of mutual partnership and reciprocity in their relationship with Brazil. However, corrupt political African elites themselves urged the Brazilian government and companies often into informal political and business norms, with controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction, infrastructure and land-grabbing. Apart from that, Brazil tried to create a niche for Brazilian management services, knowledge and technology transfer, suited supposedly exceptionally well for tropical markets. |
| Abstract: | Die Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen Brasiliens zu Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) gehen bis auf den portugiesischen Sklavenhandel zurück. Von den 9, 5 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert in Afrika gefangen genommen und in die Neue Welt gebracht wurden, landeten fast 4 Millionen in Rio de Janeiro, d.h. zehnmal mehr als alle Sklaven, die in die Vereinigten Staaten geschickt wurden. Noch heute sehen sich etwa 51 % der Bevölkerung Brasiliens als schwarz oder gemischt. Rassenungleichheit ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nach wie vor tief verwurzelt, insbesondere in Bezug auf die anhaltende Ungleichheit. Dennoch wurden Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung schwarzer Brasilianer in den modernen brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Stattdessen durchdrang ein ausgeprägter Nationalismus das politische Leben Brasiliens. Es bestimmte auch seine Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen und definierte, wie die Brasilianer die Chancen afrikanischer Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen nutzten. Erst Brasiliens Präsident Lula da Silva bekannte sich während seiner ersten Amtszeit als Präsident von 2003 bis 2011 zu den gemeinsamen historischen Wurzeln. Tatsächlich verdankte er seine Wahl der überwältigenden Unterstützung der Afrobrasilianer. Die Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beschränkten sich weitgehend auf Südafrika, auf das 90 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens entfielen. Brasilias Außen- und Handelspolitik konzentrierte sich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren auf Nigeria, einen wichtigen Öllieferanten, sowie die fünf ehemaligen portugiesischen afrikanischen Kolonien (PALOP) und das 1996 gegründete Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP). Der Handel mit Westafrika blieb, mit Ausnahme von Nigeria (34 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens), recht bescheiden. Dennoch spielten Ghana und Senegal in den frühen Stadien der afrikanischen Unabhängigkeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Gestaltung der brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Da Brasilien mittlerweile über beträchtliche eigene Energie- und Rohstoffressourcen verfügt, ist sein Ansatz im afrikanischen Handel weniger rohstoffgetrieben als der chinesischer oder europäischer Investoren, sondern orientiert sich an Ressourcendiversifizierung, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Kooperation zur Erschließung dieser Ressourcen, z.B. Bioethanolanlagen in Ghana. Daher sehen afrikanische Regierungen ihre Beziehungen zu Brasilien eher auf gegenseitiger Partnerschaft gegründet. Korrupte politische afrikanische Eliten selbst drängten jedoch die brasilianische Regierung und Unternehmen oft zu informellen politischen und geschäftlichen Praktiken, mit umstrittenen und korrupten Investitionen in Rohstoffgewinnung, Infrastruktur und Landraub. Abgesehen davon versuchte Brasilien, eine Nische für brasilianische Managementdienstleistungen, Wissens- und Technologietransfer zu schaffen, der angeblich hervorragend für tropische Märkte geeignet war. |
| Keywords: | Brazil, South Atlantic, Sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa, international trade, migration, slavery, post-colonialism |
| JEL: | E26 F22 F54 I31 J46 L31 N17 O17 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300930 |
| By: | Francesco Zanetti; Federico S. Mandelman; Yang Yu; Andrei Zlate |
| Abstract: | We document a steady decline in low-skilled immigration that began with the onset of the Great Recession in 2007, which was associated with labor shortages in low-skilled service occupations and a decline in the skill premium. Falling returns to high-skilled jobs coincided with a decline in the educational attainment of native-born workers. We develop and estimate a stochastic growth model with endogenous immigration and training to account for these facts and study macroeconomic performance and welfare. Lower immigration leads to higher wages for low-skilled workers and higher consumer prices. Importantly, the decline in the skill premium discourages the training of native workers, persistently reducing aggregate productivity and welfare. Stimulus policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, amid a widespread shortage of low-skilled immigrant labor, exacerbated the rise in consumer prices and reduced welfare. We show that the 2021-2023 immigration surge helped to partially alleviate existing labor shortages and restore welfare. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnn:wpaper:24-013e |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | In the 19th and 20th centuries, Turkey considered only North Africa a substantial part of the Ottoman Empire and neglected sub-Saharan Africa unless vital interests were at stake. However, the apathy of successive Turkish governments changed with the 1998 "Africa Action Plan". Since then, the Turkish state has intensified its diplomatic, political, economic and cultural interactions with sub-Saharan Africa. Turkish-African relations received a further boost when Ankara declared 2005 the "Year of Africa". Although the predominantly Muslim region of North Africa is the focus of Turkish foreign policy due to their shared history, the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa has also increased due to the growing demand for military and medical supplies. Since 2005, Ankara promoted state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, although it does not follow Western democratization policies. Turkey's growing economic, political and security involvement in Africa aims to open new markets for its manufactured goods, particularly its defence and security industries. Presenting itself as a relevant regional power without colonial ballast, Turkey sets itself apart from traditional Western players on the continent. Turkey's engagement in sub-Saharan Africa differed markedly from that of other emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. While Ankara shared the disregard for Western sanctions due to BRICS members' democratic deficits, it went beyond traditional state-to-state relations and increasingly relied on cooperation with non-state actors. African partners value Turkish products and expertise. In addition, Ankara has taken a coordinated approach to working with African states and leaders, avoiding entanglements with international organizations or other alliances, as in Somalia and Kenya, but more recently in much of East, South and West Africa. This has been demonstrated using the example of the three West African countries Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast. |
| Abstract: | Im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert betrachtete die Türkei nur Nordafrika als einen wesentlichen Teil des Osmanischen Reiches und vernachlässigte Afrika südlich der Sahara, es sei denn, es standen lebenswichtige Interessen auf dem Spiel. Die Apathie aufeinanderfolgender türkischer Regierungen änderte sich jedoch mit dem „Afrika-Aktionsplan“ von 1998. Seitdem hat der türkische Staat seine diplomatischen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Interaktionen mit Subsahara-Afrika intensiviert. Einen weiteren Schub erhielten die türkisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen, als Ankara 2005 zum „Jahr Afrikas“ erklärte. Obwohl die überwiegend muslimische Region Nordafrikas aufgrund der gemeinsamen Geschichte im Fokus der türkischen Außenpolitik steht, hat die Bedeutung der Subsahara-Region auch aufgrund der wachsenden Nachfrage nach militärischen und medizinischen Gütern zugenommen. Seit 2005 betreibt Ankara Förderung in Form von Staatsaufbau in Subsahara-Afrika, obwohl es nicht der westlichen Demokratisierungspolitik folgt. Das wachsende wirtschaftliche, politische und sicherheitspolitische Engagement der Türkei in Afrika zielt darauf ab, neue Märkte für seine Industriegüter zu erschließen, insbesondere für seine Verteidigungs- und Rüstungsindustrie. Indem es sich als relevante Regionalmacht ohne kolonialen Ballast präsentiert, grenzt sich die Türkei von traditionellen westlichen Akteuren auf dem Kontinent ab. Das Engagement der Türkei in Subsahara-Afrika unterschied sich deutlich von dem anderer aufstrebender Mächte wie Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika. Während Ankara die Missachtung westlicher Sanktionen aufgrund demokratischer Defizite der BRICS-Mitglieder teilte, ging es über herkömmliche Staat-zu-Staat-Beziehungen hinaus und setzte zunehmend auf die Zusammenarbeit mit nichtstaatlichen Akteuren. Afrikanische Partner schätzen türkische Produkte und Expertise. Darüber hinaus hat Ankara einen koordinierten Ansatz zur Zusammenarbeit mit afrikanischen Staaten und Führern gewählt und Verstrickungen mit internationalen Organisationen oder anderen Allianzen vermieden, wie in Somalia und Kenia, aber in jüngerer Zeit auch in weiten Teilen Ost-, Süd- und Westafrikas. Dies wird am Beispiel der drei westafrikanischen Staaten Nigeria, Ghana und Elfenbeinküste gezeigt. |
| Keywords: | Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa, West Africa, international trade, migration, sustainable development |
| JEL: | E26 F22 F54 I31 J46 L31 N17 O55 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300932 |
| By: | Bickenbach, Frank; Dohse, Dirk; Langhammer, Rolf J.; Liu, Wan-Hsin |
| Abstract: | China uses subsidies extensively to take a leading role in the global markets of green-tech products such as battery electric vehicles and wind turbines. Against the background of the current EU investigations into Chinese subsidies in these sectors, this article takes a careful look at the Chinese subsidy system and provides new data on direct government subsidies to leading Chinese producers of electric cars and wind turbines. Extensive government support has allowed Chinese companies to scale up rapidly, to dominate the Chinese market and to expand into foreign markets. The article concludes that the EU should use its strong bargaining power due to the single market to induce the Chinese government to abandon the most harmful subsidies. |
| Keywords: | China, industrial subsidies, battery electric vehicles, wind turbines, railway rolling stock, EU, anti-subsidy proceeding |
| JEL: | F13 O25 O53 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:301402 |
| By: | Schiff, Maurice |
| Abstract: | Many developing countries depend crucially on open-access renewable natural resources (NR). Trade is generally viewed as hurting the long-term health of NR in commodity-exporting countries. I examine whether trade might be beneficial in the case of population growth. Dynamic general equilibrium NR models have typically assumed constant return to scale in the manufacturing sector. I examine trade's impact under constant, decreasing and increasing returns. While population growth always results in NR and welfare collapse under autarky, the impact under trade depends critically on the manufacturing sector's returns-to-scale technology. Under trade, NR and welfare are unaffected by population growth under constant returns, collapse under decreasing returns, and increase under increasing returns. Empirical studies have typically found constant or increasing returns. Thus, countries experiencing rapid population growth may obtain long-term benefits from opening up to trade, though they experience short-term NR costs. |
| Keywords: | Population growth, Renewable natural resources (NR), Trade vs autarky, NR and welfare or societal collapse |
| JEL: | D62 F18 Q22 Q27 Q56 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1477 |
| By: | Choi, Wonseok (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Han, Hyoungmin (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Cho, Sunghun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Hong, Jin Hee (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Yoon, Hyung Jun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Cha, Jung Mi (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구는 불확실성이 커지고 있는 글로벌 경제안보 환경변화 속에서 미국·중국·EU의 경제안보 (공급망 및 과학기술외교) 정책으로 인한 위협 및 기회 요인을 점검하고, 한국의 경제안보에 영향이 클 것으로 예상되는 품목과 기술 분야를 중심으로 대응방안을 제시하였다. 이를 위해 반도체, 이차전지를 중심으로 한국의 수입의존도와 핵심기술 분야에서의 국가별 영향력을 살펴봄으로써 한국 경제안보 정책 추진을 위한 중장기 협력국가와 대응방안을 제시했다는 점에서 의미가 있다. As the international environment rapidly changes due to developments such as the war in Ukraine and the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China, major countries are pursuing new forms of economic security policies such as reorganizing supply chains, fostering industries, and strengthening research security. The study aims to examine the threats and opportunity factors posed by economic security policies of the U.S., China, and the EU, particularly in the areas of supply chain and science and technology diplomacy, amid growing uncertainty in the economic security environment. It goes on to suggest countermeasures, focusing on items and technology areas that are expected to have a significant impact on Korea’s economic security. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | economic security policy; global economic security; environmental changes |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_009 |
| By: | Schiff, Maurice (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | Many developing countries depend crucially on open-access renewable natural resources (NR). Trade is generally viewed as hurting the long-term health of NR in commodity-exporting countries. I examine whether trade might be beneficial in the case of population growth. Dynamic general equilibrium NR models have typically assumed constant return to scale in the manufacturing sector. I examine trade's impact under constant, decreasing and increasing returns. While population growth always results in NR and welfare collapse under autarky, the impact under trade depends critically on the manufacturing sector's returns-to-scale technology. Under trade, NR and welfare are unaffected by population growth under constant returns, collapse under decreasing returns, and increase under increasing returns. Empirical studies have typically found constant or increasing returns. Thus, countries experiencing rapid population growth may obtain long-term benefits from opening up to trade, though they experience short-term NR costs. |
| Keywords: | population growth, renewable natural resources (NR), trade vs autarky, NR and welfare or societal collapse |
| JEL: | D62 F18 Q22 Q27 Q56 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17200 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Since the 1960s, both the regime of Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) and, subsequently starting from 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran, have intervened in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While the Shah's policies were motivated by a virulent anti-communist stance, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) pursued a 'radical' policy of changing the political status of the Western world, including the Western Arab allies, who were hostile to the survival of the mullah regime. While the Shah focused on geopolitical interests, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the vital sea route to the Red Sea, and in South Africa, and ignored the interests of African Muslims, the IRI exploited increasingly radicalized Islamists to expand Iranian influence on the continent. For example, the IRI has spent billions of dollars in the region to provide Muslim schools and free social services through hospitals and orphanages supported by the Iranian Red Crescent. The IRI's strategy aimed to build grassroots support among Muslim communities rather than focusing exclusively on African governments. Tehran's expansionist policies included arms sales to state and non-state actors and the destabilization of regimes. The goal was to build partnerships that would help evade international sanctions while opening new terrain for its axis of resistance against its global and regional adversaries, particularly its arch-enemy Israel. Tehran's version of political Islam involved building up proxies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels, most recently in Yemen, who have wreaked havoc on international shipping lanes in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Tehran expanded its influence in the Sahel region, taking advantage of self-serving French Africa policy and the policies of other Western powers in West Africa to establish contacts with the anti-Western ASE military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russia, China and Turkey paved the way for this new alignment. The rivalry between Iran and Israel has intensified in recent decades, with several confrontations between the two countries in the Red Sea and East Africa since the 2010s. Iran has continuously expanded its engagement throughout the region, leading to a ‘balance of deterrence’ between the two countries. |
| Keywords: | Iran; Israel; State of Palestine; Sub-Saharan Africa; political Islam; jihadism; Houthi rebels; Hezbollah; Horn of Africa; Yemen; Red Sea; Sahel; South Africa; Nigeria, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia; France; Turkey; Russia; China; |
| JEL: | E26 F13 F22 F35 F51 F54 F63 H56 N17 N47 O55 P45 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–08–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121656 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Since Russia's war in Ukraine, many European countries have been scrambling to find alternative energy sources. One of the answers was to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). By bypassing the use of pipelines from the East by building LNG terminals, the EU opened up a wider variety of potential suppliers. The Europe-Africa Energy and Climate Partnership provides a framework for a win-win alliance. African countries will be key players in the future, including sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Angola. According to the REPowerEU plan, hydrogen partnerships in Africa will enable the import of 10 million tons of hydrogen by 2030, replacing about 18 billion cubic meters of imported Russian gas. Algeria, Niger and Nigeria recently agreed to build a 4, 128-kilometer trans-Saharan gas pipeline that would run through the three countries to Europe. Once completed, the pipeline will transport 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) estimates potential sub-Saharan LNG export capacity at 134 million tonnes of LNG (approximately 175 billion m3) by 2030. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to become the main producer of green hydrogen by 2050. However, this market remains to be developed and requires significant expansion of renewable production and water availability. However, the EU countries and companies involved would be well advised to take note of the adoption of much stricter EU greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2030 and the publication of the European Commission's methane strategy. That being said, the EU could risk having more than half of Europe's LNG infrastructure idle by 2030, as European LNG capacity in 2030 exceeds total forecast gas demand, including LNG and pipeline gas. Regardless, it should not be forgotten that African countries want and need to develop their domestic gas markets as a priority, and that export potential depends on this domestic development. In the long term, a global energy mix would be needed to accelerate change driven by new resources, new technologies and climate commitments. These changes in the use and availability of energy resources would also affect the use of fossil fuels. Regardless of this, in addition to the LNG supply, the EU must also take care of increasing its own storage capacities to be able to guarantee a cost-efficient response to a natural gas supply bottleneck. However, LNG alone is not enough. |
| Abstract: | Seit Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine bemühen sich viele europäische Länder darum, alternative Energiequellen zu finden. Eine der Antworten bestand darin, den Import von Flüssigerdgas (LNG) zu steigern. Durch die Umgehung der Nutzung von Pipelines aus dem Osten mittels des Baus von LNG-Terminals erschloss sich die EU eine größere Vielfalt potenzieller Lieferanten. Die Europa-Afrika-Energie- und Klimapartnerschaft bietet einen Rahmen für eine Win-Win-Allianz. Afrikanische Länder werden in Zukunft zentrale Akteure sein, darunter auch Länder südlich der Sahara wie Nigeria, Senegal, Mosambik und Angola. Dem REPowerEU-Plan zufolge sollen Wasserstoffpartnerschaften in Afrika bis 2030 den Import von 10 Millionen Tonnen Wasserstoff ermöglichen und damit etwa 18 Milliarden Kubikmeter importiertes russisches Gas ersetzen. Algerien, Niger und Nigeria haben sich kürzlich auf den Bau einer 4.128 Kilometer langen Transsahara-Gaspipeline geeinigt, die durch die drei Länder nach Europa führen soll. Nach ihrer Fertigstellung wird die Pipeline 30 Milliarden Kubikmeter Gas pro Jahr transportieren. Die African Coalition for Trade and Investment (ACTING) schätzt die potenzielle LNG-Exportkapazität südlich der Sahara bis 2030 auf 134 Millionen Tonnen LNG (ca. 175 Milliarden m3). Es wird erwartet, dass Afrika südlich der Sahara bis 2050 auch zum Hauptproduzenten von grünem Wasserstoff wird Dieser Markt muss jedoch noch erschlossen werden und erfordert einen erheblichen Ausbau der erneuerbaren Produktion und der Wasserverfügbarkeit. Allerdings wären die beteiligten EU-Länder und Unternehmen gut beraten, die Verabschiedung deutlich strengerer EU-Treibhausgas-Reduktionsziele für 2030 und die Veröffentlichung der Methanstrategie der Europäischen Kommission zur Kenntnis zu nehmen. Außerdem könnte die EU riskieren, dass bis 2030 mehr als die Hälfte der europäischen LNG-Infrastruktur stillgelegt wird, da die europäische LNG-Kapazität im Jahr 2030 den gesamten prognostizierten Gasbedarf, einschließlich LNG und Pipelinegas, übersteigt. Ungeachtet dessen darf nicht vergessen werden, dass die afrikanischen Länder ihre inländischen Gasmärkte vorrangig weiterentwickeln wollen und müssen und dass das Exportpotenzial von dieser inländischen Entwicklung abhängt. Langfristig wäre ein globaler Energiemix erforderlich, um den durch neue Ressourcen, neue Technologien und Klimaverpflichtungen vorangetriebenen Wandel zu beschleunigen. Diese Veränderungen in der Nutzung und Verfügbarkeit von Energieressourcen würden sich auch auf die Nutzung fossiler Brennstoffe auswirken. Unabhängig davon muss sich die EU neben der LNG-Versorgung auch um den Ausbau ihrer eigenen Speicherkapazitäten kümmern, um eine kosteneffiziente Reaktion auf einen Erdgasversorgungsengpass gewährleisten zu können. Allerdings reicht LNG allein nicht aus, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit des Systems im Falle eines Versorgungsausfalls zu gewährleisten. Alternative Energiequellen und Energieeinsparungen bleiben von entscheidender Bedeutung. |
| Keywords: | LNG, Hydrogen economy, e-fuels, natural gas, energy security, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | E22 E23 F13 F35 F54 L71 L95 N57 Q13 Q35 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300909 |
| By: | Ana Maria Santacreu; Ashley Stewart |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on U.S. multinationals’ intangibles. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates key provisions of the TCJA—the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) and the Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (FDII)—and derive testable implications for changes in licensing and patent transfer patterns. Using data on international royalty flows and patent assignments, we test the model’s predictions. Our findings suggest that the TCJA may have impacted profit shifting strategies through intangibles, aligning with our model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | profit-shifting; intangibles; patents; taxation |
| JEL: | F12 O33 O41 O47 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:98710 |
| By: | Kohnert. Dirk |
| Abstract: | As early as 1991, Ali Mazrui argued that the Red Sea was not suitable for separating Africa from Arabia. For the two were inextricably intertwined through languages, religions (particularly Islam) and identities in both the Sahara and the Red Sea in a historical fusion of Arabism and African identity. Their separation was closely linked to a broader trend in which the white world closed ranks and created a system of global apartheid. The historical origins of the Africa-Middle East divide, i.e. the views of the Red Sea and the Sahara as racial and civilizational boundaries created by European Enlightenment ideology and early colonial expansionism were reinforced by postcolonial authoritarian regimes and Cold War rivalries, as well as by nationalist currents in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasingly viewed the Horn of Africa as their 'Western security flank'. They were united in their desire to prevent the growing influence of Turkey, Iran and Qatar in this part of the world. These Gulf rivalries formed the basis for growing economic cooperation with SSA as well as military support and security alliances, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which together have become the largest Gulf investors in Africa, compete with each other, particularly with Qatar, which has established embassies in most SSA countries. In addition, state and non-state actors from the Middle East and North Africa were closely involved in the destabilization of the Sahel in the 2010s by providing military, intelligence and ideological support to SSA states and terrorist groups. On the other hand, the Gulf States became increasingly dependent on migrant labour and the steady increase in migration from SSA to these countries, reinforced by the massive influx from African migrant-sending countries given the restrictions on African migration to Europe. As early as the seventh century AD, Arabia had relied heavily on the slave trade and the supply of labour from SSA, founded on the philosophy that it was legitimate to enslave black people because they were no better than animals. During this time, Black Africa became the largest slave depot in the Islamic world. To this day, there are significant African migrant and diaspora communities in the Middle East. Their presence has at times helped to perpetuate long-standing derogatory views and attitudes towards Africa and its peoples. These attitudes, based on an Arab-centric social hierarchy and expressing contempt for African cultures, remain prevalent today and shape social relationships between employers and African migrants in the emirates of the Arabian Peninsula. |
| Abstract: | Bereits 1991 vertrat Ali Mazrui die These, dass das Rote Meer nicht dazu geeignet sei, Afrika von Arabien zu trennen. Denn beide waren durch Sprachen, Religionen (insbesondere den Islam) und Identitäten sowohl in der Sahara als auch im Roten Meer in einer historischen Verschmelzung von Arabismus und afrikanischer Identität untrennbar miteinander verwoben. Deren Trennung sei eng verbunden mit einem allgemeineren Trend, gemäß dem die weiße Welt ihre Reihen schloss und ein System der globalen Apartheid schuf. Die historischen Ursprünge der Kluft zwischen Afrika und dem Nahen Osten, d. h. die durch die Ideologie der europäischen Aufklärung und den frühen kolonialen Expansionismus geschaffene Sicht auf das Rote Meer und die Sahara als Rassen- und Zivilisationsgrenzen, wurden durch postkoloniale autoritäre Regime und Rivalitäten im Kalten Krieg sowie durch nationalistische Strömungen in Afrika, dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika verstärkt. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate betrachteten das Horn von Afrika zunehmend als ihre "westliche Sicherheitsflanke". Sie waren sich einig in dem Wunsch, den wachsenden Einfluss der Türkei, Irans und Katars in diesem Teil der Welt zu verhindern. Diese Rivalitäten am Golf bildeten die Grundlage für die wachsende wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit SSA sowie für militärische Unterstützungs- und Sicherheitsallianzen, insbesondere am Horn von Afrika. Saudi-Arabien und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, die zusammen zu den größten Golfinvestoren in Afrika geworden sind, konkurrieren miteinander, insbesondere mit Katar, das in den meisten SSA-Ländern Botschaften eingerichtet hat. Zudem waren staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure aus dem Nahen Osten und Nordafrika in den 2010er Jahren eng an der Destabilisierung der Sahelzone beteiligt, unter anderem durch die Bereitstellung militärischer, geheimdienstlicher und ideologischer Unterstützung für SSA-Staaten und Terrorgruppen. Andererseits wurden die Golfstaaten zunehmend abhängig von Wanderarbeitskräften und der stetigen Zunahme der Migration aus SSA in diese Länder, verstärkt durch den massiven Zustrom aus afrikanischen Migranten-Entsendeländern angesichts der Einschränkungen afrikanischer Migration nach Europa. Bereits ab dem siebten Jahrhundert n. Chr. stützte sich Arabien stark auf den Sklavenhandel und die Bereitstellung von Arbeitskräften aus SSA, begründet mit der Philosophie, dass es legitim sei, schwarze Menschen zu versklaven, weil sie nicht besser als Tiere seien. In dieser Zeit wurde Schwarzafrika zum größten Sklavendepot der islamischen Welt. Bis heute gibt es im Nahen Osten bedeutende afrikanische Migranten- und Diasporagemeinschaften. Ihre Anwesenheit hat zeitweise dazu beigetragen, seit langem bestehende abwertende Ansichten und Einstellungen gegenüber Afrika und seinen Völkern aufrechtzuerhalten. Diese Einstellungen, die auf einer arabisch-zentrierten sozialen Hierarchie basieren und eine Verachtung gegenüber afrikanischen Kulturen zum Ausdruck bringen, sind bis heute vorherrschend und prägen die sozialen Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitgebern und afrikanischen Migranten in den Emiraten der Arabischen Halbinsel. |
| Keywords: | GCC, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Sub-Saharan Africa, Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Islamic terrorism |
| JEL: | D74 E26 F55 H56 N47 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300911 |
| By: | Randrianasolo-Rakotobe, Hanitra; Ceapraz, Ion Lucian |
| Abstract: | Consumers worldwide are increasingly becoming aware of social, economic, and environmental consequences of their consumption and are modifying their preferences, attitudes, and behaviors accordingly. One significant movement that has influenced consumption patterns globally is that of fair trade (Gillani et al. 2021). In this article, in examining a French case study, we demonstrate that institutional proximity is crucial for empowering relationships between consumers and producers in a fair trade framework. North- North fair trade has recently developed by applying the same principles as those of traditional North-South fair trade by reinventing not only the unbalanced relationship between consumers and producers but also by creating a space that is shared to varying degrees: institutional proximity. |
| Date: | 2024–08–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:zx5et |
| By: | Benček, David; Schneiderheinze, Claas |
| Abstract: | Comparing emigration rates of countries at different stages of economic development, an inverse u-shape emerges. Since the “migration hump” peaks at an average income of 6000 to 10 000 USD, economic progress in developing countries is often assumed to increase migration consistently. However, it is poorly understood to what extend country-level characteristics, individual incomes and other dimensions of development evoke this pattern, which limits its value for causal inference and concrete policy advice. In this paper we focus on the role of economic growth and investigate whether in developing countries emigration indeed increases with economic progress at shorter more policy-relevant time periods of up to 10 years. Using 35 years of data on migration flows to OECD destinations, we successfully reproduce the hump-shape in the cross-section. However, our more rigorous fixed effects panel estimations that exploit the variation over time robustly feature contrasting results: emigration rates fall as incomes increase. This finding holds independent of the level of income a country starts out at. In contrast to prevailing development emigration narratives, our results imply that rising individual incomes discourage emigration and hence conducive economic policies can reduce emigration. Our findings do not rule out that other slow-moving development dimensions such as educational advancement, demographic change, and structural economic transformation could still increase migration in the long term. |
| Keywords: | International migration, Economic development, Development assistance |
| JEL: | F22 F63 O15 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:301403 |
| By: | Salla Kalin; Antoine B. Levy; Mathilde Muñoz |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether and why pensioners move across borders in response to tax rate differentials. In 2013, retirees relocating to Portugal became eligible to a full tax exemption of foreign-source pensions. Contrary to the broadly held belief that seniors "age in place", we find substantial international mobility responses to the reform, concentrated among wealthy and educated pensioners in higher-tax origin countries. The implied migration elasticity of the stock of foreign pensioners to the net-of-tax rate is large (between 1.5 and 2) and increases at longer horizons. Tax-induced retirement migration clusters in space, and exhibits amplification and hysteresis patterns consistent with agglomeration through endogenous amenities. We show such forces theoretically and empirically have significant implications for optimal tax rates, and for the limited efficacy of unilateral policy responses to tax competition, like the source-based taxation of pensions. |
| JEL: | H21 H31 R12 |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32890 |
| By: | Berliant, Marcus; Tabuchi, Takatoshi |
| Abstract: | To investigate questions related to migration and trade, a model of regional or international development is created by altering Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) to include a labor market. The model is then applied to analyze poverty traps and the home market effect. We find that in the spatial economics context of migration but no trade, poverty can persist unless population in one region of many is pushed past a threshold. Then growth commences. In the context of trade but no migration, the home market effect holds for a range of parameters, similar to previous literature. However, unlike previous literature, we find that if populations in the countries are large, the home market effect can be reversed. |
| Keywords: | Monopolistic competition; Poverty trap; Home market effect; Labor market clearing |
| JEL: | F12 R11 |
| Date: | 2024–07–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121619 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | In the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a major diplomatic offensive by Israel. Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana was the first country to establish diplomatic and economic relations. Others soon followed, so that by the mid-1960s some forty African countries were receiving agricultural and military aid from Israel and benefiting from scholarships for their students. Israel's involvement was facilitated by the CIA's activities in Africa at the time, which were conceived and funded by the United States and other Western powers as their "third force" in Africa. Since then, the situation has evolved due to Africans' growing solidarity with the Palestinians and their rejection of Israel's "apartheid" system of systematic discrimination against non-Israeli populations. Israel lost the support of most SSA countries in the early 1970s because of its collaboration with apartheid South Africa. As Nelson Mandela said, "South Africa will never be free until Palestine is free". At its 12th Ordinary Session in Kampala in 1975, the OAU for the first time identified Israel's founding ideology, Zionism, as a form of racism. Nevertheless, several African countries continued to maintain low-level contacts through thirteen foreign embassies, for example in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire, while educational and commercial exchanges continued, albeit on a much reduced scale and away from the public eye. But the scourge of Islamist terrorism necessitated a revival of relations. Military and security cooperation, including cyber security, is particularly intensive with Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, Togo and South Africa, for example. It has also often served to prop up despotic African regimes. Today, sub-Saharan Africa is a lucrative market for the Israeli defence industry. |
| Abstract: | In den 1960er Jahren erlebte Afrika südlich der Sahara eine umfassende diplomatische Offensive Israels. Das Ghana Kwame Nkrumahs war das erste Land, das diplomatische und wirtschaftliche Beziehungen aufbaute. Andere Länder folgten bald, so dass Mitte der 1960er Jahre etwa vierzig afrikanische Länder Agrar- und Militärhilfe von Israel erhielten und von Stipendien für ihre Studenten profitierten. Das Engagement Israels wurde durch die damaligen Aktivitäten der CIA in Afrika gefördert, die von den Vereinigten Staaten und anderen westlichen Mächten als ihrer "dritten Kraft" in Afrika gestaltet und finanziert wurden. Seitdem hat sich die Situation aufgrund der wachsenden Solidarität der Afrikaner mit den Palästinensern und ihrer Ablehnung des israelischen "Apartheid"-Systems, d.h. der systematischen Diskriminierung nicht-israelischer Bevölkerungsgruppen, weiterentwickelt. Israel verlor Anfang der 1970er Jahre aufgrund seiner Zusammenarbeit mit dem Apartheid-Südafrika die Unterstützung der meisten SSA-Länder. Wie Nelson Mandela sagte: "Südafrika wird niemals frei sein, bis Palästina frei ist." Auf ihrer 12. ordentlichen Tagung in Kampala im Jahr 1975 bezeichnete die OAU erstmals Israels Gründungsideologie, den Zionismus, als eine Form des Rassismus. Dennoch unterhielten mehrere afrikanische Länder weiterhin Kontakte auf niedriger Ebene über dreizehn ausländische Botschaften, beispielsweise in Äthiopien, Tansania, Uganda und Zaire, während der Bildungs- und Handelsaustausch fortgesetzt wurde, wenn auch auf deutlich reduziertem Niveau und abseits der Öffentlichkeit. Doch die Geißel des islamistischen Terrorismus machte eine Wiederbelebung der Beziehungen erforderlich. Die militärische und sicherheitspolitische Zusammenarbeit, einschließlich der Cybersicherheit, ist beispielsweise mit Äthiopien, Zaire, Uganda, Ghana, Togo und Südafrika besonders intensiv. Sie diente häufig auch der Unterstützung despotischer afrikanischer Regime. Heute ist Afrika südlich der Sahara ein lukrativer Markt für die israelische Rüstungsindustrie. Kamerun, Tschad, Äquatorialguinea, Lesotho, Nigeria, Ruanda, die Seychellen, Südafrika und Uganda erhielten zwischen 2006 und 2010 Waffen aus Israel. Im Jahr 2014 gingen 40 % der israelischen Waffenexporte in afrikanische Länder. Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und dem Beginn des israelisch-arabischen Friedensprozesses nahmen die meisten afrikanischen Staaten die Beziehungen zu Israel wieder auf, nachdem Netanyahu 2009 Premierminister wurde unter dem Motto: "Israel kommt nach Afrika zurück, Afrika kommt nach Israel zurück". Israel unterhält mittlerweile Beziehungen zu 40 Staaten südlich der Sahara, von denen einige eine pro-israelischere Haltung einnehmen als zuvor. Die Stabilisierung des Horns von Afrika wurde als entscheidend angesehen, da sie in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Einwanderungsdruck stand, dem Israel seit Mitte des letzten Jahrzehnts ausgesetzt war. Auf israelischem Boden leben schätzungsweise 40.000 afrikanische Flüchtlinge, die meisten aus dem Sudan und Eritrea. Israels internationales Ansehen wurde durch seine entschlossene Politik beeinträchtigt, die Zahl der Migranten durch den Bau einer Mauer an der Grenze zu Ägypten zu begrenzen. Seit 2013 hat die Regierung im Rahmen eines Programms der "freiwilligen Ausreise" zwischen 2014 und 2017 versucht, rund 4.000 Migranten nach Ruanda und Uganda abzuschieben. Fast alle flohen wieder aus Rwanda und machten sich auf die gefährliche Reise nach Europa. |
| Keywords: | Israel, AU, Palestinians, African immigration to Israel, trafficking, racism |
| JEL: | D31 D62 D74 E26 F22 F55 H56 N47 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300913 |
| By: | Herkenhoff, Philipp; Krautheim, Sebastian; Semrau, Finn Ole; Steglich, Frauke |
| Abstract: | Locating substantial parts of the production process in developing and emerging economies, many firms face an increasing demand by stakeholders for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) along their value chains. Contractual incompleteness between firms and their suppliers at different stages of production can exacerbate the ability to meet these demands. We analyze a model of sequential production with incomplete contracts where CSR by independent suppliers differentiates the final product in the eyes of caring consumers. Progressing down the value chain, our model predicts an increasing CSR profile from upstream suppliers with low CSR to downstream suppliers with higher CSR. We confirm this prediction using Indian firm-level data – computing a firm’s value chain position by combining its product-level sales information with the World Input–Output Database. We find that more downstream firms report higher CSR expenditures as measured by a combination of staff welfare spending and social community spending. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Social Responsibility, Global value chains, Incomplete contracts, Sustainable development, Ethical sourcing, India |
| JEL: | F12 F61 F63 L23 M14 O12 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:301393 |
| By: | Jeong, Minhyeon (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kang, Boogyun (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Min, Jiyoung (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)); Kim, Wongi (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | 본 연구는 서방의 대러시아 경제제재가 장기화되는 상황에서 제재가 러시아 경제에 미치는 영향을 이론과 실증 양면에서 엄밀하게 분석하였다. 동시에 2022년 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 이후 서방의 대러시아 제재에 대응한 러시아 정부의 대내외 전략을 체계적으로 살펴보았다. 이러한 분석을 토대로 한국과 러시아의 경제협력 안정화 방안을 단기와 중장기로 나누어 도출하였다. This research analyzes the economic impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy and explores measures to stabilize economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia. Even if the war between Russia and Ukraine are resolved in any manner, it is highly likely that Western sanctions on Russia may persist in the long term, given the difficulty in resolving deep-rooted traditional conflicts between Western ideologies and Russian ideologies. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a systematic analysis of the long-term impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy. Additionally, it is crucial not to passively observe a deterioration in economic cooperation between the two countries due to the sanctions. This is because the potential for economic cooperation between the two countries has not yet been fully realized, and expectations are high for a mutually beneficial collaboration through dense future economic cooperation. Consequently, exploring measures to stabilize economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia in the face of anticipated prolonged Russian sanctions is a highly meaningful undertaking. For this purpose, this study comprehensively compares and analyzes the diverse characteristics of Western sanctions against Russia after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War with those imposed after the 2014 Crimean Peninsula crisis. While the 2014 sanctions primarily exhibited targeted and cautionary features in specific areas, the 2022 sanctions are characterized by an all-encompassing comprehensiveness and substantial punitive nature without sectoral limitations. Due to these contrasting features, the impact of the 2022 sanctions on key macroeconomic indicators of the Russian economy was profoundly severe. (the rest omitted) |
| Keywords: | Russian economy; economic impact of sanctions; economic cooperation; Russian-Ukraine war |
| Date: | 2023–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_019 |
| By: | Fajardo Baquero, Nicolás (Universidad de los Andes) |
| Abstract: | International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) have been proposed as means to encourage green technological transfers between advanced and emerging economies, thereby promoting a global energy transition. This paper presents an endogenous growth model featuring two economies: a North representing a technological leader, and a South being its follower with the possibility of copying the Northern technologies. In addition to the standard technological flows, North and South can engage in cooperative negotiations to ease green technological transfers. I find that technological transfers are able to revert the path dependency in the South. Further, unconditional agreements reducing Northern technologies’ costs can immediately induce a global energy transition if (i) the North follows a clean growth path, and if (ii) Northern technologies are advanced enough. Otherwise, to ensure a global energy transition, the agreement must be coupled with additional policies encouraging clean innovations. |
| Keywords: | Climate change; Energy transition; International technology transfer; International agreements; Directed technical change |
| JEL: | F18 O31 O41 Q54 Q55 |
| Date: | 2024–08–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:021187 |